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ABSTRACT  
This dissertation is premised on the notions of connectedness and disconnectedness as a 
contribution to the field of South African biography. I argue that Harry Gwala’s life was 
characterised by connectedness and disconnectedness and was shaped by his determination to 
remain connected while the state utilised its coercive power to disconnect him. While South 
African history has been largely written within the framework of repression and resistance, a 
study of Gwala’s life enables historians to examine twentieth century history from a different 
perspective which focuses on themes of connectedness and disconnectedness. Gwala’s rural 
background, his training as a teacher and his later involvement in trade unionism enabled him 
to develop and maintain connectedness with grassroots sentiments. In an attempt to 
disconnect Gwala from these pursuits, he was occasionally tortured and served with banning 
orders which restricted his movement and political activities. He was imprisoned on Robben 
Island between 1964 to 1972 and 1977 to 1987. While disconnected by banning orders and 
constant harassment by state security agents, Gwala continued to retain his connectedness 
through underground activities and later through his involvement in re-establishing branches 
of the African National Congress after his release from prison in 1988. This dissertation 
argues that Gwala was a product of a complex society and varied social milieux which were 
all characterised by high levels of class deprivation and exploitation. As he meandered 
through various social milieux he developed a working class political approach which 
impelled him towards mass mobilisation and opposition to the state’s oppressive notion of 
race and class. Gwala became a medium to connect various classes and political groupings 
during the liberation struggle in South Africa. This biography also makes a contribution to 
the emerging body of literature on the histories of resistance politics at local and national 
levels in South Africa.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In June 1995, Robert Haswell, a former member of the Democratic Party who had defected to 
the African National Congress (ANC), asked Harry Gwala whether he could write his 
biography ‘as it was crucial for his legacy and values to be understood by generations.’1 
Gwala ‘reluctantly’ agreed but he was soon hospitalised. While in hospital they set the date 
for an extended recorded biographical interview. However, when Haswell arrived on the set 
date carrying a tape recorder with him, Gwala opened his eyes, shook his head and said ‘I 
don’t think the world is yet ready for my story.’2  
A few days later, Gwala died. Why was Gwala reluctant to have his biography written? 
Perhaps the robust debates that he had with the leadership of both the ANC and the 
Communist Party during the 1990s could have caused a perception that the world was 
rebuffing him and not ready for his story. This dissertation locates Gwala’s biography as a 
history which enables us to understand complex relationships between the people and the 
presence of the past. Having been unable to write Gwala’s biography, Haswell opted to write 
an obituary in which he pondered whether Gwala’s ‘autobiography could have enriched our 
understanding of the liberation struggle’ and pleaded that a biography be written.3 Even 
though it has been over 20 years since this call for a biography of Gwala was made, there is 
still a dearth of academic research on Gwala’s life. It is that interest and the longing for 
Gwala’s biography that has prompted me to embark on this dissertation. Gwala’s biography 
fills a lacuna in the history of dis/connectedness in South African political history.  
                                                 
1 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Robert Haswell.  
2 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Robert Haswell.  
3 R. Haswell, ‘Obituaries: Themba Harry Gwala (1920-1995)’, Natalia: Journal of the Natal Society, Vol. 25, 1995, 90.  
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The biography of Gwala cannot be written without closing the distinction between history 
and politics. This dissertation creates modes of understanding Gwala different to the 
racialised mould that was produced by apartheid historical narratives. Gwala’s biography 
enables the possibility of a new understanding of non-racialism, militancy and political 
consciousness. The study of Gwala is a re-categorisation of history and a process of 
establishing a dialogue about the processes of identity formation and political 
disconnectedness. Furthermore, Gwala’s biography is not only a dissertation of history but an 
analysis of how the relationship between politics, trade unionism and grassroots 
intellectualism enables us to rethink the history of the liberation struggle, political militancy 
and warlordism.  
The main theoretical interest of this dissertation is a critical examination of the life of 
Thembeyakhe Harry Gwala and the extent to which he contributed to political change in 
South Africa from the 1940s until the 1990s. Thus, Gwala’s biography is a mediating agency 
to understand the germination of political ideas and liberation history in South Africa. While 
this dissertation will contribute towards the filling of a historiographical gap, it does not 
provide an all-embracing narration of Gwala’s life and does not seek to define Gwala as 
political saint or the most significant intellectual. Instead, through the approaches related to 
the production of history, the dissertation constructs a chronological narrative of Gwala’s life, 
his contribution to development of political theory and, where possible, does not conceal that 
he had his frailities, just like any other human being. Throughout this dissertation I explore 
how Gwala was shaped by material conditions of deprivation and the extent to which these 
radicalised his politics and his understanding of bringing about social and political change.  
This biography takes a form of an intellectual history, in which Gwala’s theorisation of the 
development of political systems in South Africa, his ideas, and his approaches to resistance 
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are outlined, systematised and critically evaluated. Through the life of an individual, this 
dissertation demonstrates how silences in history have created an unfinished version of the 
past which perpetuate disconnectedness and political isolationism in post-apartheid South 
Africa. The notion of connectedness and disconnectedness enables new understanding of the 
individual and social processes and of the relationship between biography and history.   
Thembeyakhe Harry Gwala, also known as Themba, was born on 20 July 1920. His parents 
Philemon Mjamane ka Mgingqika and Bella Qhikiza, nee Mkhathini, were from 
KwaSwayimane in the New Hanover district.4 The Gwala family’s religious denomination 
had been Lutheran but Philemon converted to the African Congregational Church, where he 
became a lay preacher. The ACC, previously known as the Zulu Congregational Church, had 
been established in 1896 in the Mkhambathini area, closer to Swayimane, by Simungu 
Shibe.5 Perhaps, Philemon was attracted by Shibe’s stance towards political formations such 
as Funamalungelo and his assertiveness on the issue of African rights.  
Gwala was born into a Natal that had undergone geopolitical transition and resistance in April 
1906 which turned into a rebellion with the uprising of the Zondi chief, Bhambatha ka 
Mancinza.6 Chief Swayimana, a loyalist, had sided with the Natal government during the 
rebellion.7 However, by the mid-1920s, he had lost his status as the ‘best chief in Natal’ as he 
was at loggerheads with white commercial farmers who kept on extending their farms into his 
                                                 
4 The Mkhathini and Gwala clans are the earliest to have settled in the area during the 19th century. Up until recently, they 
owned large portions of land and wattle plantations in Swayimane, see National Archives Repository (NAR), URU, 
136/14/376/73, visit of chief Swayimana of Natal to Witwatersrand, correspondence from the Secretary of Native Affairs to 
the Director of Native Labour, 10 August 1932. The New Hanover magisterial district forms part of the Mshwathi Local 
Municipality, in the south eastern part of the uMgungundlovu District Municipality (greater Pietermaritzburg area).  
5 H. Hughes, First President: A Life of John L. Dube, founding president of the ANC (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2011), 100-101. 
6 J. Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995).  
7 M. R. Mahoney, ‘Racial Formation and Ethnogenesis from Below: The Zulu Case, 1879-1906’, International Journal of 
African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, 576. 
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land.8 As large portions of fertile land, wattle and timber plantations that previously belonged 
to local black farmers were forcibly taken, Chief Swayimana was agitated and became 
embroiled in a bitter struggle with white farmers over land ownership. Drawing from oral 
sources, Mlindeli Gcumisa argues that after the fallout with the Natal government over 
boundaries, a plot was orchestrated with a dentist in New Hanover to remove all the chief’s 
teeth without anaesthesia.9 As result of this procedure, Swayimana bled for weeks and 
eventually died. 
The great depression of 1929 had a devastating impact on the price of wattle which had been 
a source of income for many families in Swayimane area.10 Philemon, although having been a 
prosperous peasant compared to other Africans in the area, lost his fortune, resulting in Bella 
having to find employment in New Hanover as a domestic worker.11 Gwala remembered how 
his family had, for the first time, little food and was affected by hunger and poverty like 
many other African families. As a boy Gwala emphasised that his ‘grandmother used to get 
up before dawn together with other women of the area to do what was commonly known as 
togt labour at the neighbouring white farms and paid about 9 cents a day.’12 Gwala recalled 
how his ‘grandmother used to return from work at dark into the cold and there was frost, so 
she used to wear on her feet old rags to protect them from frost.’13 Such conditions would 
                                                 
8 For a detailed discussion on the role of Chief Swayimana, see J. Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in 
the Zulu Rebellion (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005); NAR, DNL, 136/14/376(71), 
correspondence from the Chief Native Commissioner in Natal, 27 April 1923. 
9 M. S. S. Gcumisa, Awuwelwa Umngeni (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1995). 
10 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. I am grateful to Professor Thomas Karis for providing me with a copy of this 
interview ahead of its use in the broader ongoing Karis and Carter projects. Even though Professor Thomas Karis recorded 
that the interview was held in Durban, after listening to it, I have realised that the interview was in fact conducted at Gwala’s 
home in Dambuza, Pietermaritzburg; Tony Karon interview with Harry Gwala.   
11 Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (PAR), Regional Supreme Court, Natal (RSC), box 1/1/1011, vol. 39, cc 108/76, 
State v Themba H. Gwala and 9 others: mitigating statement by Themba H. Gwala, 5253; Alan Paton Centre and Struggle 
Archives (APC), PC76/1/1/1, ‘Harry Gwala obituary by the Pietermaritzburg regional office of the SACP’, Harry Gwala 
Collection.  
12 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
13 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
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later have an indelible impact on his theorisation of South African politics which linked the 
liberation struggle and trade unionism.  
During the 1920s, there were no schools in KwaSwayimane area. The only schools available 
to Africans in the New Hanover Magisterial district were provided by missionaries, located 
20 kilometres from Gwala’s home. It is for this reason that Gwala attended a Presbyterian 
Mission School in Mpolweni (near New Hanover) until standard seven (grade 9).14 Gwala 
had intended to pursue further studies as he wanted to become a medical doctor, but 
economic circumstances forced him to leave high school, especially after his father died. 
Nevertheless, in 1940 he enrolled at the Adams College to complete his secondary education 
and train as a teacher. It was at Adams College where Gwala’s life began to take a different 
course which shaped the rest of his life. Gwala passed away on 20 June 1995 at the age of 75 
years, bringing to an end a career of political activism and broad-based mass political 
engagement in the Natal Midlands.  
This dissertation covers 53 years of the life of a formidable political activist and trade union 
leader. It has six chapters. Chapter One explores theoretical approaches that underpin the 
production of biographies in post-apartheid South Africa. It further explains how 
connectedness and disconnectedness have been used as a lens through which historical 
moments in Gwala’s life are seen.  
Chapter Two examines the politicisation of Gwala by looking at the political environment 
that shaped his life during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. During this era, Gwala concerned 
himself with trade unionism, resuscitating the then moribund Congress Youth League in 
                                                 
14 APC, PC76/1/1/1-2, Ruth Lundie notes after the interview with Harry Gwala, 10 March 1995. 
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Natal. Lastly, the chapter examines Gwala involvement in trade union activities in Howick 
and his broader engagement in national and local politics.  
Chapter Three examines the complex interplay between Gwala and the local state, and the 
control of African leisure time during the 1920s to 1950s. It focuses on how Gwala, mindful 
of changing urban identities, used football as a tool of political mobilisation in 
Pietermaritzburg. Gwala’s involvement in football led to animosity between him and the 
Pietermaritzburg Council which opted to support a collaborative football association.  
Chapter Four covers the trials on Gwala by the state in 1961, 1964 and 1976. It examines 
how the state used the courts as sites of exclusion. This chapter argues that it was the 
treatment by the state, including torture in detention, that resulted in a radical shift in Gwala. 
This chapter documents the role of Natal in the early years of Umkhonto we Sizwe. The 
chapter further examines these trials and how they were used as a tool to disconnect Gwala 
from liberation politics. 
The role of Gwala in and his contribution to the development of sport and political education 
at Robben Island has not been researched in a nuanced way. Chapter Five examines these 
issues as part of Gwala’s life in prison during the two terms he served, 1964-1972 and 1977-
1987. The chapter further examines how his wife, Elda, and the children, forged ties with 
broader social and political forces in order to survive in the absence of Gwala and how they 
kept his memory alive while he was in prison.  
By the mid-1980s the region of Natal and KwaZulu was characterised by violence. After his 
release from prison in 1988, Gwala featured prominently in the unfolding of violence. 
Chapter Six examines Gwala’s theorisation of violence and how he participated in the 
political transformation in Natal and KwaZulu, and South Africa as a whole. It further 
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examines Gwala’s interaction with key political role players in the region and contextualises 
political choices he made during the 1990s.  
This dissertation examines Gwala within a hybrid framework of political history and 
biography in South Africa between 1920 and 1995. While it is biographical with a primary 
focus on reconstructing Gwala’s life, this study places him within historical and political 
developments in Pietermaritzburg and Natal during the 20th century. Overall, this dissertation 
argues that Harry Gwala’s life and politics epitomised complex relations of connectedness, 
through his political involvement in the Communist Party, African National Congress and 
trade unions, and disconnectedness as the state, and later the leadership of the liberation 
movements, sought to exclude him from the political mainstream.  Gwala’s life history was 
one in which he sought to connect liberatory politics and working class struggles, and to 
maintain his connection with grassroots struggles of the people. This he tried to do in the face 
of the adversity of repression. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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CHAPTER ONE  
Connectedness, disconnectedness and Harry Gwala’s biography in South 
African historiography 
Introduction 
In August 2015, the eThekwini Municipality’s Parks, Recreation and Culture unit announced 
that it was planning to host the Harry Gwala Memorial Lecture on 2 September of the same 
year. In reaction to the announcement, Zwakele Mncwango, leader of the Democratic 
Alliance, an official opposition party in the city council, questioned the proposed 
commemoration of Gwala. Mncwango questioned whether Gwala should be honoured in this 
way, and suggested that ‘the municipality was just looking for an excuse to spend money.’1 
With support from other opposition parties, Mncwango went on to argue that ‘Gwala was 
nobody in Durban, and he was a divisive figure responsible for much bloodshed in the 
Pietermaritzburg area.’2 He emphasised that:  
Gwala was hardly someone you can regard as a struggle hero because of 
his role in the killing of innocent people, he killed many IFP supporters in 
Pietermaritzburg. Now such a person can’t be regarded as a hero of the 
struggle. Struggle heroes are those who fought against the apartheid 
regime. He was fighting his own people, he is not one we should 
celebrate.3  
Mncwango’s scathing questioning of Gwala’s struggle credentials was part of a broad set of 
dogmatic attitudes towards Gwala that have failed to recognise the contribution he made to 
the political transformation of Natal and KwaZulu during the twentieth century. The primary 
aim of this chapter is to set the scene for connectedness and disconnectedness as 
terminologies of history and how the production of Gwala’s life story is understood in this 
dissertation. The chapter also explores how the main body of biographical knowledge about 
                                                 
1 Sihle Manda, ‘Council squabble over Gwala splurge’, The Mercury, 28 August 2015.  
2 Sihle Manda, ‘Council squabble over Gwala splurge’, The Mercury, 28 August 2015. 
3 Sihle Manda, ‘Council squabble over Gwala splurge’, The Mercury, 28 August 2015. 
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Gwala generally has failed to locate his life in historical context, and has perpetuated 
historical misunderstandings about his role in history. Such has resulted to a biographical 
distortion that has failed to tell Gwala’s story in its historical totality, with appropriate regard 
for continuity and chronology.4 This chapter theorises the production of biographies in post-
apartheid South Africa, and provides a critique of the use of documents of repression as texts 
and sources in the process of writing South African history and biographies. The authority of 
documents of this nature is tainted by the repressive purposes they were written to serve. 
Connectedness, disconnectedness and Gwala’s biography 
Biographies of key persons tend to put such individuals into a central place in the narrative, 
with events and their chronology revolving around these individuals.5 The discursive and 
distributive approaches have emerged as a critique of frameworks that project the individual 
as a self-sustaining and all-knowing figure who occupies the centre as the producer of all 
historicity in the biographical narrative in question.6 These approaches provide a decentring 
theory that focuses on the question of identification rather than the subject of identity. They 
seek to locate biographical production within a physical, economic, ecological and socio-
political context, and acknowledge the interrelationship between the individual and the 
contexts within which he or she operated.7  
According to these critiques, conventional biographies tend to be stories of individuals pulled 
out of their collective cultures, with the individual under discussion becoming the unit of 
analysis. In such an analysis, the collective capacity to bring about social change is collapsed 
                                                 
4 C. Rassool, ‘Rethinking Documentary History and South African Political Biography’, South African Review of Sociology, 
Vol. 41, No. 1, 2010, 28-49. 
5 See S. Pile and M. Keith (eds.), Geographies of Resistance (London: Routledge, 1997). 
6 S. Hall, ‘Introduction: Who Needs Identity?’ in S. Hall and P. du Gay, (eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity (London: Sage, 
1996), 1-2; C. Rassool, ‘The Individual, Auto/biography and History in South Africa’, PhD dissertation, University of the 
Western Cape, 2004, 12. See also P. Bourdieu, ‘The Biographical Illusion’, Working Papers and Proceedings of the Centre 
for Social Studies, No. 14, 1987 (Chicago Center for Psychosocial Studies). 
7 Hall, ‘Who Needs Identity’, 4. 
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into the will of the individual concerned. This dissertation deliberately avoids exploring 
Gwala as a person operating in isolation. Rather, it examines how Gwala’s interaction with 
politics and with other individuals reproduced a complex set of identities. Gwala was a 
product of a specific set of political circumstances and his contribution to transforming those 
circumstances was shaped by a complex combination of factors.  
The discursive and distributive approaches enable us to understand how, despite the hostile 
political environment in which he found himself, Gwala was able to create spaces for action 
and how he took advantage of the social, economic and political systems to advance social 
change. As Neil Salkind suggests, individuals often possess foresight about the consequences 
of their behaviour, and are able to use these capabilities within the demands of their context.8 
It was these abilities that enabled Gwala to turn imprisonment at Robben Island into a site of 
political struggle. Through the exploration of the relationships between individual and the 
environment, the discursive and distributive approach sees an individual, in the instance 
Harry Gwala, as a representation of the social and historical circumstances of the community, 
as well as an era.9  
This biography of Gwala seeks to provide an example of a different way to write life history. 
It aims to bring recognition of the importance of connectedness and disconnectedness as a 
lens through which to see histories, and to embed this approach in the production of 
biography. The application of these terms together indicates their intrinsic relationship and 
predicts their dependency and application in an interchangeable manner.10 These terms help 
to describe the complexities of Gwala’s relationship with the political processes of liberation 
                                                 
8 N. J. Salkind, An Introduction to Theories of Human Development (London and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004), 210. 
9 S. Clingman, ‘Biography and Representation: Some Analogies from Fiction’, unpublished paper presented at the History 
Workshop Conference, University of Witwatersrand, February 1987, 6. 
10 For detailed discussion of biography and history, see B. Caine, Biography and History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 69. 
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organisations and trade unions, as well as with the state and its security enforcement 
agencies. As Gwala developed his political manoeuvrability, connectedness and 
disconnectedness became embedded into his identity. It has become impossible to determine 
whether the state or other political agent was responsible for Gwala’s connectedness or 
disconnectedness at a given time.11 Connectedness and disconnectedness are inherently 
subjective terminologies. Their application in this dissertation can therefore never be said to 
be based on objective analysis of the political scenario at a given time. 
Gwala’s politics of connectedness judged politics and political activism as the responsibility 
of certain individuals as well as the responsibility of the collective.12 Thus, those in 
leadership assumed that they were responsible for representing group interests, which could 
only be reflected in practice with mandates, ongoing communication, and the renewal of 
mandates whenever this was necessary. Connectedness repudiates the notion of the ‘the great 
man or woman’ in history. It puts forward society, collective leadership and class as key 
features of identity formation. Gwala based his politics on the belief that resistance against 
the white minority government required various political forces and classes to converge in 
order to establish a non-racial and democratic country. However, Gwala’s connectedness did 
not deny the need for the political heterogeneity of ways of responding to oppression.13 
Gwala’s life displayed a complex approach to politics as he could relate well with the masses 
as well as with senior leadership of both the ANC and Communist Party, and a wider network 
of trade unions. Gwala represented the early group of Communist Party members of the 
1940s who joined the ANC and became channels for connection between the two 
organisations. Furthermore, given the working class background of the rank and file members 
                                                 
11 For a detailed discussion of connectedness, see F. Moten, In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition 
(Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota, 2003).  
12 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Robert Haswell. 
13 South African History Archives (SAHA), AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter 
from T. H. Gwala to The Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, 20 December 1989. 
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of the ANC, Gwala was able to connect with them through his trade union activities. Between 
1948 and 1952 he was the secretary of ten trade unions in Durban, Pietermaritzburg and 
Howick. He was also involved in the administration of football, and was active in the Natal 
Congress Youth League (CYL). Gwala’s life was characterised by a deep thread of 
connectedness, an entanglement with historical and political moments of the kind that later 
characterised collective resistance and post-liberation politics in South Africa.  
This entanglement and these relationships involved proactive ways of interacting with the 
masses that were rooted in grassroots politics. Susan Magarey has argued that political 
biographies represent selective aspects of a person’s life. The use of connectedness enables us 
to get a broader insight into Gwala’s life and his political choices.14 Connectedness is the tool 
that enables readers to understand how politics, trade unionism and the individual have been 
integral to the production of Gwala’s biography. In addition to providing insights into 
Gwala’s life and political choices, connectedness provides a link through which insight can 
be gained into the broader political context in which he lived his life and made those choices.   
Connectedness goes further than chronological narratives and enables us to identify a 
historical thematic approach which provides a lens through which to view history and the 
production of biography. The use of connectedness in the production of Gwala’s biography in 
this dissertation does not equate to any notion of historical homogeneity. Rather, it compares 
different, complex histories of Gwala and how these took different forms over a period of 
decades.15 The complexity of Gwala’s position as an exempted native and educated member 
of the kholwa elite did not cause him to isolate himself. Instead, he was motivated by a sense 
                                                 
14 S. Magarey, ‘Three Questions for Biographers: Public or Private? Individual or Society? Truth or Beauty?’, Journal of 
Historical Biography, Vol. 4, Autumn 2008, 3-15. 
15 See G. Minkley, ‘‘A Fragile Inheritor’: The Post-Apartheid Memorial Complex: AC Jordan and the Re-imagining of 
Cultural Heritage in the Eastern Cape’, Kronos, Vol. 34, No. 1, November 2008; C. van Onselen, ‘Peasants Speak-The 
Reconstruction of a Rural Life from Oral Testimony: Critical Notes on the Methodology Employed in the Study of a Black 
South African Sharecropper’, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.20, No.3, 1993. 
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of class consciousness and the need to address the political apathy of the majority of the 
oppressed which became his life’s work.16 Gwala’s working-class based intellectual identity 
was shaped by his rural background, exposure to extreme levels of poverty, and the 
exploitation of workers in Pietermaritzburg. His background of experiencing the political 
teachings of Dr Edgar Brooks at Adams College, and witnessing the deplorable conditions of 
poverty in Edendale became motivating factors for his politicisation and connectedness. 
Throughout his life Gwala was a connector between disjointed sectors and resistance 
organisations in South Africa. From being active from the 1940s in the struggles of trade 
unions and the resuscitation of the Natal Congress Youth League, and later in mass 
campaigns, political education and sport on Robben Island as well as the re-launching the 
ANC after 1990, a central theme of Gwala’s life was building connectedness and attempting 
to re-order society along the lines of political co-operation.  
Gwala’s politics of connectedness often clashed with the disconnectedness of being isolated, 
rebuffed and imprisoned by the state. During the late 1940s, the state declared him persona 
non grata. There is no doubt that the imposition of disconnectedness inflicted a sense of 
vulnerability, immobility and marginalisation on him. Due to the complex nature of a 
liberation politics characterised by personal differences, factionalism and conflicting 
perspectives about the race question, disconnectedness was not a linear phenomenon. In 
certain instances, Gwala also became the victim of disconnectedness imposed from within the 
liberation organisations themselves.  
                                                 
16 S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, Nationalism, and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986); P. la Hausse de Lalouviere, Restless Identities: Signatures of Nationalism, Zulu 
Ethnicity and History in the Lives of Petros Lamula (c.1881-1948) and Lymon Maling (1889 –1936) (Pietermaritzburg: 
University of Natal Press, 2000); H. Mokoena, Magema Fuze: The Making of Kholwa Intellectual (Pietermaritzburg: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2011). 
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Disconnectedness imposed on him by the state took the form of a kind of political castration 
that sought to leave Gwala in an impotent and ineffectual state of being.17 Due to the high 
levels of desperation to isolate Gwala, the state often extended its efforts to disconnect him 
through subjecting members of his close family (mainly his wife and Lulu, his elder 
daughter) to monitoring by the Security Branch, and to detention at times. Fred Moten argues 
that disconnectedness desires to destabilise the originality and the rearrangement of 
citizenship.18 The state’s imposition of disconnectedness became a tool to criminalise 
Gwala’s identity and to disrupt his political agency. In spite of these attempts, Gwala was 
able to act on sites of disconnectedness and convert them into zones of connection and 
affiliation. It was his ability to fuse pragmatism with an understanding of the theory of the 
resistance that enabled Gwala to withstand the state’s efforts to disconnect him. Thus, 
connectedness and disconnectedness, as a framework, enables us to locate Gwala’s biography 
as an expression of a range of efforts of mobilisation and subordinated subjectivities that have 
characterised political history during the twentieth century.  
Biography and history in post-apartheid South Africa 
Up until recently, many South African political biographies have focused largely on 
‘presidentialism’ and the link between individual and national histories. Thus, post-apartheid 
biographical production has been characterised by narratives that hero-worship individuals, 
effectively transforming popular reverence into biographical records. These narratives omit 
key aspects of history that characterised the course of the liberation struggle, especially in 
Natal where the ANC waged a low-intensity war with Inkatha. This set of events has been 
less documented by historians and is seldom reflected in biographies. In this dissertation, 
Gwala’s biography is located within broader debates about history in post-apartheid South 
                                                 
17 Moten, In the Break, 4. 
18 Moten, In the Break, 5. 
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Africa and how liberation history has been documented. Premesh Lalu has argued that the 
‘appropriation of history to re-envision the nation and identity tends to emphasise rather than 
displace the disciplinary reason that was the very modus operandi of apartheid.’19 Ciraj 
Rassool has argued that biography has played a pivotal role in the production of history in the 
post-apartheid era. He points out that the ‘conception of politics and resistance has remained 
characterised by a focus on organised bodies, led by great men whose leadership has largely 
been taken as given.’20 Nevertheless, while Gwala shaped the nature of political discourse in 
South Africa and played a pivotal role in shaping political education on Robben Island, he is 
only anecdotally mentioned in Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom and the memoirs of other 
political peers. The general absence of Gwala in scholarly literature could be attributed to the 
complex nature of his politics and his hard-line stance towards the leadership of both the 
ANC and Communist Party on Robben Island and during the 1990s.21  
The scant attention given to Gwala in scholarly writing is partly a result of the tendency of 
South African historians to overlook the history of Pietermaritzburg and focus on the 
histories of the major cosmopolitan cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, 
East London and Durban. The historiography of Natal and KwaZulu focuses largely on the 
social history of Durban and the pre-colonial and colonial history of Zululand. This skewed 
focus has left the social history of the Natal Midlands and its contribution to historical 
developments in South Africa relatively neglected. A few scholars have contributed to a 
limited historiography that focuses in Pietermaritzburg. Amongst the issues covered in this 
work are the role of Pietermaritzburg as an economic hub, centre of education, aspects of 
sport, as well as mass mobilisation and violence from the second half of the twentieth 
                                                 
19 P. Lalu, The Death of Hintsa: Post-Apartheid South Africa and the Shape of Recurring Past (Cape Town: Human Sciences 
Research Council, 2009), 8.  
20 Rassool, ‘Rethinking Documentary History’, 29.  
21 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Robert Haswell. 
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century. In addition, the Pietermaritzburg historiography has not devoted much attention to 
biographies of people from the area, as well as the contribution that Pietermaritzburg and the 
Natal Midlands made to national struggles.22  
This dissertation seeks, in part, to add to this limited historical scholarship on 
Pietermaritzburg. It further seeks to dispel the currently held historical illusion which projects 
Pietermaritzburg as a hub of political violence and which overlooks the contribution of 
Pietermaritzburg activists to shaping regional and national discourses. This is in no way 
intended to deny the large-scale violence that took place in Pietermaritzburg and Natal 
Midlands, as extensively recorded by Anthea Jeffrey and John Aitchison.23 The intention is to 
argue that violence was not the only characteristic, or even the dominant characteristic, of the 
politics of the Natal Midlands. Many other significant historical events took place in this area, 
and this dissertation seeks, in part, to record those events through telling Gwala’s life story. 
Gwala’s biography is used here, in part, to ‘document a history of a particular era.’24 
A substantial body of work on auto/biographies has grown exponentially in South Africa in 
the past 20 years. These biographies are largely marked by certain key features. Work by 
                                                 
22 For some of this work see, S. M. Mkhize, ‘Mass Mobilisation and Resistance: A Study of Selected Stay-aways and Protest 
Marches in Pietermaritzburg, 1985-1989’, BA Hons thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1995; J. Aitchison, 
‘Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal Midlands, 1987-1989’, MA thesis, 
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1993; N. Gwala, ‘Inkatha, Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in 
Pietermaritzburg’, paper presented at the Workshop on Regionalism and Restructuring in Natal, University of Natal, Durban, 
28-31 January 1988; M. Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David Philip, 
1990); J. Laband and R. Haswell (eds.), Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: 
Shuter and Shooter, 1988); G. A. Dominy, ‘The Imperial Garrison in Natal with Special Reference to Fort Napier, 1843-
1914: Its Social, Cultural and Economic Impact’, PhD dissertation, University of London, 1995; R. Gordon, The Place of the 
Elephant: A History of Pietermaritzburg (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1981); H. L. Peel, ‘Sobantu Village: An 
Administrative History of a Pietermaritzburg Township’, 1924-1929, BA Hons thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 
1987; D. Bonnin, ‘Class Consciousness and Conflict in the Natal Midlands, 1940-1987: The Case of the BTR Sarmcol 
Workers’, M Soc Sc thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1987; S. M. Mkhize, ‘Contexts, Resistance Crowds and Mass 
Mobilisation: A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Apartheid Politics in Pietermaritzburg during the 1950s and the 1980s’, MA 
thesis, University of Natal, 1998; and N. N. Bhebhe, ‘Mobilization, Conflict and Repression: The United Democratic Front 
and Political Struggles in the Pietermaritzburg Region, 1983-1991’, MA thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1996. 
23 A. J. Jeffrey, The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997); 
J. Aitchison, Death from Political Violence in Natal Midlands, 1980-1992 (Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult Education, 
University of Natal, 1993). 
24 This is what Callinicos observed in relation to Tambo’s biography, see L. Callinicos, Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli 
Mountains (Cape Town: David Philip, 2004), 15. 
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Ciraj Rassool, Jonathan Hyslop and Colin Bundy has summarised some of the main debates 
and challenges of biography and history in South Africa. Rassool’s critique is that ‘South 
African biography has been substantially been driven by documentary approaches to archives 
as well as historical narration.’25 He suggests that biography should transcend an approach 
‘that relies on conventional distinctions and hierarchies between history and sources, as well 
as history and heritage.’ Rassool argues that South African biography constructs national 
histories in which leaders become agencies to narrate a ‘national history’ of persons and 
institutions, and that these tend to be formalist and teleological.26 Hyslop concurs with 
Rassool by saying that South African political biography has been teleological and hero-
worshipping. However, he argues against the notion that biographies of key figures in history 
are not valuable. Instead, he believes that ‘strategically placed individuals can, in certain rare 
circumstances, have a decisive impact on the direction of historical developments.’27  
Bundy holds similar views to Rassool and Hyslop, but says biography has the potential to 
‘omit’ certain aspects of history.28 Gwala can be characterised as a complex mixture of a 
great leader who remained rooted within the masses, who was also seen by his supporters as 
an ordinary person. This dissertation expands on Rassool’s argument that biography should 
not be formal and teleological. Here I want to suggest that biography should interpret the 
connectedness between human lives and historical events by considering how the subject 
reacted to such events rather than provide a chronological narrative of historical events. It is 
this connectedness between history and human reactions that a biographer should carefully 
study when writing a political biography.  
                                                 
25 Rassool, ‘Rethinking Documentary History’, 29; also see Rassool, ‘The Individual, Auto/biography and History’. 
26 Rassool, ‘Rethinking Documentary History’, 29. 
27 J. Hyslop, ‘On Biography: A Response to Ciraj Rassool’, South African Review of Sociology, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2010, 109. 
28 C. Bundy, Govan Mbeki: A Jacana Pocket Biography (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2012), 148 and 154. 
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Secondly, the proliferation of presidentialism in the production of the post-apartheid 
biography ignores the value of local particularism and grassroots intellectualism. Much of 
these presidential biographies focus on the histories of great men and women who played a 
pivotal role in the liberation struggle in South Africa.29  They tend to oversimplify the 
liberation struggle by focusing on the role of individuals as sole players and a narrow partisan 
perspective which systematically overlooks the contribution of broader organisational 
movements and the political complexities that underpin the twentieth century’s history of 
repression and resistance. In the process of concentrating on presidents, they overlook the 
role of the masses and local struggles. This approach could lead to historical distortions 
because the liberation struggle was a mass-based project in which the broader South African 
underclasses were active participants.30  
Thirdly, post-1994 biographies have become a powerful tool to record previously neglected 
voices in South Africa. The increase of biographical writings is part of a wide movement to 
reclaim histories of the underclasses and to present them as an integral part of the nation’s 
identity. This has resulted to the increased production of ‘heroic biographies’ both in the 
sphere of popular history as well as in the academy. Biography has been utilised as the 
‘historical reconstruction’ of lives of individuals from a variety of sources, and is also 
perceived as emancipatory.31 Thembeka Orie reminds us that biography enables us to see 
within a historical instance how individuals used the cultural, material and political resources 
                                                 
29 N. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (London: Little Brown, 1994); B. Pogrund, 
How Can a Man Die Better?:The Life of Robert Sobukwe (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997); E. Sisulu, Walter and 
Albertina Sisulu: In Our Lifetime (Cape Town: David Philip, 2002); R. van Diemel, In Search of “Freedom, Fair Play and 
Justice”: Josiah Tshangana Gumede, 1867-1947: A Biography (Cape Town: Raymond van Diemel, 2001); Callinicos, 
Oliver Tambo; M. Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki: A Dream Deferred (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2007); S. Couper, Albert 
Luthuli: Bound by Faith (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010). 
30 Marks and Trapido provide a clearer perspective on the relationship between class and liberation politics, for more 
information, see S. Marks and S. Trapido, The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa 
(London: Longman, 1987); P. Maylam and I. Edwards (eds.), The People’s City: African Life in Twentieth Century Durban 
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1996).  
31 E. Brizuela-Garcia, ‘The Past Never Stays Behind: Biographical Narrative and African Colonial History’, Journal of 
Historical Biography, Vol. 2, 2007, 65.  
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at their disposal to shape their own lives and circumstances.32 This dissertation covers the life 
of a person and an era characterised by much political and economic turbulence.  
Fourthly, published biographies of Oliver Tambo, Govan Mbeki, Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma, 
John Dube and Kgalema Motlanthe have become powerful political tools in the political 
domain. However, these have tended to be ceremonial and commemorative in nature. Luli 
Callinicos’s biography of Oliver Tambo and Mark Gevisser’s biography of Thabo Mbeki 
offer examples of how a political biography may be manipulated to serve a political objective 
of a political entity.33 Callinicos unearthed the life and a legacy of a charismatic leader of the 
ANC using a variety of sources including oral interviews and private papers. Published in 
2004, Tambo’s biography became a tool to celebrate the ten years of  South Africa’s 
democratic government and became part of the monumentalisation of his life that served as 
means to galvanise mass-based support for the ANC during the 2004 general elections. 
Due to the fact that Tambo’s political life was largely spent in exile than he did in South 
Africa, the Callinicos biography was intended to connect him with the history of ordinary 
South Africans. Gevisser’s biography of Thabo Mbeki offers a different perspective with 
which to understand political biographies. The biography was published a month before the 
ANC’s national elective conference in Polokwane where Mbeki was contesting to retain the 
presidency of the ANC, a contest which he lost to Jacob Zuma. The biography was used 
unsuccessfully by the Mbeki camp as a tool to legitimise his candidacy.  
                                                 
32 T. Orie, ‘Raymond Mhlaba and the Genesis of the Congress Alliance: A Political Biography’, MA thesis, University of 
Cape Town, 1993, 3; T. Vammen, ‘Forum: Modern English Auto/Biography and Gender’, Gender and History, Vol. 2, No. 
1, 17, 1990; C. N. Parke, Biography: Writing Lives (New York: Routledge, 2002); E. Homberger and J. Charmley (eds.), The 
Troubled Face of Biography (London: Macmillan, 1988). 
33 Callinicos, Oliver Tambo; H. Hughes, First President: A Life of John L Dube, Founding President of the ANC 
(Johannesburg: Jacana, 2011); Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki; J. Gordin, Zuma: A Biography (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2008); 
E. Harvey, Kgalema Motlanthe: A Political Biography (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2012).  
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Another characteristic of post-apartheid biographies is that many have largely been produced 
by journalists rather than academics. The biographies of Jacob Zuma and Kgalema Motlanthe 
by Jeremy Gordin and Ebrahim Harvey respectively offer very little historical analysis. 
Rather, they offer a journalistic approach to understanding individual subjects without 
locating them in a historical context. These studies appear to be populist and lack in-depth 
historical analysis. In the writing of Gwala’s biography, I try to provide a fresh analysis of the 
relationship between class, political mobilisation and the individual. Through this approach I 
emphasise that political biographies are about more than a single prominent individual. They 
are about interactions, parallels and histories of various political groupings and classes. As a 
result, the connected and disconnected histories of these groupings and classes have also been 
written in this story of Gwala’s life and his historical and political significance. 
This critical political biography of Gwala takes into consideration multifaceted factors and 
reads sources against the grain. Gwala’s biography presents an opportunity to unpack 
biographical complexities that overcome narrow partisan perspectives and highlight the 
various political viewpoints that he held in his life. This dissertation contributes largely to a 
resistance and liberation project which informs a closer examination of Gwala in trade union 
and working class struggles, and political struggles between the 1950s and the 1990s. In 
many biographies that have been published since the democratic era, Gwala’s name is 
mentioned, but only anecdotally. The dissertation contends that the anecdotal attention that 
Gwala has received in other writings does not do justice to the contribution he made to the 
transformation of the South African political landscape. Until now, he has been an obscure 
character in the annals of South African history.  
Arthur Marwick reminds us that biography has ‘clearly been invaluable in filling serious gaps 
in historical knowledge’ and has emerged as a popular historical tool to record histories of 
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previously marginalised groups.34 Historians and other social scientists have contested 
whether biography should be reconstructionist or re-inventionist in its approach.35 Recent 
debates between Ciraj Rassool and Jonathan Hyslop have played a vital role in sharpening the 
theory of biographical writings in South Africa. The works of these academics and that of 
David William Cohen have sharpened my approach to writing a political biography of 
Gwala.36 The process of writing Gwala’s biography has been more than ‘a recitation of facts 
related to the life of an individual’ because it rests on a critical analysis of sources and seeks 
to properly contextualise the choices that Gwala made at various points in his life.37  
Because Gwala lived in a complex society, it goes without saying that any attempt at a 
biographical study should be analytical rather than descriptive. For this reason, I have 
adopted a ‘critical biography’ approach. This dissertation seeks to explore the life of an 
individual who has been invisible and disappeared from South African historiography. This is 
the case, notwithstanding the fact that he is recognised by his political peers as one of the 
most influential leaders in political movements and trade unions in Pietermaritzburg, and on 
Robben Island during the second half of the twentieth century. As Ebrahim Harvey has 
correctly argued, ‘political biographies are often rough territories’ and require a biographer to 
have an ability to mediate between presumption of omniscience and impartiality.38 This 
dissertation critically examines Gwala’s strengths and weaknesses in the complex interplay of 
personal, cultural, organisational, political and wider societal factors that framed him.  
                                                 
34 A. Marwick, The Nature of History (London: Macmillan, 1989), 138.  
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The Making of Silences and Commemorations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).  
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William Beinart has also argued that ‘a chronicle of one man’s life cannot explain or capture 
the totality of social change, nor can ideology and consciousness be reduced to one man’s 
ideas.’39 However, an exploration of an individual’s life and experience enables historians to 
better understand broader patterns of social change and the political environment of the time. 
Gwala’s biography requires that such concepts as connectedness, disconnectedness, working 
class identities, popular resistance and political conflict should be critically examined to 
determine their ability to assist historians to appreciate the history and historiography of the 
South African liberation struggle more fully.  
Documents of repression and Gwala’s biography 
Documentary approaches to the production of resistance history in South Africa have 
proliferated, especially after the publication of the six-volume series From Protest to 
Challenge.40 These volumes collected and presented documentary evidence of a history of 
South Africa struggles, including court documents and oral interviews. In 1983, Tom Lodge 
published a nuanced documentary history of African resistance since 1945.41 These studies 
have presented a ‘case for political biography as a valid arena for academic research and an 
essential component of scholarly work on South African resistance history.’42  
The period up to the 1950s is not well recorded because neither the ANC nor the Communist 
Party had good administrative systems. Furthermore, they deliberately did not keep proper 
records for fear of infiltration by state security agencies. This has led to a tendency in 
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histories and biographies to rely on newspapers articles, oral interviews, praise poetry, party 
political magazines and private collections.43 Most poignant has been the tendency to rely on 
court records and other documents produced under conditions of repression as sources for 
documenting resistance history in South Africa. Ciraj Rassool advises that it is vital that 
‘production of political documents, their distribution and redistribution, and the meanings 
produced and accumulated’ is examined thoroughly.44 In his view, the inability to properly 
interrogate these documents has resulted in the production of resistance histories and 
biographies that lack proper theoretical grounding.  
As Bongani Ndhlovu has recently argued, it is important to adapt a ‘critical reading of the 
archive and sources along and against the grain.’45 This can lead to appreciating different 
philosophies that shaped individuals like Gwala and their narratives. The critical analysis of 
sources both with and against the grain enables historians to explore different social layers 
that shaped and radicalised Gwala. It also serves as a philosophical mechanism to deconstruct 
the perceived controversies about his personhood by critically examining processes involved 
in the reproduction of his life. This dissertation does this by asking probing questions about 
political tensions, political militancy, warlordism, and connections with other individuals 
within the liberation movement and the many interactions he was privy to.46  
The dissertation relies on various records such as affidavits, evidence in camera, statements 
made under duress and court transcripts to reconstruct Gwala’s biography. Franziska Rueedi 
has warned that the production of historical knowledge through trial records warrants careful 
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45 B. C. Ndhlovu, ‘David Cecil Oxford Matiwane and Auto/Biographic Memory: Political Activism, Social Pragmatism and 
Individual Achievement in Twentieth Century South Africa’, PhD dissertation, University of the Western Cape, 2015, 44. 
46 Rassool, ‘Rethinking Documentary History’, 35. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
24 
attention.47 While utilising this evidence, this dissertation has been mindful that evidence 
presented in court is not a transparent medium but rather a ‘historical document in itself’, 
similar to ‘distorted glass’ whose ‘inherent distortions’ must be understood.48 Frans Kunene’s 
evidence and later affidavit is an example of this kind of distortion. Kunene had been arrested 
with Gwala in November 1975, due to his alleged involvement in underground ANC 
operations in Natal. However, while he was in detention, the state offered him immunity from 
prosecution in exchange for becoming a state witness.49 
Frans Kunene testified against Gwala and was kept in solitary confinement until the end of 
the trial. After the trial was concluded, Kunene disclosed that he had been coerced to become 
a state witness after severe torture by the Security Branch. He further disclosed that the 
Security Branch coached him on what to say in his testimony before the court. He claimed 
that he had been forced to rehearse his testimony because the state’s case relied on the 
presentation of a homogenous and linear version of events that would result in the conviction 
of the accused and the imposition of severe sentences.50 During the process of coaching 
Kunene to give evidence, state agents removed ambiguities and contradictions from his 
version of events to make the state’s case more convincing. It is possible that Bruno Mtolo 
had been subjected to a similar process of coercion and coaching as he became a trained state 
witness in major political trials from the 1960s and 1970s.  
Jeff Peires and Premesh Lalu have cautioned against the use of documents of repression as 
primary sources of evidence since these are riddled with lies, both deliberate lies and self-
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delusion as well as innuendo.51 The usefulness of these records is limited because they were 
produced to criminalise accused persons and reproduce a certain false version of history. Lalu 
argues that documents of this nature provide a legal fiction which was intended to appeal to 
certain official structures and set legal precedents for repressive purposes.52 I have used these 
documents with caution and in some case have verified them with knowledge generated 
through oral interviews.  
The dissertation has extensively utilised documents that were produced by the state 
intelligence services. I am mindful that these documents were produced as records of 
affirmation and documents of repression to justify political ideologies, cement power 
relations, and become a pretext for state violence. Ben Martins has also cautioned that 
documents of this nature should be regarded with suspicion and distrust.53 Martins questions 
the motive for generating the information they present and the purpose they served. His 
argument is that state intelligence reports were produced for nefarious purposes, and these 
were often disseminated to divide the leadership of the ANC. Martins is correctly sceptical 
about the use of state intelligence documents as sources for documenting the history of the 
ANC and the liberation struggle.  
In South Africa, access to classified documents is regulated by the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act. This law has bureaucratised access to primary documents, thus limiting the 
ability of scholars to gain access to certain historical sources. Even when access is granted, 
the names of other participants in certain historical events are masked, reducing the ability of 
researchers to connect history and individuality. Although documents of repression have been 
                                                 
51 P. Lalu, ‘The Grammar of Domination and the Subjection of Agency: Colonial Text and Modes of Evidence’, History and 
Theory, Issue 39, December 2000, 45-68; J. B. Peires, The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-
Killing Movement of 1856-7 (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1989).  
52 P. Lalu, ‘Sara’s Suicide: History and the Representational Limit’, Kronos, No. 26, 2000, 96. 
53 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Ben Dikobe Martins.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
26 
extensively utilised throughout this dissertation, these have not been taken at face value. 
Where possible, I tested their reliability through oral interviews, cross-referencing, and 
comparing the content with secondary sources.  
Most importantly, I have made use of accounts of Harry Gwala’s life that he himself 
presented, through interviews with a number of researchers and journalists. Although 
mediated, in some way access to Gwala’s own accounts of his life has enabled me to 
overcome some of the problem of repressive sources.  
The case for Harry Gwala’s political biography 
Anthony Butler has argued that the twentieth century history of South Africa was dominated 
by racial segregation and apartheid.54 Gwala, on the other hand, argued that while race was a 
fundamental dividing feature of the twentieth century South African state, class was a 
transversal unifying feature. For this reason, he said that the South African struggle should be 
seen as a class struggle rather than a race struggle. This is why Gwala joined the Communist 
Party in 1942.55 Since much of South African political history from the 1940s until the 1990s 
has been dominated by a focus on the role of resistance politics, there has been a rise of 
official narrative of the liberation struggle that is centred on the ANC and that romanticises 
its part in the struggle to make it the dominant player in the story. While it is undisputed that 
the ANC was a leading political force, especially from the mid-1940s, the role of other 
components of the liberation struggle should not be forgotten. The history of resistance 
cannot be studied without also examining the symbiotic relationship between trade union 
movements, the Communist Party, and the ANC, especially from the 1940s. It is these 
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connections that strengthened mass mobilisation and that became the main source of class 
consciousness among the oppressed.  
Since the 1920s, the relationship between the ANC and the Communist Party has been 
marked by robust political disagreement that had the result of the parties not being able to 
work closely with each other. Josiah Gumede laid the foundations for the birth of the ANC-
Communist Party alliance during his term as ANC president general (1927-1930). Gumede’s 
overtures towards the communists put him in a difficult position within the ANC. He lost the 
ANC presidency in 1930, largely because his alliance with the Communist Party had 
generated so much opposition within the ANC.56 It was not until the 1940s that the ANC 
started to develop a cordial relationship with the Communist Party. However, as Nelson 
Mandela conceded in his autobiography, the nature of the ANC-Communist Party alliance 
was a subject of robust political debate even on Robben Island, a debate which was never 
resolved. In Mandela’s words: 
We were constantly engaged in political debates. Some were dispatched in 
a day, others were disputed for years. I have always enjoyed the cut and 
thrust of debating, and was a ready participant. One of our earliest and 
longest debates concerned the relationship between the ANC and the 
Communist Party. Some of the men, especially those MK soldiers who 
had been trained in socialist countries, believed that the ANC and the 
party were one and the same. Even some very senior ANC colleagues, 
such as Govan Mbeki and Harry Gwala, subscribed to this theory.57 
As Ahmed Kathrada asserts, these debates should not give an ‘impression that the congress 
organisation was split into two distinct or antagonistic camps’ even though ‘they were tense 
and heated.’58  
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While many biographies have concentrated on formal politics as a point to understand the 
liberation struggle, here I rather concentrate on the interconnectedness between the ANC, 
Communist Party, trade unionism and class consciousness. Gwala’s life was strongly affected 
by these struggles. Gwala’s political biography enables us to understand such class identities 
and the formation of political consciousness in Pietermaritzburg. There is sufficient evidence 
to suggest that there were relations between the ANC, Communist Party and trade unions 
from the early 1940s. However, this relationship has not been adequately documented in 
South African historiography. This dissertation documents this largely undocumented 
relationship between political and shop floor struggles of the 1940s and 1950s, and how trade 
unions became a vanguard of the development of political consciousness. The dissertation 
provides a discursive, analytical and critical narrative of Gwala’s life and focuses on the 
political connections and disconnections between political organisations, trade unions and 
mass mobilisation.  
The changing socio-economic landscape of the 1940s that resulted in massive urbanisation 
provided an opportunity to consolidate workers’ and socialist struggles. Iain Edwards asserts 
that the 1940s constituted a ‘politically crucial decade with greater attention devoted towards 
various aspects of African city life.’59 However, much of the work done focuses mainly on 
Durban and other major metropolises in South Africa, and this topic has not been studied 
through the life of an individual whose history is intrinsically linked to these struggles. This 
dissertation provides an opportunity to document broader political struggles in 
Pietermaritzburg and the extent to which urban and rural struggles interfaced with one other 
between the 1940s and the 1990s. It explores Gwala’s role in the establishment of mass-based 
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worker-oriented politics whose multiple discourses and influences are seldom recorded in 
South African historiography. This dissertation argues that Gwala was a significant figure in 
the Natal Midlands, in spite of the low profile accorded him in the scholarship. 
As demonstrated by the University of the Witwatersrand’s History Workshop and the South 
African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) project, South African local particularism 
should be an important focus in the production of a national historical narrative. Through 
Gwala’s biography I argue that the narrative of South African history should recognise local 
particularism as a historical genre that contributes immensely to the broader national 
narrative.60 Gwala’s life displayed a complex approach to politics as he could relate with the 
masses as well as with senior leadership of both the ANC and Communist Party. This 
involved proactive ways of interacting with the masses and consistently remaining connected 
with grassroots politics. It is this character and political approach that became the cornerstone 
of the liberation movement’s success in Pietermaritzburg, Natal and elsewhere in South 
Africa from the late 1940s. Gwala spent nineteen years on Robben Island and, because of his 
role in prison and in Natal, he commanded a high level of respect within political circles in 
South Africa.  
When Gwala was transferred from Robben Island in 1987 and eventually released in 1988, he 
arrived to a Natal and Zululand that was different from the one he had left in the mid-1970s. 
From the 1980s, violence had escalated to extreme levels that resulted in a state of 
ungovernability in townships.61 The relationship between Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Gwala 
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deteriorated and Gwala called for amaqabane62 to defend themselves and publicly used the 
phrase ‘kuzokhala isigwagwagwa’63  at political rallies. By 1990 Gwala’s politics had 
undergone a metamorphosis that fused radical Marxism and militant activism. He became 
more confrontational as he had to defend ANC-aligned people in Natal and Zululand against 
Inkatha violent attacks. In 1992 the London’s Daily Telegraph listed Gwala as one of the 
world’s top 30 warlords.’64 There is a body of literature that has not been able to problematise 
Gwala which simply regurgitates the warlordism stance as propounded by media and 
apartheid government.65 
Paul Maylam has correctly argued that ‘biographic writing about prominent historical figures 
who have been widely admired in their lifetime carries with it certain difficulties.’66 He 
cautions that this could lead to hagiography with popular reverence being simply transcribed 
into the biography. Undoubtedly, such reverence becomes more vivid during the interaction 
with Gwala’s former comrades and his family. There is a danger of making conclusive 
statements about certain controversy as aspect of life of Gwala and those around him, such as 
the fact that his elder daughter, Lulu, headed the family at times.67 In accordance with 
Maylam’s caution, this dissertation problematises Gwala and examines his life within the 
social and political context in which he lived. Unlike existing literature, I interrogate the use 
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of the term ‘warlord’ and try to contextualise Gwala in the particular socio-political 
background that had such a profound influence on his life and the lives of the broader African 
population during the twentieth century.  
As South Africa enters what has been broadly referred to as the ‘second transition to 
democracy’, issues of economic emancipation and class formation have become central 
arenas of historical and political engagement.68 The examination of Gwala’s life is an 
opportunity to understand the history of class identities and provides a platform to understand 
the history of inequalities. Gwala referred to the Freedom Charter as the first step toward 
socialism and said the liberation struggle should result in ‘people’s democracy which would 
provide a clear framework for economic transformation.’69 Since the circulation of the 
Inqindi-Marxism document at Robben Island prison in 1978, the South African liberation and 
post-liberation politics has always seen complex debates about whether the post-apartheid 
dispensation should be a peoples’ democracy or a bourgeois democracy.70 This political 
biography provides a platform for these debates to be unpacked and historicised.  
Throughout his life, Gwala associated himself with various groupings and, in certain 
instances, was involved in complex political relationships. After his release from prison in 
1988, his public utterances were often militant, radical and controversial and he had a 
complicated relationship with the national leadership of the ANC, the Communist Party and 
with Mangosuthu Buthelezi. The existing historical literature does not enable historians and 
ordinary people to understand these complexities and seeming contradictions in Gwala’s life.  
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 Post-apartheid historical studies have largely been characterised by the proliferation of pro-
ANC history and the appropriation by the ANC of the liberation movement as almost entirely 
its project. This has marginalised the role that other political movements played in the 
struggle against apartheid. This biased approach has downplayed complex relationships 
between different political systems and schools of thought, and presents the struggle as a 
monolithic project. This perspective overlooks the complex relationships and heterogeneity 
of liberation history in South Africa. It is vital to point out that multiracial cooperation took 
place at time of racial turmoil in Natal, which culminated in the so-called 1949 African-
Indian riots. Gwala took advantage of the ‘Doctors’ Pact’ to consolidate trade unions across 
racial backgrounds. Although shaky, these mobilisations helped to establish a more durable 
Congress Alliance unity from the 1950s, especially in Natal.71  
Gwala’s biography and oral sources  
Varying degrees of exclusion and marginalisation are apparent when one assesses how Harry 
Gwala has been profiled within the corpus of liberation history in South Africa after 1994. 
Although a brief profile of Gwala appears in From Protest to Challenge, this is limited to his 
involvement in the trade union activities in the late 1940s.  
The first attempt to document Gwala’s biographic trajectory was done by state intelligence 
agents who wrote a short biographical sketch of Gwala’s family background, place of birth 
and potential sources of his politicisation.72 This biographical sketch was linked to Gwala’s 
political activities and it was updated regularly through ongoing surveillance. It was through 
this process that government bureaucrats turned Gwala into a subject. In other words, they 
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subjectified him. This became a biographical text and was used to build a state-imposed 
criminal identity on Gwala which led to his prosecution during the period between 1964 and 
1976.  
At the end of the trial in July 1977, Gwala was found guilty of high treason. As accused 
number one, he was expected to plead in mitigation of sentence by speaking about the broad 
political environment that had led him to undertake the actions that resulted in their 
convictions. Gwala used this platform as a moment of autobiographical narration. He 
contextualised his experiences in the prevailing political environment in which he lived. For 
him, the socio-political environment was an important impetus for political germination.73 He 
concluded his autobiographical statement by emphasising that ‘the lives of the people are 
much more important than [his] individual life’, thus indicating that he was prepared to pay 
with his own life.74 By opting to utilise the rhetoric that had been used by Nelson Mandela 
during the Rivonia trial in 1964, Gwala was entangling the two trials. Perhaps, mindful of the 
media coverage of the trial and attendance in the court gallery, he was giving a message of 
hope that the state had not succeeded in stopping the liberation struggle by arresting Mandela 
and the other Rivonia trialists.  
The life imprisonment imposed in Gwala seemed to lead the state to lose interest in him. It 
was not until the mid-1980s that a new kind of state biography of Gwala began to emerge, the 
biography of imminent death. Once Gwala was confirmed to have contracted motor neuron 
disease, an incurable and progressive condition, the state began to document his deteriorating 
health. State medical practitioners even predicted that he would not live for more than two 
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years and advised that he should be released to avoid a situation where he could be seen as a 
martyr who died in prison. These biographical statements were intended to intimidate Gwala 
into becoming a compliant pacifist and collaborator.  
Once Gwala was released in 1988, Mzala (the pseudonym of Jabulani Nxumalo, a 
theoretician of the Communist Party) showed interest in writing Gwala’s biography. Mzala 
interviewed Gwala using both video and audio equipment and was said to have produced a 
manuscript. However, Mzala’s untimely death on 22 February 1991 stopped this biographic 
project. No such manuscript has been located, although it was reported as being among 
Mzala’s papers which were still unsorted in Ngoje, his birth place.75 
Several researchers interviewed Gwala on a wide range of issues before his death. However, 
none of these were used to produce a published book or an academic dissertation on Gwala’s 
political career. I utilised a large number of interviews conducted by other researchers on 
topics relevant to this dissertation.76 In addition, I conducted interviews with a number of 
people who were associated with Gwala in various ways. These include ex-political prisoners 
on Robben Island, his former comrades in Natal, members of the family, and other people 
who worked closely with Gwala. I also drew on interviews with key individuals who worked 
closely with Gwala which are held by the Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archives.  
SADET has made an important contribution in assembling the previously unrecorded history 
of the liberation struggle in South Africa. This research has been published in a number of 
volumes that focus on various periods of the liberation struggle, one decade at a time. This 
                                                 
75 Mxolisi Dlamuka telephone interview with Mpho Nxumalo, Mzala’s widow.  
76 These include interviews by Tony Karon (8 January 1989); Brian Bunting (October 1989), Thomas Karis (15 December 
1989) Padraig O’Malley (8 January 1993, 10 November 1993 and 21 November 1994); and Ruth Lundie (1995). 
Furthermore, Gwala was interviewed on video by Cassius Lubisi, Mzala, and an unidentified person during the 1990s.  
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study adds to Jabulani Sithole’s contribution to the history of Natal Midlands.77 The existing 
literature provides limited insights into Gwala’s life as it tends to be biased towards 
producing a broader history of the ANC. This dissertation uses Gwala’s life as a prism to 
understand broader societal ‘struggles’ and the way in which these struggles were undertaken 
by ordinary people. I argue that the history of the liberation struggle in South African cannot 
be understood without taking into consideration the symbiotic interconnectedness between 
labour and political formations. 
Leslie and Andrew Bank have reminded us of the ‘ethical issues that are involved in the 
writing of other people’s life stories.’78 A study of this nature requires an analysis of sources 
that need to be read carefully as they were generated within a particular political milieu. The 
interview with Mangosuthu Buthelezi provides an example. He argues that he had a good 
relationship with Gwala during the late 1970s and up to his release from prison in 1988. 
Buthelezi claims that he offered Gwala R2 000 on his release from prison in order to perform 
a Zulu cultural cleansing ritual. He further claimed that he was surprised when Gwala 
rebuked him in the early 1990s and said he did not know what caused such hostility.79 This 
information should to be treated with circumspection because, although Buthelezi may be 
aware of the cause of political turmoil between him and Gwala, he may not be willing to 
admit it. 
                                                 
77 See J. Sithole, ‘The ANC underground and the armed action in Northern Natal’, The South African Democracy Education 
Trust (SADET), The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 4, 1980-1990 (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010); J. Sithole, 
‘The ANC underground and the armed action in Southern Natal’, SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 
4, 1980-1990, (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2010). 
78 L. J. Bank and A. Bank, ‘Untangling the Lion’s Tale: Violent Masculinity and the Ethics of Biography in the “Curious” 
Case of the Apartheid-Era Policeman Donald Card’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1, 8.  
79 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Mangosuthu Buthelezi. 
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Gwala, memory and history 
In the week between the day Gwala died and his funeral, there was a notable interest in his 
history and his political contribution to the liberation struggle. However, soon afterwards, this 
interest came to an end. Between 1995 and 1999, there was a lull of public imagery and 
iconography that featured Gwala. His role in the liberation was lambasted in Padraig 
O’Malley’s biography of Mac Maharaj and very few people were willing to mention Gwala’s 
name in public.80 It was not until 1999, when South Africa was hosting its second national 
and provincial elections, that Gwala’s name reappeared when Msunduzi Local Municipality, 
that incorporated Pietermaritzburg and surrounding townships, announcing its intention to 
rename Jan Smuts Stadium after Gwala. The proposal to rename the stadium after Gwala was 
prompted by the desperation of the ANC to increase its electoral support in KwaZulu-Natal, 
especially in Pietermaritzburg. The wide range of opposition expressed in the local 
newspapers about this proposal indicated a complete lack of awareness of any positive role of 
Gwala in any struggle and confirmed that the memory in the public imagination that had 
stuck was that of a warlord. This dissertation fills this historical void by producing a political 
biography that enables South Africans to understand Harry Gwala more fully and appreciate 
his role in liberation history in a new, more comprehensive, more nuanced, light.  
Since Gwala’s death, a number of tributes have been paid to his role in mobilising and 
resuscitating ANC branches in Natal and Zululand. Kgalema Motlanthe has lamented the 
absence of a clear record which reflects Gwala’s deep understanding of democratic process 
within the ANC and the manner in which he articulated himself during the first elective 
conference of the ANC in 1991.81 Rob Haswell and Shakes Cele have asserted that, had it not 
                                                 
80 P. O’Malley, Shades of Difference: Mac Maharaj and the Struggle for South Africa (New York: Penguin, 2007), 286-291. 
81 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Kgalema Motlanthe; Kgalema Motlanthe, address at the inaugural Harry Gwala 
Memorial Lecture, Bulwer, 30 November 2013 (unpublished). 
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been for Gwala, the political dynamic in KwaZulu and Natal would have been very different 
during the early 1990s. Without Gwala’s contribution, the ANC would have struggled to 
generate any significant following against the well-supported Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).82  
Conclusion 
This chapter explains how processes of connectedness and disconnectedness, especially links 
with historical events, have shaped the production of Gwala’s life trajectory. It argues that 
Gwala’s biography cannot be written in isolation from historical events because he was both 
an active participant in the making of history, and he was its product. The chapter also argues 
that a political biography of Gwala is necessary to acknowledge the contribution he has made 
in history. Finally, it examines the limitations and ideologically biased content of texts that 
were produced as part of repression, and questions the extent to which they are useful sources 
of primary material for producing a biography of Harry Gwala.  
 
                                                 
82 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Robert Haswell; Mxolisi Dlamuka telephone interview with Shakes Cele, 8 March 2013. 
Jay Naidoo also makes reference to Harry Gwala’s hard line stance and its impact on the ANC’s performance in Natal, see J. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
Mass mobilisation, non-racialism and the politics of connectedness,      
1942-1960 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the origins and development of Harry Gwala’s political consciousness 
from 1942 to 1960. It locates him within the broader scope of resistance politics that unfolded 
during the 1940s and 1950s. It traces the genesis of his politics of connectedness as he 
mobilised workers and ordinary citizens across racial lines. The chapter shows how Gwala 
was a product of socio-political conditions that were not of his own making by exploring 
three interrelated aspects of his politics of connectedness between 1942 and 1960. It begins 
by examining the genesis of Gwala’s politicisation and his role in the proliferation of radical 
politics in Natal and in the popularisation of the Congress Youth League (CYL). There has 
been extensive research on the contribution of the CYL to reviving the moribund Natal ANC 
and changing the nature of South African liberation politics in the 1940s.1 However, Gwala’s 
contribution to establishing the CYL in Natal and the modalities of connectedness and 
disconnectedness that underpinned the relationship between the Natal CYL and the 
Communist Party in Natal has not received sufficient scholarly attention. Gwala’s 
contribution has been minimised by an over-emphasis on the contributions of Anton 
Lembede, Jordan Ngubane and A. P. Mda.  
                                                 
1 The CYL and the political dynamics of Natal during the 1940s are discussed on in passing by R. Edgar and L. ka Msumza 
(eds.), Freedom in Our Lifetime: The Collected Writings of Anton Muziwakhe Lembede (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1996); R. Edgar, ‘Changing the Old Guard: A. P. Mda and the ANC Youth League, 1944-1949’, in S. Dubow and A. Jeeves 
(eds.), South Africa’s 1940s: World of Possibilities (Cape Town: Double Storey, 2005); G. Rosenberg, ‘Auto/Biographical 
Narratives and the Lives of Jordan Ngubane’, Alternation, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2000; K. A. Eales, ‘Jordan Ngubane, Inkundla Ya 
Bantu and the African National Congress Youth League, 1944-1951’, BA Hons thesis, University of Natal, 1984; T. 
Couzens, The New African: A Study of the Life and Work of H. I. E. Dhlomo (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985). 
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This chapter goes on to examine Gwala’s politics of class consciousness through his 
involvement in the Communist Party and non-racial trade unions in Pietermaritzburg, Durban 
and Howick, and how he connected these with the broader struggle for the national liberation 
of South Africa. The nature of Gwala’s life and politics displayed interconnectedness 
between the individual, society and the prevailing political milieu. The germination of 
Gwala’s political consciousness was a product of a wider range of historical and political 
conditions that prevailed during the 1930s and 1940s.  
Tom Lodge, Saul Dubow and Dunbar Moodie are among the academics who have 
characterised the 1940s as a ‘crisis’ and as a ‘turbulent’ decade. They have argued that the 
1940s were a ‘watershed in the development of African politics in South Africa’ as this 
decade witnessed the rapid transformation of resistance politics in South Africa.2 This chapter 
seeks to extend these insights by asserting that the 1940s and 1950s constituted a crucial era 
in Gwala’s politics of connectedness, as he began to interweave African nationalism with 
class struggles. In addition, just as Iain Edwards and Jon Soske have cautioned against the 
tendency to ‘generalise regarding South African developments on the basis of events and 
alliances that are largely confined to Johannesburg’, this chapter focuses on Gwala’s political 
activism in Natal and, to a limited extent, KwaZulu.3 Nieftagodien has argued that ‘place 
shapes struggle in important ways and should therefore play a more central role in the 
analysis of resistance. 4 This, I suggest, is a critical aspect of understanding Gwala’s politics 
of connectedness. Furthermore, in analysing Gwala and the network of political relations in 
                                                 
2 T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983), 1; S. Dubow, ‘Introduction: South 
Africa’s 1940s’; T. D. Moodie, ‘The South African State and Industrial Conflict in the 1940s’, International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1988), 21-61. 
3 J. Soske, ‘“Wash Me Black Again”: African Nationalism, the Indian Diaspora, and Kwa-Zulu Natal, 1944-1960’, PhD 
dissertation, University of Toronto, 2009, 64; I. Edwards, ‘Mkhumbane Our Home: African Shantytown Society in Cato 
Manor, 1946-1960’, PhD dissertation, University of Natal, 1989. 
4 N Nieftagodien, ‘Popular Movements, Contentious Spaces and the ANC, 1943-1956’ in A. Lissoni, J. Soske, N. Erlank, N. 
Nieftagodien and O. Badsha (eds.), One Hundred Years of the ANC: Debating Liberation Histories Today (Johannesburg: 
Wits University Press, 2012), 137. 
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Natal from 1940s to1960, I utilised the ‘geography of resistance’ framework to suggest that 
the modalities of constructing historical knowledge should recognise the role of local 
particularism which emancipates historically silenced regional voices.5 The period from the 
1940s to 1960 was characterised by robust, defiant politics that shaped the nature of 
resistance throughout the struggle for liberation of South Africa. However, this chapter 
suggests that there were important geographical and regional variations.  
When rethinking Gwala’s politics, it is imperative that he is placed within the complexity of 
class and racial relations that characterised Natal, mainly Durban and Pietermaritzburg, 
against the backdrop of an exclusive African nationalism that constituted the dominant form 
of radical politics from the 1940s. Even though the Communist Party supported the need for 
national liberation before class-based struggle, race relations were complex in Natal, mainly 
between Africans and Indians. In addition, as David Everatt has argued, ‘progressive whites 
exerted undue influence over the nature and course of African nationalism in South Africa.’6 
This chapter argues that, in Natal, Gwala connected African nationalism and class struggle in 
a manner that was relevant to all non-European groups. Gwala’s politics between 1942 and 
1960 epitomises the fusion of multiracialism and non-racialism and the various forms it took, 
especially during the late 1940s and 1950s.  
Connectedness and the Congress Youth League in Natal 
In a memorandum submitted to the Minister of Justice, the Commissioner of Police listed a 
series of Gwala’s political activities that state intelligence had gathered since 1942.7 Gwala 
                                                 
5 For more discussion on the relationship between geography and resistance, see H. Sapire, ‘African Organisation in Brakpan 
Location in the 1950s’ in P. Bonner, P. Delius and D. Posel (eds.), Apartheid Genesis, 1935-1962 (Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 1993); S. Pile and M. Keith (eds.), Geographies of Resistance (London: Routledge, 1997). 
6 D. Everatt, The Origins of Non-Racialism: White Opposition to Apartheid in the 1950s (Johannesburg: Wits University 
Press, 2009), 18. 
7 NAR, DOJ papers, file no. 2/1/53, top secret document: Memorandum of the Commissioner of Police to the Minister of 
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was identified as a key figure in the political landscape in Natal’s Communist Party and the 
Natal Congress Youth League. This memorandum is a testament to how the state’s 
bureaucratic systems were manipulated to construct a criminal identity for Gwala that became 
a tool to disconnect him throughout his life. It also marked the beginning of Gwala’s political 
objectification by the state which became the baseline for constructing relations of 
confrontation, antagonism and criminality.  
Material conditions that characterised the ANC prior to the 1940s shaped Gwala’s politics. 
As Clive Glaser and Colin Bundy have argued, after its ‘flirtation with radicalism’ in the 
early 1920s, the ANC experience some decay during the 1930s.8 Pixley ka-Isaka Seme had 
replaced Josiah Gumede, whose radical and pro-Communist approach was cut short because 
he had openly embraced the Communist Party and had participated in the activities of the 
African trade unions.9 Gumede attended the League Against Imperialism conference held in 
Brussels in 1927 together with two South African Communists, James La Guma and Dan 
Colraine. Gumede spoke at the conference about the plight of Africans in South Africa, 
concluding that ‘I am glad to say that in South Africa there are Communists. I am not a 
Communist, but we find that the CPSA [Communist Party of South Africa] are the only 
people who are with us in spirit and we are watching them.’10 Gumede was one of the South 
Africans to visit the Soviet Union as a tourist while he was president-general of the ANC. 
Although Gumede was ‘previously sceptical about the usefulness of communist revolutionary 
                                                 
8 C. Glaser, A Jacana Pocket History: The ANC Youth League (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2012),12; C. Bundy, ‘Land and 
Liberation: The South African National Liberation Movements and the Agrarian Question, 1920s-1960s’, Review of African 
Political Economy, No. 29, July 1984, 14-29.   
9 Van Diemel, ‘In Search of Freedom’, 294; T. Karis, ‘Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa’, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2, 1983, 381. 
10 The South African Worker, 14 April 1927, cited in Van Diemel, ‘In Search of Freedom’, 100. 
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methods to his cause,’ his exposure to the communist world at the 1927 Brussels conference 
had a positive impact upon him.11 
Gumede’s pro-Communist stance did not go down well with the ‘old guard’ who were 
opposed to collaboration with the Communist Party. Gumede was repudiated by the old guard 
and lost the presidency of the ANC in 1930. He then seemingly retreated to his home town, 
Pietermaritzburg, where he spent most of his time working with local trade unions. Moreover, 
Seme’s approach toward government policy disillusioned Gumede and he began to align 
himself with the rank and file in the Communist Party in Pietermaritzburg.12 Perhaps Gwala 
was inspired by Gumede’s belief that constitutional and peaceful extra-parliamentary means 
of struggle had long been exhausted.  
Between 1940 and 1941 Gwala was enrolled as a student at Adams College to ‘further higher 
education and train as a teacher.’13 While at Adams College, Gwala was influenced by Dr 
Edgar Brookes and Chief Albert Luthuli.14 Gwala claimed to have been politically 
conscientised by Dr Brookes as he had introduced a ‘subject that was not in the syllabus, 
called Civics.’15 Through this subject Gwala ‘began to know something about the society.’16 
                                                 
11 I. Filatova and A. Davidson, The Hidden Thread: Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 
2013), 149. 
12 Van Diemel, ‘In Search of Freedom’, 298. 
13 Neame, Sylvia interview with Harry Gwala, 29 October 1989, Berlin. University of Witwatersrand Library (UWL) 
Historical and Literary Papers (HLP), Sylvia Neame Collection, A2729, E2.  
14 Brookes was born in England and came to Natal with his parents in 1901 when he was four years old. Together with CT 
Loram, J. D. Rheinallt Jones, D. D. T. Jabavu, R. F. A. Hoernle and Leo Marquard, he established the South African Institute 
of Race Relations in 1929. Between 1934 and 1945, Brookes was a principal of Adams College while a Senator representing 
the Africans of Natal from 1937 to 1952, see C. de B. Webb, ‘Edgar Harry Brookes, 1897-1979’, Natalia: Journal of Natal 
Society Foundation, No. 9, 1979, 39-42; Albert John Mvumbi Luthuli was born sometime around 1898 near Bulawayo, 
Southern Rhodesia, the son of a Seventh Day Adventist missionary. In 1908 he was sent to his ancestral home at Groutville, 
Natal where he went to the mission school. Having first trained as a teacher at Edendale, near Pietermaritzburg, Luthuli 
attended additional courses at Adam’s College (in 1920), and went on to become part of the college staff. He remained at the 
college until 1935. In 1935 Luthuli accepted the chieftaincy of the Groutville reserve. Chief Albert Luthuli joined the ANC 
in 1945 and was elected Natal provincial president in 1951. In 1946 he joined the Natives Representative Council. In 1952 
Chief Luthuli was one of the leading lights behind the Defiance Campaign. At the end of 1952, Albert Luthuli was elected 
President-General of the ANC, a position he held until his death in 1967, see A. J. Luthuli, Let My People Go: An 
Autobiography of a Great South African Leader (London: Collins, 1962).  
15 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala.  
16 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala.   
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Luthuli had resigned from teaching at Adams College before Gwala was a student but ‘used 
to visit the school’ to talk to students about issues related to segregation and Africans. In 
1941, while on school holidays in Pietermaritzburg, Gwala ‘passed through an Indian 
restaurant and saw some books, one of which was about pass laws, and the Guardian 
newspaper.’17 Gwala was eager to read these materials but did not have money to buy them. 
When the owner realised that Gwala had an interest, he gave him two items of literature for 
free. It was this exposure to leftist literature that stimulated Gwala’s interest in the 
Communist Party. After he started teaching, he was ‘taken to a meeting of the Non-European 
United Front’ (NEUF) by one of his colleagues.18 The NEUF had been established in 1939 as 
a leftist-dominated organisation and soon fell under the influence of Trotskyists. It became 
active in Pietermaritzburg but subsequently dissolved in the early 1940s and its members 
were absorbed into the Communist Party.19 Despite the short duration of its activities in 
Pietermaritzburg, the NEUF introduced Gwala to politics that accorded with his own 
viewpoints. 
In 1942 Gwala was employed at Slangspruit Government School in Pietermaritzburg. As a 
teacher dealing with a large number of children from poor families, Gwala witnessed first-
hand the appalling socio-economic conditions in which African people were living. In an 
interview, Gwala recalled seeing that some of these children ‘were dozing while he was 
teaching and he was wondering why that was so.’20 Gwala keenly felt the contradiction of 
teaching school children from poverty-stricken family backgrounds about ‘physiology and 
hygiene.’ Inspired by the civics classes that he had participated in while at Adams College, 
                                                 
17 Brian Bunting interview with Harry Gwala.  
18 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
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National Congress, 1912-1952, (London: C Hurst & Company, 1970), 186.  
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Gwala decided to visit the families of school children in order to understand their conditions 
at home. This enabled him to gain first-hand experience of the deplorable circumstances in 
which these children and their parents lived in. Gwala was convinced that children’s lack of 
participation in the classroom was a symptom of the broader political system, and this 
required that he conscientised both children and their parents.21 This resulted in the 
establishment of ‘Intathakusa Youth Club’ which became a political forum to conscientise the 
community of Slangspruit about segregation and its impact on the livelihoods of Africans.22 It 
was through this initiative that Moses Mabhida, one of Gwala’s students, was recruited to the 
Communist Party during the mid-1940s.  
The Communist Party was active in Natal and it had a local office in Pietermaritzburg. While 
Gwala was still employed as a teacher, he attended political classes conducted under the 
auspices of its Pietermaritzburg branch. Just as in Johannesburg, the Communist Party offices 
in Pietermaritzburg became a ‘rendezvous of natives.’23 As Lionel Bernstein asserts, most 
‘Communist Party members were involved either in the trade union movement or in the 
Party’s most important activity, the running of night-schools for adult black workers.’24 
While a growing network of these schools was provided with basic tuition in reading, writing 
and arithmetic, they also became the vanguard of political education for African migrants 
who had recently moved to the cities. Bernstein believed that through the night schools, the 
‘Party was making contact with serious and responsible men and women, and introducing 
                                                 
21 A survey of the African community in Edendale highlighted dietary deficiencies, both in terms of quality and in terms of 
the lack of many of the nutrients were necessary for the maintenance of good health. In addition, it was found that only 14 
per cent of the population had access to milk and potatoes and fewer than 5 per cent to vegetables and eggs, see University 
of Natal, Department of Economics, Experiment at Edendale: A Study of non-European Settlement with Special Reference to 
Food Expenditure and Nutrition (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1951), 234.  
22 NAR, DOJ papers, file no. 2/1/53, declassified top secret document: Memorandum of the Commissioner of Police to the 
Minister of Justice, undated.   
23 E. Roux, Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man’s Struggle for Freedom in South Africa, (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1948), 215.  
24 R. Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting: Memoirs from a Life in South African Politics, 1938-1964 (London: Penguin, 
1999), 40. 
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them to social and political ideas.’25 In Pietermaritzburg, these political classes were 
conducted by a certain James Corrighan, who was an architect, and John Heckslet, a local 
baker. Gwala’s interest in reading Communist literature grew substantially, and he was 
recruited as a member of the Communist Party in June 1942 by Peter Martindale, who was 
branch secretary of the Pietermaritzburg Communist Party.26 Gwala recalled that the 
Pietermaritzburg branch of the Communist Party consisted mainly of whites and a few 
Indians, while he and Selby Mazibuko were the only Africans.27  
By 1943, Gwala had been nominated by the Pietermaritzburg branch to attend a Communist 
Party school in Johannesburg where he met Lionel ‘Rusty’ Bernstein, Hilda Bernstein, Yusuf 
Dadoo and Violet Weinberg, all of who had an influential role in shaping his politics of 
connectedness. It was at the Communist Party’s school that Gwala learned about the history 
of the ANC, about why it was important to be involved in the ANC’s activities, and about 
African nationalism.28 He joined the ANC in 1944, having been a member of the Communist 
Party since 1942. Gwala emphasised in two interviews that ‘there was no African National 
Congress in Natal’ during the early 1940s.29 His membership of the Communist Party gave 
him direct access to the literature and intellectual training that was part of the Communist 
Party’s summer school syllabus. It also sowed the seeds of disconnectedness among those 
within the ANC who were suspicious of Communists, and also drew interest from the South 
African state, which perceived Communists as a threat to its dominance. Gwala joined the 
ANC as it was being revived in Natal, and at the same time as the CYL was being 
                                                 
25 Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 40; R. Suttner, ‘The Character and Formation of Intellectuals Within the ANC-led 
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26 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
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http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
46 
established. Having been influenced by Josiah Gumede’s views, Gwala sought to use the 
CYL as a vanguard to transform the moribund Natal ANC into an active political player in 
the liberation struggle.  
The origins of the CYL date back to the late 1930s when Manasseh T. Moerane, a school 
teacher at uMpumulo High School in Natal and Secretary of the Natal Bantu Teachers’ 
Association, attended the ANC conference in Bloemfontein. After his return, Moerane 
suggested to Jordan Ngubane that a youth league should be formed.30 The National Union of 
African Youth (NUAY) was duly established in 1939 with Moerane as the ‘head’ and Jordan 
Ngubane as secretary. The NUAY attracted over a ‘dozen members, mostly young teachers, 
who met every weekend and published a newsletter.’31 In its brief manifesto, written mainly 
by Moerane, the NUAY’s stated goals were to ‘stir the political consciousness of African 
youth and to set the pace for the development towards freedom.’ When Moerane was forced 
by the Department of Education to withdraw from the NUAY, and after Jordan Ngubane 
moved to Johannesburg to become the assistant to Selope Thema, editor of the Bantu World, 
the NUAY disappeared from the political landscape.  
Gwala argued that the initiative for the formation of the Youth League came from the Party. 
He remembered: 
We in the Party had the Young Communist League, but we had a problem 
of getting the YCL into the townships. So it was felt that a Youth League 
should be formed in the ANC and this would provide the basis for 
recruitment into the YCL. I remember that this issue was discussed when I 
attended a Party school in Johannesburg in [June/July] 1943.32 
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32 ‘The Socialist Path is the only one open to the oppressed everywhere: an interview with Harry Gwala’, The African 
Communist: Journal of the South African Communist Party (South African on the March), No. 120, 1990, 65. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
47 
Despite Gwala’s assertion here, it was not until the December 1943 ANC conference in 
Durban that Moerane proposed a resolution to organise a ‘youth conference in each province 
with the ultimate aim of establishing a Congress Youth League.’33 While ANC president of 
the time, Alfred Xuma did not necessarily embrace the CYL’s ideas and tactics, he gave his 
blessing for its establishment, despite a warning from A. W. G. Champion.34 Although Xuma 
had an ambivalent attitude towards the CYL, he attended its inaugural meeting at the Bantu 
Men’s Social Centre in Johannesburg during the Easter weekend of 1944. W. F. Nkomo and 
Lionel Majombozi were elected as provisional chair and secretary respectively until the CYL 
had drafted its constitution and conducted its formal elections of office bearers. While 
Nkomo and Majombozi enjoyed widespread popularity among the Youth Leaguers, they 
were viewed as ‘transitional appointments’ since it was known they would not have sufficient 
time to focus on the CYL as both were medical students at the University of Witwatersrand.35 
In addition, Lembede and other Youth Leaguers believed Nkomo was secretly a member of 
the Communist Party and had ‘suggested a wording for the youth league manifesto which 
would have given it a communist slant.’36 When the elections took place in September 1944, 
Nkomo and Majombozi stepped aside and Anton Lembede was elected as the first president 
of the CYL. Lembede was a devout Catholic as well as an uncompromising anti-Communist. 
The CYL delegated the drafting of a manifesto to A. P. Mda, Anton Lembede and Jordan 
Ngubane.37 The manifesto positioned the CYL as an ‘answer and assurance to the critics of 
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the national movement [ANC] that African Youth will not allow the struggle and sacrifices of 
their fathers to have been in vain.’38  
The CYL was conceived to be the brains-trust and a power-station of the spirit of African 
nationalism. However, as Robert Edgar has also argued, while ‘the manifesto provided a 
liberatory creed, it did not spell out how freedom was to be achieved, concentrating instead 
on creating a space for the CYL within the ANC.’39 Lembede, Mda and Ngubane agitated for 
Africans to be ‘self-reliant’ and were suspicious of alliances with non-Africans, calling on the 
ANC not to cooperate with Indians and Communists. Lembede, Mda and Ngubane believed 
that the Communist Party was dominated by whites who ‘did not really have African interests 
at heart.’40 Thus, Lembede’s ‘African nationalism’ was conceptualised as a mechanism to 
overcome Africans’ sense of inferiority and drew on the ‘rich cultural traditions of Africa’ 
which encouraged them to take ‘pride of their identity, an identity rooted in the “soil” of 
Africa.’41 Peter Walshe argues that Lembede, Mda and Ngubane’s conception of African 
nationalism was meant to mobilise ‘mass support in preparation for the emergence of 
Africans as the predominant political power in the Union.’42 Between 1944 and 1947, the 
CYL established provincial branches in Transvaal and Natal. The Transvaal CYL became 
stronger and subsequently became a ‘mantle of the CYL.’43  
Jon Soske has argued that developments within Indian politics and Indian congresses in Natal 
had an influence on the ‘development of African nationalist politics during the 1940s.’44 
Soske shows that CYL activist like Lembede and Nelson Mandela ‘avidly studied the 
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writings of Nehru, especially his semi-autobiographical Discovery of India’, and frequently 
quoted him in their writings and speeches.45 Against this background, the establishment of 
the CYL in Natal was inspired by the developments in the Natal Indian Congress Youth 
League (NICYL). Formed in February 1939 with George Poonen as vice-president, the 
NICYL brought together about 40 sectoral and religious youth bodies. By the mid-1940s, 
Poonen had already formed a Worker’s Study Circle in Clairwood, while George Singh 
organised the Merebank Literary and Debating Society. These two organisations focused 
mainly on organising classes in political economy, grammar, and public speaking.46 Poonen 
was a respected activist within the Indian community in Durban. He had been recruited to the 
Communist Party by Edward Roux in 1934. About a month thereafter, the Communist Party 
held its annual general meeting (AGM) in Durban. Only seven individuals attended the 
meeting, and Poonen was elected party organiser for the Durban district. By 1938, Poonen 
had progressed to be chairperson of the Durban branch of the Communist Party.47 The 
NICYL became an active force in galvanising political interest among the Indian youth in 
Natal. By the late 1950s it had started working with the South African Congress of 
Democrats to host conferences that dealt with politics, sport and culture.48  
Moerane formally introcuduced the CYL in Natal.49 The inaugural meeting was held on 20 
May 1944 at the Bantu Social Centre in Durban. Moerane professed that the meeting would 
be attended by the ‘cream of the nation’ and the Youth would be ‘united by a common 
loyalty.’50 The meeting established the Natal CYL and elected a ‘committee’ comprised of 
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Selby Ngcobo, Wilson Cele, Congress Mbata, A.T. Hadebi, Herbert Dhlomo, and Jordan 
Ngubane, with Moerane as president.51 Despite a well-attended inaugural meeting, the Natal 
CYL became dysfunctional because of factionalism in its executive. In addition, two of its 
committee members, Herbert Dhlomo and Jordan Ngubane, were elected onto the executive 
of the Natal ANC in April 1945 under Champion’s leadership. Neither had much time to deal 
with Natal CYL executive matters as both held portfolios in the Natal ANC while also 
holding down permanent jobs as journalists.52 Soon after the South African state found out 
about Moerane’s political activities, he was again relieved of his duties as a teacher. Glaser 
has argued that ‘prior to 1948 the Congress Youth League consciously kept its official 
membership small as it had hoped to radicalise the ANC through internal pressure group 
politics.’53  
Under the leadership of Lembede, the old guard fended off the CYL’s attempts to influence 
the ANC’s national policy.54 Lembede’s presidency was characterised by attempts to cut off 
Communists and reduce their influence on the ANC. The ANC executive turned down 
Lembede’s proposal to prohibit members of other political organisations from serving on the 
ANC provincial and national executive, which was aimed at limiting Communist 
involvement in the ANC.55 Despite several requests to ‘all the provinces of the Union and 
protectorates’ to commence organising the CYL, it was not until 1948 that an ‘active’ branch 
of the CYL was launched in Natal.56 This was the first branch to be launched outside the 
Witwatersrand area, something made possible by A. P. Mda’s pragmatic stance of allowing 
                                                 
51 Staff reporter, ‘African Congress Youth League’, Inkundla ya Bantu, 31 May 1944. 
52 Couzens, The New African, 275. 
53 C. Glaser, ‘Students, Tsotsis and the Congress Youth League: Youth Organisation on the Rand in the 1940s and 1950s’, 
unpublished paper presented at the “The Making of Class” Conference, 9-14 February 1987, University of Witwatersrand.  
54 Edgar, ‘Changing the Old Guard’, 160. 
55 Gish, Alfred B. Xuma, 102. 
56 Staff reporter, ‘Call to Youth’, Inkundla ya Bantu, Vol. ix, No. 131, January 1947; Staff reporter, ‘Congress Youth 
League’, Inkundla ya Bantu, 2 June 1948.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
51 
Communists to play a pivotal role in the CYL.57 Mda had been elected president of the CYL 
after the death of Lembede in 1947. In addition, as Glaser shows, after 1948 the CYL made a 
concerted ‘effort to go national.’58 Thus provincial CYL branches were established in Natal, 
Orange Free State and the Cape, with the latter branch’s membership concentrated at the 
University of Fort Hare. 
In March 1948, Messrs. Nivard J. Dlamini, Caiphas D. Madwe, Edgar S. Mefereka, Zablon 
M. Madela and Abner Makhaye called ‘young men of Durban’ to work towards the 
‘establishment of the Congress Youth League of Natal.’ They considered the CYL to be a 
vanguard that would ‘develop the spirit of African nationalism as propounded by 
Lembede.’59 Dlamini’s team remained suspicious of Communists and their influence in the 
ANC. At the same time as Dlamini and his team were trying to mobilise support for the 
establishment of the CYL in Natal, another committee comprising of Percy Khumalo, Selby 
Msimang, H. T. Gwala, E. O. Msimang, H. I. Dhlomo and Reggy Moses, most of whom were 
from Pietermaritzburg, was also mobilising towards the same goal.60 This committee 
consisted of both African nationalists and Communists, with Gwala known to be a member of 
the Communist Party. Percy Khumalo’s committee received an ‘encouraging response and 
the approval of the majority of organisations in Natal and Zululand.’ There is no archival 
evidence that Dlamini’s committee succeeded in hosting the meeting they had envisaged. 
Percy Khumalo admitted that a meeting was scheduled to take place in May, but ‘due to 
unforeseen circumstances the meeting had to be postponed.’61   
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Gwala’s committee managed to host the inaugural meeting of the Natal CYL on 4 July 1948. 
The meeting was to be held at Durban Bantu Social Centre, but the Durban Town Clerk 
turned down the application for a permit and the meeting was moved to Baumannville Hall. 
Gwala presided over the meeting while Percy Khumalo gave a ‘well-thought-out and 
challenging speech which focused on the history, aims, objects and programme of the 
League.’62 The meeting was ‘well attended by delegates from various regions in Natal and 
KwaZulu’ and after discussion delegates ‘showed a great enthusiasm for a new organisation 
and the cause.’ The meeting decided ‘unanimously to constitute itself as the Congress Youth 
League of Natal and elected a committee of six members with Mr T. H. Gwala as a Chairman 
and Mr. Yengwa as Secretary.’63 Gwala and M. B. Yengwa’s committee was given a mandate 
to ‘organise for a mass meeting at which office bearers will be appointed.’ The success of the 
meeting demonstrated the extent to which Gwala’s politics of connectedness was beginning 
to generate positive spinoffs for liberation politics as the committee was mainly driven by 
him, with the Pietermaritzburg branch of the Communist Party covering the costs of the 
meeting.64  
Gwala was aware of the antagonistic stance of the Natal ANC towards the CYL. In an open 
letter to the readers of Ilanga lase Natal, he anticipated that some would ‘look at the new 
organisation as a movement of the intelligentsia while some Congress die-hards will probably 
look at it as a rival organisation to the ANC.’65 He described the newly formed CYL as ‘an 
organisation of all young people formed for the purpose of giving political, economic and 
social education to young people so that they can take a conscious active part in the liberation 
of their own nation.’ Gwala argued that political organisations were a product of the 
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conditions of their era, and he considered the formation of the ANC to be a product of the 
establishment of the Union of South Africa. For Gwala, the CYL arose out of the conditions 
that ‘non-whites’ faced during the 1940s.66  
Soon after Gwala’s committee was elected, A. W. G. Champion launched a scathing attack 
on the Natal CYL. What Champion articulated openly had been the cause of a dilemma for 
Xuma, who also viewed the Communist Party as both ‘a potential ally and potential rivals.’67 
Unlike Xuma, Champion was open about his dislike for the CYL and referred to the League 
as ‘men who are full of book education-theorists, who have just mastered the studies of Karl 
Marx, Gandhi and the rest of the reformers and want to step into their shoes without taking 
the trouble to study the local conditions, disrespecting advices from well and tried field 
officers.’68 Champion was a Durban-based politician who had been a leader of the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU), a member of the Native Representative Council 
(NRC) and the president of the Natal ANC between 1945 and 1951.69 Champion and the 
executive of the Natal ANC viewed the state ‘as something that could be persuaded rather 
than resisted and felt it was worth working strategically within the state-subsidised advisory 
structures, such as township Advisory Boards.’70  
Champion had been invited to Gwala’s inaugural meeting but it appears that he was not 
informed that the venue had been changed from the Bantu Social Centre to Baumannville 
Hall. He claimed to have gone to the Bantu Social Centre on the day of the meeting and 
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realised the meeting was not taking place. Champion claimed to have been ‘surprised’ by 
Gwala’s report in the Ilanga lase Natal newspaper on the following weekend that said that 
the meeting did in fact take place, but at Baumannville Hall, and that an interim committee 
had been elected under Gwala’s chairmanship. It is quite unlikely that, given his leadership 
position and political stature in Natal, Champion would have taken a whole week to find out 
that a meeting of such significance in the politics of Natal had taken place. Although 
Champion had been invited to the meeting, it is intriguing that he was not on the list of 
speakers. Yet, Selby Msimang spoke in his capacity as the secretary of the Natal ANC.71  
Champion was known for his dislike of Communists and asserted that Gwala and Percy 
Khumalo’s intentions for the Natal CYL were different from those of the Transvaal CYL. 
Thus, Champion saw ‘Gwala’s CYL’ as a rival to the Natal ANC rather than a cooperative 
body. This is because ‘Gwala’s CYL’ did not seek approval from the ANC and did not work 
with Jordan Ngubane, who, he claimed, had been assigned in 1945 to assist in the formation 
of the Congress Youth League in Natal.72 Champion’s suspicions of the Pietermaritzburg 
committee were based on his often acrimonious relationship with Selby Msimang and E. O. 
Msimang over their accommodating attitudes towards Communists and their stance on 
multiracialism. Champion claimed that Msimang was ‘not clear about the Youth League’ 
which he considered to be a parallel organisation to the Natal ANC.73  
The election of Gwala and M.B. Yengwa to lead the organising committee further fuelled 
tension in the already tense relationship between the new body and Champion, as Gwala was 
a well-known Communist and Yengwa was known to be sympathetic to Communists and was 
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already working closely with the Communist Party in Durban.74 There were also underlying 
animosities between certain other members of the Natal ANC executive and Youth League 
about its approach to, and relationship with, the Communist Party. The Youth League denied 
that it was a front for the Communist Party.75 It emphasised that it was still committed to 
African nationalism, which was perceived to be the antithesis of the Communist Party.76 
Champion was openly hostile to the CYL and claimed that it was disrespectful to the ‘old 
guard.’ He said that the CYL had been established because its members did not want to be 
under the leadership of this old guard. Champion claimed that the Natal CYL comprised of 
his ‘old enemies in Chesterville politics and Durban’ and Gwala and Wilson Cele were 
known members of the Communist Party.77 Gwala remembered that in some meetings 
Champion would emphatically shout ‘isando nesikela’ (hammer and sickle) just before 
Gwala spoke.78 Champion occasionally ‘delivered some very rude remarks’ about the Natal 
CYL, stating that not only were the Youth Leaguers not part of the Congress, they were 
enemies of Congress.79 
David Everatt has argued that the involvement of members of the Communist Party in the 
radicalisation of the ANC ‘exacerbated ideological differences among socialists and 
communists.’80 The Communist Party was divided in its understanding of and response to the 
growth of African nationalism and the ANC. Everatt shows that some ‘party members, 
located largely in the Cape, warned of the dangers of African nationalism and called for a 
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greater concentration on the pursuance of class struggle.’81 Gwala was part of a group, which 
together with other Communist Party members from Transvaal, began to develop a theory of 
internal colonialism which saw national struggle as a natural and necessary response to 
colonial forms of oppression by means of which the white minority controlled the black 
majority.  
Against the background of this antagonism from the Natal ANC, especially from Champion, 
Gwala’s committee mobilised youth in Natal and Zululand to attend the elective meeting of 
the Natal CYL on 4 September 1948 at the Bantu Social Centre in Durban.82 Gwala chaired 
the meeting, which was ‘well attended by young men and women from various walks of life.’ 
Jordan Ngubane gave an overview of race relations from the turn of the century up to the 
1940s. Thereafter Herbert Dhlomo delivered an address which ‘galvanised the youth to take 
charge of their own lives by joining the CYL.’83 After a robust debate and a heated 
discussion, delegates agreed to formalise the establishment of the Natal CYL. The League 
then elected the following executive: Jordan Ngubane (president); H. T. Gwala (vice 
president); S. B. Ngcobo (treasurer); Percy Khumalo (organiser); M. B. Yengwa (secretary); 
B. Nomvete (assistant secretary); and M. T. Moerane (additional member).84  
During the meeting delegates were encouraged to join the CYL and Yengwa was given the 
task of managing membership. Delegates were also encouraged to establish branches and 
hold regular meetings. The influence of the Communist Party and that of Gwala became clear 
when branches were ‘encouraged to host debating clubs and study groups’ that focused on 
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promoting an understanding of South African politics.85 Furthermore, Gwala emphasised that 
it was important for Natal CYL’s branches to teach illiterate members how to read and write 
through night schools. The meeting also mandated the Natal CYL executive to investigate the 
possibility of establishing its own newspaper which would be responsible for publicising 
‘CYL activities in Natal.’86 Jordan Ngubane only had a short stint as president. Early in 1949 
he fell ill, was given medical advice to ‘do as little work as possible’, and was moved from 
Durban to recuperate in Rosetta, near Estcourt in the Natal Midlands.87 Jordan Ngubane’s 
long absence meant that Gwala was at the helm of the Natal CYL, and he seems to have 
preferred working closely with Yengwa. 
Although Champion had been invited to the September 1948 meeting, he did not attend and 
sent an apology indicating that he had prior engagements.88 As meeting chairperson, Gwala 
read Champion’s apology and made it clear that the executive of the Natal ANC had been 
invited to attend. It is possible that Champion did not attend because of his stance on the 
Natal CYL and the animosity that had emerged earlier that year with his erstwhile friend, 
Jordan Ngubane.  
Before his election to the Natal ANC in 1945, Jordan Ngubane had been based in 
Johannesburg. He was instrumental in the establishment of the CYL and assisted Mda and 
Lembede to write its constitution and its manifesto. He served on the propaganda committee 
of the CYL with Lembede and Walter Sisulu.89 He returned to Natal in 1944 to become the 
editor of Inkundla ya Bantu, by that time a monthly journal serving mainly northern Transkei 
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and southern Natal.90 Under Jordan Ngubane’s editorship, Inkundla ya Bantu became a 
‘leading forum for the expression of African political opinions.’91 Although Ngubane served 
on the executive of the Natal ANC under the presidency of Champion, he openly campaigned 
against Champion in favour of Chief Albert Luthuli in 1951.   
The Natal CYL was active during its infancy. Gwala and the provincial executive committee 
met the CYL national president, A. P. Mda in Durban and discussed with him ‘various 
matters connected with the League and the general position of Africans in South African 
society.’92 The meeting also discussed the position of the Natal CYL with regard to the 
ongoing animosity between itself and the executive of the Natal ANC. Mda toured all 
provinces in an attempt to increase the membership of the CYL. While the Natal CYL had 
many branches throughout Natal and Zululand, the Durban branch provided effective 
organisational machinery and became its de facto provincial headquarters. By 10 December 
1948, the Durban branch of the Natal CYL had organised a ‘Parliamentary Debate Society’ 
along the same lines as that of the Natal Indian Congress Youth League. The aim of the 
debating society was to ‘bring together all those interested in the welfare of the nation to 
come and study in an interesting and objective way the many problems that face the race.’ 
The debating society was meant to have ‘a practical and healthy effect in the public life of the 
community.’93 The effectiveness of the Durban branch could be attributed to Gwala’s 
presence after the Communist Party had moved him to Durban to be a full-time trade union 
organiser. Both Gwala and Yengwa ensured effective coordination of the Natal CYL’s 
activities and were able to communicate efficiently through Ilanga lase Natal and Inkundla 
ya Bantu.  
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Non-racialism and the politics of cooperation in Natal 
In the late 1940s, South African liberation politics were characterised by robust discussion 
and contradictory debates about cooperation with the Indian political structures. Initially the 
CYL was not in favour of forging relations with other non-European communities. However, 
after the Passive Resistance campaign, H. E. I. Dhlomo and Jordan Ngubane began to 
advocate for cooperation with the Natal Indian Congress (NIC).94 Dhlomo spoke on behalf of 
the Natal ANC at the demonstration that launched the Passive Resistance movement and 
wrote a series of articles in Ilanga lase Natal on the significance of the campaign for 
Africans.  
Similarly, Jordan Ngubane argued that ‘the Indian’s battle is ours’ and cautioned Africans not 
to fall for the propaganda of whites wishing to promote animosity between Africans and 
Indians.95 Having made this point, Jordan Ngubane immediately contradicted himself by 
saying ‘it is true that the Indian community on the whole is interested only in making money 
out of us and when it has done this, it avoids doing anything tangible to help the African 
march to a better life.’96 Similar contradictions in the relationship between the ANC and 
Indians had emerged when Lembede surprised his CYL colleagues by enthusiastically 
supporting the 1947 Doctors’ Pact, a cooperation agreement signed by Yusuf Dadoo, Monty 
Naicker and Xuma. However, Lembede’s untimely death shortly after its signing ‘render[ed] 
actual positions an open question’ within the CYL politics.97 It remains unclear whether his 
devotion to African nationalism would have excluded the possibility of active cooperation 
with other non-white groups in South Africa.  
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Soske argues that, after the death of Lembede in 1947, a section of the CYL began to distance 
itself from his extreme views and adopted the cooperation rhetoric developed earlier in 
Natal.98 Ngubane introduced a new narrative that argued that ‘Indians did not come to Africa 
as exploiters and conquerors but as exploited.’99 This new rhetoric enabled the Natal CYL to 
locate itself within a framework of non-racialism. This was reciprocated by some within the 
leadership of the NIC throughout Natal. George Ellary, an honorary secretary of the Natal 
Indian Congress, sent the greetings of the Dannhauser Branch of the NIC to the Natal ANC 
president. Ellary wished the Natal ANC well in its forthcoming conference and indicated that 
his ‘earnest hope was that sooner the different sections of the Non-European will unite to 
fight the common cause of freedom.’100  
Gwala was determined to undo Lembede’s earlier legacy of racial chauvinism that 
emphasised African nationalism and self-emancipation, which compelled the CYL to reject 
cooperation with other non-Europeans.101 Gwala persuaded the Natal CYL to establish 
relations with the NICYL and build on the rhetoric of political cooperation between Indians 
and Africans contained in the Doctors’ Pact. The Natal ANC executive refrained from 
supporting the Pact because it felt there had been insufficient consultation with the provincial 
structures. Msimang argued that neither the NIC nor the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) 
were competent to negotiate national interests as ‘these congresses did not fall within the 
category of national organisations.’102 According to Msimang, the Natal ANC felt that 
‘negotiations with provincial organisations should be effected through provincial congresses 
subject to confirmation or ratification of the National Executive Committee or the South 
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African conference.’103 The Natal ANC claimed that no province of the Union was competent 
to negotiate cooperation with the Indians other than Natal itself since the preponderance of 
the Indian population was in Natal. It suggested that before an agreement could be reached 
with the Indians, very ‘important and vital issues involving political, economic and social 
differences would have to be examined and determined in the light of the very strained 
relations between Indians and Africans’ in Natal.104  
Msimang questioned whether ‘the agreement was signed by Dr Naicker on behalf of the 
NIC.’ He claimed that Dr Naicker ‘represented a Province in which he had, insofar as the 
executive committee was aware, done nothing to foster the spirit of cooperation which 
involves the fulfilment of certain vital conditions responsible for the very strained relations 
between the two races.’105 As a clear sign of repudiating the Pact and the spirit of 
cooperation, Msimang and the Natal ANC executive stated that ‘in the absence of indications 
that the cooperation sought would guarantee the Africans a measure of protection from the 
Indian, it would not be possible for Natal to accept an agreement in the framing of which she 
had not been consulted or given an opportunity to express her wishes and opinions.’106 Vahed 
suggests that although the agreement intended to herald significant joint political campaigns, 
‘the attempt by the Natal ANC to forge non-racial identity led only to unity at the national 
level.’ Despite attempts to repudiate it, the Pact was an ‘important precursor to the multi-
racial alliance of the 1950s.’107  
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These attempts of broad political collaboration had an influence on the politics of the CYL. In 
December 1948, the CYL accepted in principle a merger with the All African Convention 
(AAC) which had been established in 1935 as a militant opposition to the Hertzog Bills. The 
ANC had withdrawn from the AAC, leaving it to the influence of leftist intellectuals who 
were members of the underground Workers Party. The CYL, however, felt that concentration 
should be directed to the basis of the unification and the adoption of a Programme of Action 
that allowed for the aspirations of various political groups, subject to the ‘condition that the 
method adopted create or give expression to such unity not in any way militate against the 
spread and growth of African nationalism.108 However, as Vahed posits, the spirit of 
cooperation ‘did not permeate to the masses’ as tension intensified between Africans and 
Indians in Durban.109 Although Gwala personally supported the idea of cooperation with 
Indians, he was unable to change the stance of the Natal CYL on the Indian question. 
Nevertheless, the Communist Party believed that the Pact and the cooperation it proposed 
represented the first step towards the goal of political unity.  
Gwala and the challenges of non-racialism  
At the same time as prospects for cooperation were emerging, the simmering tension which 
had been caused mainly by competition for scarce resources between Africans and Indians 
boiled over on 13 January 1949, and a large-scale riot broke out in Durban. Although it was 
centred mainly in Durban, the riots spread to many areas of Natal. From the time of his 
appointment in 1944 by the Communist Party to work as a full-time trade union organiser, 
Gwala had established himself as a non-racialist and a large number of his trade union 
members were Indians.110 The 1949 riots had a devastating impact on race relations in Natal, 
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mainly in Durban and Pietermaritzburg where large numbers of Indians resided. The Natal 
CYL worked closely with the national office to defuse racial tension between Africans and 
Indians. The National Working Committee of the CYL visited Durban and had a lengthy 
meeting to discuss the riots. It argued that: 
In a view of the critical and dangerous situation in Natal, the National 
Working Committee of the Congress Youth League of South Africa 
appeals to the Executives of the African National Congress and the South 
African Indian Congress, as well as other Africans and peoples 
organisations, to establish a joint peoples Commission of Inquiry at once, 
to enquire into the causes of and remedies for, the Indo-African fraction in 
Natal, the Commission to include other centres of Indo-African population 
in the Union where inter-racial strife might arise in future.111 
 
While the National Working Committee believed that ‘racial clashes’ were a direct result of 
the policy of segregation and of white domination, it also believed that there were secondary 
causes which were traceable to the immediate economic and social relationship between 
Indians and Africans. It proposed the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry composed of 
‘non-European’ organisations. It urged the Commission to be a ‘useful solution to both the 
African and the Indian leadership in their attempts to normalise relations between the sections 
on a ‘foundation of understanding and justice.’112  
The 1949 riots left executives of both the Natal ANC and CYL riddled with division, 
inconsistency and contradictions. Champion, Yengwa and Jordan Ngubane rejected the 
violence at the same time as endorsing confrontation with Indians. Champion and Yengwa 
cooperated with the NIC, and simultaneously justified the riots. Gwala had a clearer stance on 
the events that unfolded in January 1949, as he rejected the riots and any attacks on Indians 
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outright. During a meeting soon after the 1949 riots, Gwala decided to stage a walkout 
because he ‘could not stomach the racist approach’ that was being articulated by 
participants.113 Champion and Yengwa used the riots and subsequent boycott to advance their 
own business interests as they invested in the Zulu Hlanganani cooperative in Cato Manor.114 
Internal divisions in the Natal CYL were exacerbated after the 1949 riots. Internal conflicts 
over these events paralysed both the Natal ANC and Natal CYL.  
The ineffectiveness of the Natal CYL disappointed some of its members who seem to have 
had higher expectations, especially those had who had attended the meeting of July 1948. A 
certain H. Pamla, a ‘staunch supporter’, claimed to have attended the meeting of the CYL in 
1948 which was held in Durban, and became disillusioned and disappointed because no 
public meetings had been held since the election of the executive. 115 Pamla urged the 
executive emphatically to convene a meeting ‘anywhere in Natal and arrange to hold it 
immediately before we start to criticise you.’116 In its June/July 1950 newsletter, 
Uvukayibambe iAfrika, the Natal CYL conceded that ‘even though the CYL was well known, 
there was still a proportion of youth that did not understand its political tactics to attain 
freedom.’117 
In January 1950, the Natal CYL held its annual conference at the Bantu Social Centre in 
Durban. In his capacity as the vice-president, Gwala chaired the meeting since Jordan 
Ngubane had not yet recuperated from his illness. In his opening address, Gwala observed 
that many oppressed countries throughout the world were pressing with their demands for 
                                                 
113 Tony Karon interview with Harry Gwala. 
114 I. Edwards, ‘Mkhumbane Our Home’, 214. 
115 H. Pamla, ‘Youth League’, Ilanga lase Natal, 23 April 1949, 15. 
116 H. Pamla, ‘Youth League’, Ilanga lase Natal, 23 April 1949, 15. 
117 UWL, HLP, AWG Champion Papers, A922, Ec7, Uvukayibambe iAfrica, Natal Congress Youth League newsletter, 
June/July 1950.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
65 
liberation and that some were very close to achieving freedom.118 Yengwa, the secretary, 
conceded that the executive had not achieved its goals due to the illness of Messrs M. T. 
Moerane and Jordan Ngubane, and because Mr Nomvete was unable to participate in the 
activities of the Natal CYL as he had received a job transfer to Cape Town.119 Yengwa 
downplayed the impact of the acrimonious relations between the Natal CYL and the 
conservative ANC leadership in Natal. Both Yengwa and Gwala emphasised that, despite 
challenges, the Natal CYL had managed to assist in the establishment of the Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg branches, both of which provided support for the organisation’s activities. 
Yengwa reported on the establishment of the newsletter, Uvukuyibambe iAfrika, which was 
distributed to the membership for the first time at the event. The conference resolved that the 
Natal CYL would oppose the apartheid system of the Nationalist Party government and 
would not participate in the Natives’ Advisory Board and the Native Representative 
Council.120 During the January 1950 conference, Jordan Ngubane and Gwala were re-elected 
as the president and vice president respectively.121  
After the 1950 conference, the CYL seemed to have regained its strength and held regular 
meetings in both Durban and Pietermaritzburg. In Durban, Yengwa was elected chairperson 
while Gwala organised regular Pietermaritzburg branch meetings in Sobantu Hall.122 The 
Natal CYL expanded its scope of activities to challenge the extension of pass laws to women 
and Gwala led a women’s march to the Durban City Hall. Through Yengwa, the Natal CYL 
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issued an invitation to all women, members and non-members, to attend a meeting in April 
1950 to discuss the impact of the proposed extension of pass laws to women. Gwala delivered 
the keynote address.123 Although there was a renewed level of activism within the Natal 
CYL, there is little evidence to indicate that it had expanded beyond Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg. 
By the beginning of 1950, the state introduced the Unlawful Organisations Bill which gave a 
clear indication that the Communist Party was about to be banned. Gwala remembered that 
the Communist Party ‘came up with a very precise analysis of the Bill which indicated that it 
was going to affect everything democratic’ in South Africa.124 The Communist Party 
published a booklet entitled Malan’s Madness in South Africa and Gwala translated it into 
Zulu. The Communist Party mobilised various political formations to reject the Bill. Gwala 
reminisced that ‘when the Nationalist Party realised that other people other than Communists 
were raising their ire against the Bill, they immediately changed it to the Suppression of 
Communism Bill’ in order to defuse opposition from the broader political fraternity.125 Soon 
afterwards, the only political formations that opposed the Bill were the Communist Party, the 
South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the ANC. The Communist Party organised joint 
meetings with the SAIC and the ANC throughout the country to explain the threat of being 
banned and rally opposition against the Bill.  
A top secret Commissioner of Police’s report listed numerous instances where Gwala was 
either a speaker or provided interpretation at various meetings for speakers who were not 
conversant in Zulu.126 Before the Programme of Action could be implemented, several 
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organisations combined to organise May Day demonstrations on the Rand.127 During these 
demonstrations, some 19 Africans were killed and others wounded in Benoni, Orlando, 
Alexandra and Sophiatown.128 This brought about ‘a union-wide feeling of sympathy and a 
determination among Africans, and it was felt that the time for action had come.’129 The act 
of repression convinced the ANC, Communist Party, SAIC and African People’s 
Organisation to call for a national day of stoppage of work to protest against the killing of 
demonstrators during the May Day demonstrations and against the proposed Suppression of 
Communism Bill.130  
The decision to protest was initially taken by the ANC executive as a ‘National Day of 
Mourning and Protest’, as purely an ‘African decision.’131 However, it received ‘a universal 
approval among Africans of every political shade and everyone was prepared to make it 
succeed.’ Dr James Moroka, president general of the ANC, visited Natal to address public 
meetings. Local Natal Indians and coloureds pledged their support for the stoppage. Due to 
the renegade attitude of the Natal ANC under Champion’s leadership, Walter Sisulu, the 
national secretary of the ANC, was sent to Natal to further ‘negotiate with the Indian 
Congress, African People’s Organisation and with African leaders.’132 Sibongiseni Mkhize 
argues that, although Champion remained resolutely opposed to the protest action, Msimang 
gave his unequivocal support to the Day of Protest.133 The extent of Msimang’s involvement 
was to collect ‘some money from other Non-European groups.’ While Msimang was the 
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organiser in Natal, Gwala’s role was to mobilise grassroots support for the day of protest.134 
Gwala argued that the National Stoppage Day marked the beginning of the implementation of 
the Programme of Action which had been adopted during the 1949 ANC national conference 
in Bloemfontein.135 This marked a major shift in the politics of liberation as it heralded the 
era of mass demonstrations and robust protest politics.  
It was through Gwala’s involvement in the National Stoppage Day that he met a youthful 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi in the ANC offices in 1950. This was after Buthelezi had been 
expelled from Fort Hare University for opposing the visit by the Governor-General of South 
Africa.136 Buthelezi had been politicised by his association with the Fort Hare CYL and had 
been introduced to the Natal ANC in Durban during the 1949 riots.137 Gwala and Buthelezi 
were tasked by the organising committee to ensure that ‘the message reach every nook and 
corner of South Africa.’ They ‘distributed leaflets and hosted meetings jointly throughout 
Natal and Zululand.’138 Inkundla ya Bantu reported that 70 per cent of the African workers in 
the textile, tobacco and furniture industries had stayed away from work in Durban and the 
overall absenteeism rate was about 60 per cent.139 Champion’s renegade stance had serious 
implications for his political career. Jordan Ngubane had already been using Inkundla ya 
Bantu to ridicule him openly and support Chief Albert Luthuli as the next president of the 
Natal ANC, and the Natal CYL rejected Champion in support of Luthuli. Moreover, 
Champion’s stance on the Day of Protest worsened the already acrimonious atmosphere 
between him and Msimang.   
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With the imminent promulgation of the Suppression of Communism Act, in anticipation of 
being banned, the Central Executive Committee decided to dissolve the Communist Party.140 
The Communist Party was dissolved on 20 June 1950, the same day on which Parliament 
passed the Suppression of Communism Bill which was eventually signed into law on 14 July 
1950. The dissolution came as a surprise to Gwala as the decision was taken by the Central 
Executive Committee, and there was insufficient time to properly communicate this to all 
Communist Party structures.  
As the state began to serve banning orders on those aligned with the Communist Party, Gwala 
predicted that his political activism was going to be severely affected.141 By the end of 1950 
Gwala had decided to allow his term to expire without seeking re-election to the Natal CYL 
executive. He was ‘not going to play any leadership role in active politics’ but remained 
active in organising secret meetings of the Natal CYL.142 Despite the difficulties he 
experienced throughout his tenure on the Natal CYL executive, Gwala ‘credited Communist 
Party members who went out of their way to first accommodate these people and then 
embark on a campaign of educating them to real politics, which they did successfully.’143 
Anton Xaba, a Sobantu ANC and Communist Party activist who had been recruited by Gwala 
during the 1940s, credited Gwala for mobilising both for the Natal CYL in Pietermaritzburg 
and for the Natal ANC.144 Xaba argued that Gwala ‘brought the ANC to ordinary people in 
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factories, sporting fields, taxis and sheebens.’ Xaba said he had been politically conscientised 
and introduced to the ANC by Gwala in the late 1940s, and recruited by Gwala into the 
Communist Party. Both mobilised Sobantu, a village for Africans, so that it became a hotbed 
of support for the ANC and the CYL. Many meetings of the Natal ANC took place at the 
Bantu Social Centre in Durban or in Sobantu Hall in Pietermaritzburg.145 Even though the 
Natal CYL was characterised by simmering tensions within its executive, and had a frosty 
relationship with Champion’s conservative ANC faction, it produced a generation of 
dedicated stalwarts who were significant in directing the South African freedom struggle for 
many decades.146 Furthermore, under Gwala’s influence, the Natal CYL managed to 
transform the ANC from being an organisation of ‘elite in African terms’ and connected it 
with the ‘growing ranks of the working class.’ However, it was unable to sustain its linkages 
with the struggles of the working class despite its radical political rhetoric.147   
Gwala’s politics of connectedness developed significantly between the 1940s and 1951. At 
the same time as being vice president of the Natal CYL, Gwala was also an ‘office bearer of 
approximately ten trade unions in Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Howick, respectively and 
active in Communist Party activities.’148 A memorandum from the Commissioner of Police 
listed various meetings of the Communist Party in which Gwala participated actively, and 
recorded that, in certain meetings Gwala gave addresses that ‘incited people to disobey the 
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law.’149 Gwala’s continued involvement in Communist Party activities fuelled further 
animosity between him and Jordan Ngubane and Champion. Relationships in the Natal CYL 
executive were characterised by quarrels and intense disagreements.150 As soon as he had 
recuperated from his long illness, Jordan Ngubane issued statements to the effect that 
communists were lesser evils than apartheid as they ‘were using the Congress as a big stick 
with which to flog the Capitalists for their own ends.’151 Ngubane hated communists and 
claimed that ‘they want to keep us a proletariat community while the other racial groups 
become the ruling hierarchy.’152 By the beginning of 1951, the political differences between 
Gwala and Jordan Ngubane reached boiling point. Gwala emphasised that Jordan Ngubane, 
like many members of the CYL during the 1940s, was not just negative but very hostile 
towards the Communist Party and its members. In addition, Ngubane resisted the notion of 
cooperation with non-Africans. Compared with other parts of the country, differences 
between Gwala, Ngubane, Champion and Msimang, together with acrimony between 
Africans and Indians that resulted in uprisings in 1949, led to a delay in the Defiance 
Campaign in Natal. 
Connectedness and working class struggles in Natal 
The 1939-40 Native Affairs Commission noted the ‘rise of an industrial class among the 
Bantu’ which was being influenced by ‘agitators’ and that ‘their power cannot be ignored.’ It 
further acknowledged that by 1940 there were already ‘a number of ‘native trade unions 
demanding recognition.’153 The report suggested that these trade unions were organised by 
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‘Europeans some of whom perceived this as a means of improving the lot of the native 
worker.’ The Commission assured the government that although ‘industrial solidarity’ has 
proven to be ‘fruitful in attaining the position occupied by the trade union world in Western 
Europe,’ it would not be successful in ‘South Africa for the Bantu workers.’154 It argued that 
the success of trade union movement in Europe was due to the leadership ‘by men of 
experience and outstanding common sense,’ while in the South African context, it was led by 
‘a people just emerging from barbarism, with no industrial experience, no elementary 
acquaintance with economics.’155 While the Commission underestimated the potential of the 
mushrooming African trade unions, it advised the government to establish a mechanism to 
provide ‘some form of recognition’ for African trade unions.156 It recommended that such 
recognition should be in a form that would ‘prevent Native workers from becoming the dupes 
of Europeans who seek to exploit their grievance for their own profit.’157 The Commission 
was oblivious to the impact political education was to have on emerging African trade 
unionists such as Gwala, Steven Dlamini and Moses Mabhida.  
Tim Nuttall argues that, from the late 1930s, Communist Party activists assisted in 
establishing non-racial trade unions in keeping with principles it adopted when the Party was 
revived.158 This, however, did not mean that the Communist Party was better organised, as it 
remained a small organisation with a membership of approximately 280, half of whom were 
based in Johannesburg. In 1940, as Communist Party influence on trade unions was limited, 
Moses Kotane, its secretary general, urged members to ‘pay much closer attention to local 
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township politics.’159 The growth of the Communist Party’s influence among mainly non-
European trade unions should be understood against the background of extreme poverty and 
deplorable living conditions, especially among urbanised groups, mainly Africans.  
On the other hand, the industrial expansion unleashed by the war required that the state relax 
influx control laws in order to attract cheap African labour. As Vishnu Padayachee, Shahid 
Vawda and Paul Tichmann have argued, wartime economic growth resulted in a dramatic 
increase in the employment of African workers in more semi-skilled positions and thus 
increased their bargaining power.160 The Communist Party extended its influence amongst the 
newly urbanised African working class as it attracted young educated and semi-educated 
migrants through its night school programmes and reading clubs.161 Gwala was among the 
first Africans who rebuilt the Communist Party in Pietermaritzburg and subsequently 
participated in linking class struggles with the broader politics of African nationalism. As the 
Communist Party was being rejuvenated, its membership grew rapidly, and its influence in 
the emerging trade unions became apparent.162  
Michael Hanagan and Charles Stephenson have argued that there is a relationship between 
industrialisation and greater class consciousness of the working class.163 Industrial expansion 
in South Africa in the 1940s led to proletarianisation which subsequently expanded into 
urban class formation. This section extends Hanagan and Stephenson’s analysis by arguing 
                                                 
159 D. Fortescue, ‘The Communist Party of South Africa and the African Working Class in the 1940s’, The International 
Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1991, 484; G. Vahed, ‘Race or Class? Community and Conflict 
Amongst Indian Municipal Employees in Durban, 1914-1949’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2001, 
105-125. 
160 V. Padayachee, S. Vawda and P. Tichmann, Indian Workers and Trades Unions in Durban: 1930-1950, Durban: 
(University of Durban-Westville: Institute for Social and Economic Research, 1985), 15. 
161 Fortescue, ‘The Communist Party of South Africa’, 481-512; Moodie, ‘The South African State and Industrial Conflict in 
the 1940s’, 21-61; D. Hemson, ‘Dock Workers, Labour Circulation, and Class Struggles in Durban, 1940-59’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 4, No.1, 88-124. 
162 E. Maloka, The South African Communist Party in Exile, 1963-1990 (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2002), 2. 
163 M. Hanagan and C. Stephenson (eds.), Proletarians and Protest: The Roots of Class Formation in an Industrializing 
World (London: Greenwood Press, 1986), 4.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
74 
that Gwala’s focus on workers’ mobilisayion enabled the creation of working class identities 
in Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Howick that transcended pre-existing class, racial and 
sometimes ethnic backgrounds. As the Communist Party in 1943 encouraged its members to 
join the ANC, Gwala developed a complex class analysis which connected class with the 
politics of African nationalism. Although African trade unions were almost obliterated during 
the 1930s, the 1940s marked a new era, as the Communist Party rooted itself within the 
struggles that were affecting non-Europeans.164  
Edward Roux noted that in Natal, Communists were busy organising Indians, Africans, and 
sometimes whites as well, into new industrial unions. In 1941 a number of African unions 
came together to form the Council of non-European Trade Unions (CNETU).165 Although 
CNETU remained largely based in the Witwatersrand, it managed to inspire the 
establishment of trade unions in industries that had previously not had any. While CNETU 
had a relatively short life, it succeeded in drawing links between labour and political 
questions. This was made possible by CNETU’s ability to draw its leadership largely from 
political activists. Steven Freidman has argued that CNETU was the first African union 
movement to create a local leadership.166 By January 1946, the African trade union 
movement had grown to such an extent that A. B. Xuma remarked that ‘the African worker is 
becoming more conscious of his needs and his rights and is becoming to understand the value 
of trade union organisation and collective bargaining.’167  
The Communist Party’s summer schools model provided a platform for educating newly 
recruited members on the intellectual foundations of the Party. Gwala’s participation in these 
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schools introduced him to trade unionism. Naboth Mokgatle has noted that ‘at the school a 
long range of subjects were taught: political economy, socialism in general, trade unionism, 
the difference between the Communist Party and Labour party, social democracy and 
communism, the origin of man and society, civics, the meaning of democracy, the right of 
people in society and state.’168 There is no doubt that some of these subjects helped to shape 
Gwala’s politics because he soon started to incorporate what he had learned in his own school 
teaching. Some of these teachings expressed themselves later during his incarceration on 
Robben Island.  
While Gwala was becoming more involved in the activities of the Communist Party, the 
state’s security agencies were also scrutinising his political activities very closely since he 
was still employed as a full-time teacher. The Commissioner of Police notified the 
headmaster of Slangspruit Government School about Gwala’s political activities.169 In 
January 1944, he was charged by the Department of Education for propagating communism 
in a school. Although Gwala was acquitted from the charges, by June 1944 he had resigned 
from teaching after the Communist Party asked him ‘to leave teaching and do trade union 
work’ full time.170 Gwala was tasked with focusing on organising trade unions in 
Pietermaritzburg, Durban and, later, Howick, and he was also actively involved in the 
activities of the Communist Party in Pietermaritzburg.   
Gwala’s first trade union responsibility was to organise the distributive workers, and sweet 
workers and municipal workers in Pietermaritzburg as well as rubber workers at Howick. As 
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a trade union organiser, Gwala ‘used to go out to factory meetings and address workers on 
issues that affected their livelihood.’171 Between 1944 and 1948 Gwala showed how it might 
be possible to build a vibrant trade union consciousness in Pietermaritzburg. By the end of 
the 1940s, Gwala was secretary general of ten trade unions in Natal.172 
In July 1948, the Natal Communist Party deployed Gwala to Durban to organise the Textile 
Workers’ Union. While in Durban, Gwala seemed to be more preoccupied with the work of 
the Durban and District Committee of the Communist Party than trade unionism. Gwala 
became an organiser of the Durban and District Committee of the Communist Party and was 
responsible for conscientising Africans, Indians and coloureds about the dangers of apartheid 
that had been introduced by the National Party. In one meeting organised by the Communist 
Party in October 1948, Gwala warned the audience that the National Party wanted to deport 
them from town and that this would have negative consequences on their livelihoods.173  
Although Gwala was based in Durban, he remained connected with Pietermaritzburg even 
though the Pietermaritzburg City Council described him as ‘not a Native citizen of this city’ 
and that ‘he had no locus standi to represent local natives.’174 His family remained in 
Ockertskraal near Pietermaritzburg, and he normally spent weekends at home. Towards the 
end of 1949, Gwala returned to Pietermaritzburg not having achieved much in Durban. He 
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found Durban’s politics more complicated, as it was characterised by racial animosity 
between Africans and Indians.175  
Howick and Gwala’s underground activities 
In 1985, over 1 000 workers were fired at BTR Sarmcol in Howick after they were involved 
in a legal strike. Mkhize argues that ‘it all began when Harry Gwala was unionising workers 
at Sarmcol.’176 Moreover, when interviewed, some of these workers claimed to be products of 
‘Gwala’s unions’ of the 1950s and early 1960s. How did it happen that despite being banned, 
restricted to his magisterial district without any right to hold public meeting or to speak to the 
public, and imprisoned at Robben Island, the stories of Gwala’s unions were never forgotten, 
even in the mid-1980s? Why, despite being disconnected for over thirty years, was Gwala’s 
political activism still visible among the working class and people in the political sphere?  
As Debby Bonnin has argued ‘Gwala left behind a one message, unity.’177 Before Gwala was 
deployed to Durban in 1948, he had already identified the industrial workers in Howick as a 
group to work with. He had been surprised that, despite the deplorable conditions under 
which they worked, they were not organised and had no trade unions. More than any other 
sector, Howick presented an opportunity as ‘there were over a thousand industrial workers 
concentrated in one place.’178 After the Suppression of Communism Act was signed into law, 
Gwala’s politics shifted significantly. He had to contend with the state’s intention to include 
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his name in a list of persons who were associated with the banned Communist Party. As a 
consequence, the focus of his work became mobilising industrial workers in Howick. 
As early as 1946, Gwala’s political activities fell under state surveillance and a top secret 
report proclaimed him to be a ‘danger to state’s security.’179 He was believed to have 
appeared at Communist Party public gatherings and made statements that ‘incite violence and 
hatred of the state.’180 Based on such surveillance, on 6 September 1950 Gwala was informed 
that the Minister of Justice intended to list him. He was required to make representation 
within twenty days to ‘show why his name should not be included in a list of persons who 
had been office bearers, officers, members or active supporters of the Communist Party.’181 
Despite Gwala’s record of political activism, the Minister of Justice highlighted the basis of 
listing Gwala as ‘evidence that he had been a member of the Pietermaritzburg District 
Committee of the Communist Party and a chairperson.’182 Gwala claimed to have received 
the letter on 18 September and, based on the ‘delay’, he requested an extension as he was 
‘seeking a legal opinion in the matter.’183  
Gwala sought the services of R. I. Arenstein attorneys to handle his legal battle with the 
Minister of Justice. Rowley Arenstein had joined the Communist Party in 1938, becoming an 
organiser for the Durban and District branch. In 1947, he withdrew from active politics in 
order to concentrate on his legal practice, but did participate in activities of the Durban 
branch of the COD in the 1950s. Arenstein worked closely with Chief Albert Luthuli and 
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. After Buthelezi was expelled from Fort Hare University for his 
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ANC activities, he had come to work at the Durban Commissioner’s Court to gain 
administrative experience that could be useful to the future chief. Arenstein and Buthelezi 
became close friends. Buthelezi became one of Arenstein’s articled clerks. When the 
chieftaincy of the Buthelezi clan was offered to Buthelezi, Arenstein helped him defeat an 
early challenge to his position and became his legal adviser. Arenstein was first barred from 
political activities in 1953 when he was banned. During this period, he was active in 
organising opposition to the new laws enforcing apartheid and in establishing labour unions 
in Durban. Arenstein suffered the longest period of banning (33 years) in South African 
history and endured the longest house arrest (18 years). Though banned, he continued to 
defend persons accused of political offences. In 1988, despite the vehement protests of the 
government, Buthelezi nominated Arenstein as a member of his negotiating committee with 
Pretoria. Thus, Arenstein also served as a legal advisor for the Inkatha Freedom Party.184  
Arenstein and Gwala developed an argument that sought to disconnect Gwala from ‘comrade 
Gwala’ thus arguing that ‘there was no empirical evidence that suggested that Gwala and 
‘comrade Gwala’ were in fact one person.185 It appears, however, that Arenstein backtracked 
from the earlier argument to disconnect Gwala from the identity of ‘comrade Gwala’. By 
August 1951 Arenstein admitted Gwala’s involvement in Communist Party activities. 
Arenstein’s argument focused on the legitimacy of Gwala’s participation in the Communist 
Party during the 1940s as it was still a ‘perfectly legal organisation in the same way as any 
other political organisation’ before the Suppression of Communism Act was signed into law 
on 14 July 1950.186 Because this had happened prior to the passing of the Act, Arenstein 
claimed that Gwala had not contravened any law of South Africa. Arenstein further claimed 
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that ‘neither at any time has Gwala done anything of which he should be ashamed.’ He 
pointed out that on the contrary Gwala ‘upheld and strove for progressive ideals such as a 
social system free form exploitation of man by man. Gwala upheld the principle that all men 
should have equality of opportunity irrespective of race, colour and creed.’187 Despite 
Arenstein’s representations that Gwala’s political activities were legitimate and justified, his 
name was ‘included in the list on the grounds that he had been a member and active 
supporter’ of the Communist Party.188 The listing of Gwala’s name marked the beginning of 
the phase of the state’s imposition of disconnectedness that was to impact upon Gwala’s 
politics until the 1990s.  
While Gwala was fighting for his name not to be included in the list, he was simultaneously 
organising workers in Howick, which led to the formation of the Howick Rubber Workers’ 
Union (HRWU) in September 1951.189 The union was primarily formed to improve the wages 
and working conditions of its members. Although the constitution of the union referred to the 
‘Howick Rubber Workers’ Industrial Union’ it was popularly known as the Howick Rubber 
Workers’ Union and its letterhead carried the latter name.190 In line with Gwala’s politics of 
connectedness, the union positioned itself as a vanguard of the oppressed groups in society to 
such an extent that the unemployed people of Howick were eligible to be members. Gwala 
was the secretary while a certain David Sewdan was chairperson. The union applied for 
registration with the Department of Labour on 26 October 1951 and reported that it had 150 
members in good standing while 550 were in arrears with their subscriptions.191  
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In line with Gwala’s non-racialism, the union was open to coloureds, Indians and Africans. 
This caused a delay in its registration as Africans were not defined as employees according to 
the Industrial Conciliation Act. While its registration took an unprecedentedly long time to be 
approved, the union affiliated with the South African Trades and Labour Council 
(SATLC).192 In the meantime, the union became more active at Sarmcol as over 75% of 
Sarmcol employees were reported to be members of ‘Gwala’s union.’ It continually 
petitioned Sarmcol’s management with a list of workers’ demands. One such petition was a 
demand for higher wages and the improvement of the conditions of employment that the 
union submitted to the Sarmcol management on 11 October 1951. Although the union had the 
support of close to 900 employees, Sarmcol management disregarded its demands and did not 
reply to its petition.193 Sarmcol did not respond because it refused to recognise Gwala’s 
union. The company prevented him from entering its premises to conduct trade union 
activities. In the meantime, Sarmcol management offered to appoint a ‘committee to convey 
grievances of the workers to the management.’ This was unanimously rejected by the 
workers, as they were convinced the ‘committee was going to circumvent any appointment of 
a conciliation board at Sarmcol.’194  
The union remained a powerful voice in Sarmcol because it drew support across the racial 
divide. Gwala was forced to resign as a secretary after he was served with a banning order in 
April 1952. Gwala’s resignation did not paralyse the workers’ activism that had developed in 
Sarmcol. Worker militancy continued even after Gwala was no longer a union official. In 
addition, as Clemence Gumede testified, even though he was banned, Gwala continued to 
                                                 
192 UWL, HLP, SATLC: Disputes, 1951-1954, AH646/DC 8.91-111, box 93, letter from H. S. Boyder to the secretary of the 
Howick Rubber Workers’ Union, 8 May 1952. 
193 UWL, HLP, SATLC: Disputes, 1951-1954, AH646/DC 8.91-111, box 93, letters from T. H. Gwala to Sarmcol 
management, 11 October 1951 and 19 November 1951.  
194 UWL, HLP, SATLC: Disputes, 1951-1954, AH646/DC 8.91-111, box 93, statement by S. B. Maharaj, 16 June 1952. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
82 
support the union’s activities and had secret meetings with union members under a tree.195 
Norman Levy also asserts that Gwala disregarded the banning order and instead continued to 
build non-racial worker militancy throughout the 1950s.196 While the Department of Labour 
delayed the registration of the union because its membership included non-Europeans, 
employees of Sarmcol appointed a certain S. B. Maharaj to be their negotiator and acting 
union secretary.197 Soon after his appointment, Maharaj applied for the appointment of an 
arbitrator and asked the SATLC to intervene. Sarmcol management remained unwilling to 
engage with either the union or the SATLC. Sarmcol claimed that its ‘employees have at all 
times direct access to the higher management, for the purpose of discussing any question 
bearing on their employment.’ They further claimed to be ‘very close indeed to all workers 
including Indians, Coloureds and Natives, and they were satisfied that there was no genuine 
dissatisfaction amongst them.’198  
Instead of recognising the union, the labour department opted to intimidate workers by 
sending petition forms to the Indian and coloured employees of Sarmcol. Each petitioner was 
called by the Sarmcol management to ascertain whether they were signatories to the 
application for a conciliation board. Fearing victimisation, many employees denied that they 
had signed the application for a conciliation board.199 After protracted negotiations and 
demands by both the union and SATLC, the Howick Rubber Workers’ Industrial Union was 
registered towards the end of 1953. This meant that Sarmcol management was forced to 
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recognise the union.200 Through Gwala’s influence, Moses Mabhida became secretary of the 
union in 1953.201 However, the union did not survive long because the management of 
Sarmcol made it difficult for it to function and, in 1955, Mabhida was moved to organise 
trade unions in Durban. The union was finally deregistered in 1958 by the Department of 
Labour ‘for its failure to comply with the provisions of the law’ and inability to submit 
audited financial statements.202  
In 1953, the Communist Party was formally reconstituted as an underground organisation.203 
Gwala was not aware that the Communist Party was being re-established but, in 1954, he 
received a clandestine note in his post-box that Marxist discussion cells were being 
resuscitated. Gwala was committed to defying his banning order, made contact with 
Mabhida, Selby Mazibuko, Bobby Pillay and Goolam Rasool, and they started a cell in 
Pietermaritzburg.204 This cell grew to become the centre of political discussion and 
underground operation in Pietermaritzburg. When his banning order expired in 1954, he was 
served with another ban on 7 June 1954. The order ‘prohibited him attending, during the 
period of two years, any gathering in any place within South Africa.’205  
In 1953, Gwala worked for a law firm in Pietermaritzburg as a typist. In 1954, he worked as a 
typist in the laboratory at Edendale Hospital.206 The Edendale job placed Gwala in an 
advantageous position since, as a typist, he had access to government printing facilities. He 
utilised the hospital printing facilities to print propaganda material of the ANC and the newly 
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regenerated Communist Party. Gwala’s employment at Edendale Hospital provided more 
opportunities to develop clandestine material for the Pietermaritzburg cell. He was also 
central in organising the Natal Midlands delegation which attended the Congress of the 
People in Kliptown in 1955.207   
Gwala’s banning order was renewed every two years while state security kept him under 
close surveillance. Intelligence reports were used by the security service to justify the renewal 
of his banning order.208 However, in 1956, in defiance of the banning order and the 
conditions attached to it, Gwala’s political outlook underwent a metamorphosis as he openly 
engaged in protest politics. During the mid-1950s The New Age had become an organ of 
ANC expression under the editorship of Brain Bunting, a member of the Communist Party.209 
The New Age covered the intersection of economic, cultural, social and historical issues, and 
reported avidly about protest politics in South Africa. Because the political leadership and its 
constituency was drawn from a rejuvenated social class that was increasingly literate and 
urbanised, newspapers that were linked to the liberation struggle became an instrumental tool 
to express and exchange political opinions, and a means to connect readers with the 
mainstream politics of liberation.  
In July 1956, The New Age announced that it was hosting the ‘New Age Short Story 
Competition’ and invited its readers to submit their short stories for consideration. It 
appointed Phyllis Altman, Harry Bloom, Duma Nokwe and Michael Harmel as the 
competition judges. Nokwe and Harmel were openly associated with both the ANC and the 
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Communist Party. ‘Thirty-odd stories that were submitted came from every quarter of the 
country’ and attracted authors from diverse cultural and racial backgrounds.210 In their report, 
the judges acknowledged the ‘varying degrees of literary merit’ of each competition 
contributor and noted that each story ‘presented a vivid and realistic portrayal of different 
aspects of life in South Africa.’211 Submitted short stories were of such a high quality that 
more than a third were recommended for publication. The judge’s adjudication did not focus 
on issues of syntax and grammar; rather it weighed up the ‘imponderable qualities such as 
artistic truth and significance.’  
A defiant Gwala, who was still banned, contributed to the competition with a short story 
entitled ‘On That Hillock’, which intertwined issues of forced labour, poll tax and an 
‘overseer’ who symbolised oppression and white superiority. Gwala’s short story invoked a 
memory of the last armed resistance to British colonialism in South Africa, the 1906 
Bhambatha Rebellion. Gwala’s focus on the Bhambatha Rebellion should be understood in 
the light of the ANC having already agreed in 1953 that a plan would be drawn up to prepare 
the organisation to operate underground in the event that it was banned.212 It is possible that 
since Gwala had been made aware of the re-emergence of the Communist Party, he might 
also have been informed about plans for the armed struggle. Gwala interpreted the 1906 
Rebellion as an anecdote of the struggle against a system of capitalist domination while 
emphasising that it was not against white people as a race. Gwala cautioned that ‘better 
methods of warfare’ and strategies should be adopted in armed struggle.213 Gwala’s short 
story drew parallels between the 1906 Rebellion and the armed struggle. While he conceded 
the defeat of Africans during the rebellion, he also emphasised that although ‘some battles 
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could be lost the final victory is certain.’ The short story presented the 1906 Rebellion as the 
foundation for the armed struggle for the liberation of South Africa.  
Gwala shared third prize with Alfred Hutchinson.214 The judges described Gwala as having 
‘developing qualities of a first class writer’ with the ability to create a stirring reconstruction 
of the day of the Bhambatha Rebellion. They also acknowledged Gwala’s ‘talent of bringing 
history to life.’215 It was due to this story that the Commissioner of Police argued that 
Gwala’s ‘sympathy continued to lie with the Communists and he will return to his old ways 
as soon as he is no longer subjected to his restrictions.’216 
Gwala, now a regular contributor to the newspapers, continued to use the Bhambatha 
Rebellion as a metaphor. In the December 1956 volume of Fighting Talk, a pro-Communist 
magazine edited by Ruth First, Gwala’s short story, ‘The Trial’, was published. This story 
dramatised the agony and trauma of the trial that followed the Bhambatha Rebellion.217 
Gwala’s short story was written against the backdrop of the government’s swooping arrest of 
156 Congress leaders in the early hours of 5 December 1956, after which they were put on 
trial for high treason. Gwala’s short story drew parallels between the Bhambatha trial and the 
1956 treason trial as both were ‘based on the premise that the King could do no wrong but 
men could and always did wrong.’218 Gwala’s stories were widely read and ‘stimulated a 
sense of pride to the histories of the African people.’219 
There were robust debates about the direction of the Congress movement in 1949, and Gwala 
was among those in Natal who supported the Programme of Action. Gwala was supportive to 
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strikes actions, boycotts and other forms of civil disobedience. Nevertheless, he was unable to 
be at a forefront due to restrictions that had been imposed to him by the regime. Gwala 
viewed his employment at Edendale Hospital as an opportunity to continue with the key 
principles of the Programme of Action. He helped to establish a workers’ union at Edendale 
Hospital that included hospital nurses, doctors and other staff. Gwala organised the first ever 
doctors’ strike at Edendale Hospital in 1957.  
As soon as the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was launched in 1955, 
Moses Mabhida, Gwala’s protégé and confidante, was tasked with establishing its Natal 
offices in Durban and Pietermaritzburg and to mobilise workers. In August 1955, the ANC, 
South African Congress of Democrats, SAIC and SACTU established the National Co-
ordinating Council (NCC) that comprised elected representatives from all Congress 
organisations. During May 1957, the NCC called for a national strike on June 26th, which 
culminated in the ‘£1 a Day’ campaign. While the Transvaal and the Cape were more 
militant, the Natal leadership adopted a ‘cautious approach throughout 1957’ because they 
felt that mobilisation on a mass scale was not possible while trade unions were relatively 
weak.220 As the Natal leadership was cognisant of its limitations, it diluted the strike call 
issued by the national leadership. However, Gwala mobilised the hospital staff to participate 
in the £1 a Day campaign. While there is no clear evidence that hospital staff did participate, 
the hospital management dismissed Gwala in January 1958 after being instructed to do so by 
state security agencies. 
The sacking of Gwala coincided with the expiry of his banning order that had been issued in 
1956. To Gwala this meant a temporary relief. Although he had been previously ordered to 
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resign from his trade union positions, the expiry of the banning order allowed him to be 
politically active again.221 By mid-1958, Gwala had already started reorganising BTR 
Sarmcol workers which resulted in the re-emergence of the Howick Rubber Workers’ Union 
in 1960. Although the new union was in fact a resuscitation of the Howick Rubber Industrial 
Workers’ Union which had been established in early 1950s, it omitted the name ‘industrial’ 
since Gwala was prohibited from participating in the activities of a union under that name.222 
The members of the union executive were Clemence Gumede, Felix Ngcobo, Joseph Nduli 
and Frans Ross.223 Although Clemence Gumede was the elected chairperson, he requested 
Gwala to address many members’ meetings. The union did not elect a secretary but ‘took 
Gwala as organising secretary.’  
Because Gwala was prohibited from entering the premises of BTR Sarmcol, union meetings 
were held under a tree outside the premises, and these were mainly addressed by Gwala. The 
union continued to adhere to its non-racial character as it drew its membership from non-
European BTR Sarmcol workers.224 The union had a strong political inclination because its 
leadership comprised ANC activists. One such was Jacob Zuma who was at that time an 
ANC activist in Natal and shop steward of the union.225 Gwala, Zuma and Joseph Nduli also 
addressed meetings of the union and urged workers to ‘unite and go to the employers and 
demand to be paid one pound a day.’226  
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From 1958 Gwala’s politics seem to have gravitated towards a militant political stance as he 
reconnected himself with national and class struggles.227 This development might have been 
prompted by the manner in which the state security apparatus had disconnected him. This 
was also motivated by the fact that discussions about the armed struggle were taking place 
within Communist Party cells. In addition, his banning order had expired and had not been 
renewed. Gwala took advantage of being a ‘free person’ and immersed himself in the 
political rhetoric around the £1 a Day campaign and other ANC mass mobilisation 
activities.228 In February 1958, Gwala attended a conference of the £1 a Day campaign in 
Durban organised by SACTU.  
At the same time, Gwala was also preoccupied with women’s struggles and played an active 
role in the mobilising women against the government instruction that they were to carry 
reference books (passes). He continued to play a pivotal role in shaping the direction of the 
ANC and participated in both its provincial and national conference that were held in Natal. It 
was because of his active role that Gwala was elected to the Natal Provincial Executive 
Committee of the ANC in 1959. The declaration of the State of Emergency in 1960 after the 
massacres of Sharpeville and Langa on 21 March made Gwala realise that time was right to 
embark on the armed struggle.229 Soon afterwards the state ‘introduced a battery of draconian 
measures: the ANC and Pan Africanist Congress were banned and security laws and 
institutions were extended and reinforced.’230  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the period between 1942 and 1960 marked the 
germination of Gwala’s politics of connectedness. The chapter has examined complex 
political environments under which Gwala’s politics of connectedness developed and located 
Gwala within the historical trajectory of the emergence of youth politics, mass mobilisation 
and the fusing of African nationalism with class imperatives. The chapter has argued that the 
development of African nationalism can only be understood within an examination of wider 
political developments that unfolded within Indian politics and the politics of the Communist 
Party. In order to understand the development of mass-based radical politics in Natal that 
characterised the 1950s, the chapter demonstrates how Gwala’s non-racialism played a 
fundamental role in connecting the various opponents of the state’s segregationist apartheid 
laws.  
Gwala’s politics coincided with pervasive negative perceptions of the Communist Party. This 
created turmoil between the conservative Natal ANC executive and the Natal CYL while the 
Natal CYL was unable to take advantage of the support of white liberals due to its 
Communist links. While Gwala emerged as a connector, he was simultaneously disconnected 
mainly by the state apparatus as well as within the Natal CYL. Yet, a politically conscious 
and determined Gwala continued to work with the ANC to strengthen mass mobilisation and 
liberation politics. Gwala’s resilience and connectedness enabled him to avert criminalisation 
and disconnection as he continued to hold secret meetings in pursuit of his goals of mass 
mobilisation and connectedness. Although Gwala left active participation in the Natal CYL, 
in 1951 he played a vital role in advocating for the transformation of the Natal ANC 
leadership which resulted in the defeat of AWG Champion and the ascendance of Chief 
Albert Luthuli to the chairpersonship. After Champion lost the presidency of the Natal ANC, 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
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he indicated that he was ‘pulling out of the Congress’ because he had ‘never found a good 
home in the Congress.’231   
It was the political activism of Gwala, Moses Mabhida and Stephen Dlamini during the 1940s 
and 1950s which laid the ground for the interweaving of class and trade unionism which 
became the basis of forging connectedness in the liberation struggle. In many ways, these 
connections provided the foundation for the tripartite alliance between the ANC, Communist 
Party and trade unions. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
Harry Gwala and the politicisation of football in Pietermaritzburg,    
1920s-1950s 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the complex interplay between football and Harry Gwala’s politics of 
connectedness. Increasing urbanisation and the state’s anxiety about the potential influence of 
the radical politics of the 1920s compelled the Pietermaritzburg Council (PMBC) to rethink 
its position on the provision of facilities and funds for football among Africans. Under 
Gwala’s influence, football became a tool of mobilisation, contestation and connectedness, as 
well as an arena where political struggles were fought. Ciraj Rassool and Virgil Slade have 
argued that football could be ‘a lens to through which to understand complicated issues like 
race and identity formation, political principles and strategies, and resistance to apartheid.’1 
This chapter examines Gwala’s role in football administration, his journey to the leadership 
of a football association during the late 1940s, and his acrimonious relationship with the 
PMBC. Furthermore, it demonstrates how football became an arena of modes of expression 
about citizenship and group identities within the urban landscape.  
The first part of the chapter explores the politics of local government and its provision of 
recreational facilities for the use by Africans in Pietermaritzburg from the 1920s until 1942. 
While Gwala was not involved in football administration at this time, foundations were laid 
through which football became a vehicle for the creation of class and political identities. 
Football provided a mechanism for urban Africans to redefine, and re-imagine themselves 
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within an atmosphere of narrowing social spaces and hardening racial stratification. This 
section also examines the involvement of the local state in the provision and regulation of 
African leisure time between the 1920s to 1950s. At this time African recreation was seen as 
‘a potential saving on police’ and a way of trying to dampen emerging political consciousness 
among Africans. It further examines how the provision of facilities and funds for African 
football was influenced by white paternalism and the anxieties of liberal reformers about the 
security of capital and their own livelihoods. African recreation developed its own character 
in Pietermaritzburg as the PMBC sought to use football to ameliorate conditions for the 
middle class and control the spare time of Africans. However, through Gwala’s politics of 
connectedness, football also became contested terrain, a space of mass mobilisation amidst 
the deepening complexities of class, racial formation and political mobilisation.  
The second part of this chapter examines Gwala’s engagement with the PMBC and critically 
analyses how football-based identities were not necessarily people’s only identities. People 
could be described as having generated multiple identities simultaneously, seasonally or 
consecutively. It seeks to build on the theme of connectedness and disconnectedness by 
demonstrating how Gwala’s ascension to the leadership of a football association gave him a 
platform to communicate to a wider spectrum of people. The PMBC felt threatened by 
Gwala’s activities and took a political decision to deprive him and his association of access to 
the Council’s sport grounds and annual club grant. Gwala’s involvement in football should be 
understood through Jeremy MacClancy’s argument that sport cannot be divorced from social 
and political relations of power. 2 The question of who controls sport, such as football, how it 
was organised and played, and by whom it was played, seems to have driven Gwala’s interest 
in the administration of football in Pietermaritzburg.  
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Gwala was mindful of the extent to which the PMBC had used sport to ameliorate living 
conditions for the urban working classes, since the 1920s, while at the same time it also 
displayed sport as a tool of dominance as part of a long-term strategy of social control. 
Christopher Merrett argues that, as was the case in Durban, in Pietermaritzburg the council 
became ‘increasingly involved in controlling the leisure time for Africans in the hope of 
diverting the spare time of workers and encouraging the middle class’ to become 
assimilated.3 Before Gwala joined political and football structures in Pietermaritzburg, 
leaders such as Chief Albert Luthuli had been involved in the administration of football. The 
potential for using sport as a tool of mass mobilisation to oppose the state machinery had 
already been established.4 For Gwala football was a terrain of political interaction, 
mobilisation and resistance.  
Football identities and the politics of connectedness 
In 1999, the Msunduzi Local Municipality announced that the city’s Jan Smuts Stadium was 
to be renamed after Harry Gwala. Soon after the announcement the local newspaper, The 
Witness, was inundated with a mixture of vitriolic letters of complaint and those that 
supported the proposal as part of transforming the city’s landscape. John Mitchell, a former 
headmaster of King’s School in Nottingham Road and a historical commentator asked:  
How many in 200 years will remember Harry Gwala or what he meant to 
Pietermaritzburg? They will probably imagine that he played soccer! I 
can’t resist a smile at the thought that our arch-communist is to be located 
between Princess Elizabeth and Princess Margaret drives. I hope he would 
have enjoyed this joke.5  
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Mitchell’s letter insinuated that it was inappropriate for the stadium to carry Gwala’s name, 
thus completely disconnecting Gwala from football history in Pietermaritzburg. He offered an 
‘alternative idea’ of erecting Gwala’s statue in the ‘Freedom Square’ in the centre of 
Pietermaritzburg as this would be ‘close to the seat of municipal and provincial power which 
he fought for.’6 Mitchell’s letter illustrated how Gwala’s complex historical identities had 
been obfuscated and simplified.  
Although the re-imaging of Gwala’s history has dislocated him from his involvement in sport 
in Pietermaritzburg, Lindiwe Gwala, his daughter, has reinforced her father’s close passion 
for football: 
My father loved football. It was in football that he found space to 
reconnect with the people he associated himself with, the working class. 
However, many people do not know that it was football that enabled him 
the space to intercept social and class consciousness which became the 
embodiment of his life.7 
Perhaps Gwala’s political stature eclipsed his involvement in and association with football 
administration in Pietermaritzburg and in Natal more widely. His involvement in football 
administration has generally been overlooked in oral interviews conducted with Gwala 
between 1989 and 1995. It is possible that because of the political violence that engulfed 
Natal and KwaZulu between the mid-1980s and 1990s, Gwala involvement in football 
administration was considered by those researchers to be peripheral. With the exception of 
the work of Christopher Merrett, Gwala’s involvement in football administration has not 
received much scholarly attention.8  
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The period between the 1920s and 1950s was marked by the emergence of two organised 
African football associations, the Maritzburg and District Native Football Association 
(MDNFA) and the Maritzburg and District African Football Association (MDAFA). These 
two associations represented social groups and political views that had different modalities of 
engaging with the PMBC. While the MDNFA was a moderate body and became an ally of 
the PMBC, with C. E. Young as its patron from 1926 and Chief D. J. Sioka as vice president 
in the 1930s, the MDAFA chose to become independent and radical, a position that often led 
to confrontation with the PMBC.  
Although scanty, existing archival evidence suggests that the PMBC did not consider the 
provision of football infrastructure for Africans to be a high priority. From the 1920s, the 
relationship between the PMBC and Africans was characterised by paternalism and marked 
by contradiction. While the PMBC used football as an ameliorative tool and a form of social 
control, Africans used it as a tool of political activism and often contested the social 
objectives of white authorities.9 By contrast, the managers of the PMBC’s Native Affairs 
Department (NAD) reported that ‘natives cooperated with authorities.’10 However, this 
changed drastically from the early 1940s as the newly established MDAFA repudiated the 
PMBC’s authority and openly aligned itself with the radical political rhetoric of the trade 
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unions and the Communist Party.11 As Gwala became central in the leadership of African 
football in Pietermaritzburg, the MDAFA became increasingly vociferous and the PMBC 
ignored its requests for the provision and improvement of football grounds for Africans. The 
radicalisation of football occurred during an era of enormous social change that was brought 
about by increasing urbanisation and industrial expansion and, as we have seen, the ferment 
of trade unionism, as well as the rejuvenation of the Natal Congress Youth League.   
Gwala’s involvement in football went beyond the duties of administration and he also 
associated himself closely with ordinary football spectators. Gwala’s football work was also a 
conspicuous display of connectedness. Perhaps his involvement in football was a repose to 
the elitist posture and politics of the African petty bourgeoisie that led the Natal CYL from 
1944 to 1947. His engagements transformed football administration from being ‘arenas of 
entertainment and sociability’ in the 1930s to centres of political consciousness and 
contestation, and connected with working class struggles in the late 1940s.12 Notable African 
political leaders in Natal, such as O. E. Msimang and Chief Albert Luthuli, had already been 
involved in football administration from as early as the 1920s. Msimang had been treasurer 
and president of the MDNFA and the South African Native Football Association (SANFA) 
respectively during the 1920s and the 1930s, while Luthuli was the first secretary of the 
South African Football Association (SAFA). Luthuli described himself as a ‘compulsive 
football fan’ who was always ‘carried away helplessly by the excitement of a soccer 
match.’13 As Peter Alegi has argued, Luthuli’s involvement in the struggle against racism and 
apartheid demonstrates how football ‘stretched its influence beyond the boundaries of playing 
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fields and created connections and alliances between people in South Africa’s industrial 
society.’14 It was these connections that Gwala sought to reinforce.  
Between 1947 and 1951, Gwala’s politics transformed the management of urban space and 
football from being an elitist preoccupation into a form of popular resistance in 
Pietermaritzburg. During the 1940s, while the PMBC was determined to increase the 
provision of sporting facilities in order to reduce the likelihood of Africans participating in 
emerging radical politics, Gwala used football as a means of reaching out to the masses and 
the working class. During this period, Gwala and Selby Mazibuko led an outspoken faction 
within the MDAFA, which often led to disputes with NAD manager R. E. Stevens and later 
his successor, D. N. Bang. However, with the promulgation of the Suppression of 
Communism Act in 1950, Gwala decided to relinquish his involvement in the affairs of the 
MDAFA as he was preparing to operate underground. The complex relationship between the 
PMBC and MDAFA that manifested itself during the 1940s was a product of the historical 
circumstances of increased urbanisation and intensification of social and racial complexities.  
The state and control of African leisure time   
The decades between the 1920s and the 1950s represented a period of tremendous change for 
Africans in Pietermaritzburg and Natal more broadly. The deteriorating conditions in the 
Natal rural hinterland coupled with steady industrial growth in cities such as Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg resulted in rapid urban settlement. Many Africans sought ways of improving 
their economic fortunes as their homestead livelihoods had deteriorated to the point that 
families were struggling to survive.15 The urban African population presented a political 
conundrum for white capital. White conservatives viewed African urban settlement as 
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important as long as it served the interests of white capital and firmly rejected any prospects 
of a permanently urbanised African population. On the other hand, liberal reformers proposed 
that a class of urbanised Africans was necessary to sustain the needs of capital.16 As Saul 
Dubow has correctly argued, liberal reformists’ anxieties were concerned with the ‘moral 
degeneration of Africans in the foreign environment of the cities.’ Yet they also worried 
about the potential threat of uncontrolled Africans in cities.17 As a result, urban social welfare 
became an important area of liberal concern as a way to defuse social and industrial conflict 
and the supposed socially dislocating effects of the city.  
Initially the PMBC rejected the concept of providing recreational facilities to Africans. 
Instead, until 1922 the PMBC was convinced that ‘native education’ was more vital than 
recreation.18 The PMBC opted to provide a grant for ‘native night schools’ in the face of 
increasing demands from an organised sport association requesting the improvement of 
football grounds and a nominal grant.19 Even though the PMBC was aware of increasing 
urbanisation, mainly by Africans and Indians, it considered the provision of sport and leisure 
as a lesser priority than housing, which it admitted ‘it was generally very unsatisfactory.’20  
Since the early 1920s, the MDNFA had represented African soccer teams in 
Pietermaritzburg. The MDNFA persistently submitted requests to use the City’s football 
grounds. The PMBC provided access after it had firstly established whether the Maritzburg 
District Football Association (MDFA), an association that represented white footballers, was 
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planning to use those grounds.21 It was not until 1923 that the PMBC gave the MDNFA an 
ad-hoc grant to cover administration costs.22 However, this support was inconsistent and 
short-lived as the PMBC still had no interest in African football. During the 1924 football 
season, the PMBC turned down a request by the MDNFA to use football grounds as it 
suspected that ‘they were pursuing other interests that were not favoured by the City 
Council.’23  
The MDNFA operated in a complex political environment and struggled to manage the 
cohesion of its football teams as well as the involvement of its leadership in broader political 
movements that were hostile to the state. It was often granted access to football grounds that 
were far from where many Africans resided, or which were poorly maintained, or both. It was 
also unable to manage spontaneous conflicts between its rank and file members. E. O. 
Msimang, for example, had cordial relations with the state, yet had been part of African 
nationalist politics in Natal. Willie Sakela, an executive member of the MDNFA, seems to 
have operated outside the political framework of protest politics and was less antagonistic to 
the state. Despite the MDNFA having good relations with the state, the PMBC remained 
‘suspicious of their involvement in politics’ as they feared that ‘they might use the 
opportunity provided by football to influence the natives.’24 Also, the MDNFA’s inability to 
build a cohesive organisation compromised its potential to confront the PMBC’s attitude 
towards African football.  
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An event that occurred on 5 September 1922 became a pretext for the PMBC to withdraw 
access to football facilities and grant funding. The Unities Football Club was dissatisfied 
about a goal awarded to the Come Agains Football Club. When the matter was referred to an 
Appeal Committee, the association was ‘satisfied that the referee acted well in accordance 
with the rules of the competition.’25 When a suggestion from Willie Sakela and his club that 
the matter be referred to arbitration by Messrs Griffin and Young of the English Football 
Association was rebuffed by the MDNFA, the club requested the Town Treasurer’s 
intervention. The club threatened to obtain a court order forcing the matter to be taken to 
arbitration and to interdict the association from running the 1923 football season.26 Although 
there is no archival evidence that Willie Sakela approached any court, the animosities 
resulted in a public spat which weakened the leadership of the MDNFA until 1925. The 
inability of the MDNFA to resolve this matter amicably caused considerable damage to its 
reputation and contributed to its inability to influence the PMBC in its favour. In 1925, the 
PMBC capitalised on the tension and refused to provide permission for the MDNFA to use 
any football grounds and turned down its application for an annual grant. In 1926 Willie 
Sakela withdrew from the MDNFA to form the Maritzburg Bantu Football Association 
(MBFA). Although the MBFA was moderate, it failed to draw support from the PMBC, and 
split weakened it and led to its decline.  
The political transformation in Natal during the mid and late 1920s forced the PMBC to 
adopt new approaches towards the ‘urban native question.’27 The activities of the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) showed signs of leading to the radicalisation of 
protest politics, and the PMBC was afraid of the emergence of assertive articulations of 
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worker grievances and the growing participation of workers in urban struggles.28 Despite the 
on-going differences on the ‘urban native question’, both liberal reformists and conservatives 
believed that sport was an effective means of social control of Africans in Pietermaritzburg. 
Similarly, Johannesburg and Durban ratepayers raised their concerns about the number of 
unsupervised ‘natives who were seen loitering around the city.’29 For them, organised sport 
provided a solution for this problem and the PMBC had to find ‘proper recreational facilities 
that would keep them occupied, especially on Sunday afternoon.’30  
In October 1925, the PMBC established the NAD which was responsible for the control of 
the ‘native togt and registration office, the native men’s and women’s hostel, and the 
establishment of the native village.’31 Previously, native affairs had been managed under the 
Brewer and Native Affairs Department. In the period 1925 to 1950, the NAD was led by 
three different managers: Graham Ballenden, and his successors R. E. Stevens and D. N. 
Bang. Ballenden was appointed as the first superintendent and was also required to ‘advise 
Council generally on Native administration.’32 In 1926 Ballenden admitted: 
Natives are badly neglected in the matter of facilities for healthy 
recreation. I find that there is only one ground set aside for them by the 
Council, and that is on the Edendale Road near Mason’s Mill, about 3 
miles from the Town Hall. Apart from any other reason the City cannot 
afford to allow this state of affairs to continue. Some opportunity must be 
provided for the native population to indulge in healthy games, but, as the 
average domestic servant gets very little time off, any grounds set aside 
for their use should be as convenient to the centre of the City as possible. 
It must be further realised that because of the very meagre wages natives 
are paid they are in greater need of assistance than any other section of the 
community.33 
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Ballenden’s submission seems to have persuaded the PMBC to pay more attention to the 
provision of recreational and sport facilities to Africans and to consider an ad-hoc grant to the 
association. However, there is no archival evidence that suggests that Ballenden’s views 
influenced the PMBC to give more attention to Africans’ recreational needs. Ballenden 
resigned in April 1927 to take up a similar position with the Johannesburg Municipality, 
having laid a foundation for the organisation of African football in Pietermaritzburg.34 Under 
the leadership of his successor, R. E. Stevens, especially from the mid-1930s, the PMBC 
gave more attention to the provision of recreational facilities for Africans. In addition, 
Stevens increased opportunities of accessing football grounds and funding in the succeeding 
years. Increasing control of African leisure time was a reaction to other political 
developments in Natal and to increasing complaints from the white community about ‘natives 
that were loitering in town.’35 
The PMBC was shocked by the outbreak of the 1929 riots in Durban which culminated in an 
eighteen-month boycott of its beerhall. The PMBC took seriously the recommendations of 
the De Waal Commission of 1929-30 that investigated the causes of the 1929 Durban riots, 
having already established the post of Native Welfare Officer as early as 1927.36 As Goolam 
Vahed has argued, although it did not blame the state, the Commission called for an 
improvement in the social conditions of Africans, and the channelling of funds into African 
recreation and welfare to defuse unrest.37 While the De Waal Commission was an 
investigation into disturbances in Durban, its recommendations became the blueprint for the 
provision of recreation services to Africans in most South African cities.  
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The 1931 Native Economic Commission provided more impetus for the PMBC to adopt a 
different approach towards the provision of recreation facilities for Africans. J. B. E. Farrer, 
who had been a magistrate in Natal for over 40 years, testified that ‘the huge native 
proletariat in towns would be a very dangerous thing, yet white capital cannot do anything 
without them.’38 Farrer’s evidence epitomised the political dilemma that confronted the 
PMBC. Perhaps Farrer’s opinions influenced the PMBC since once again it began to view 
African recreation more positively despite occasional hostility. As Merrett has argued, the 
PMBC had been unable to meet the demands for housing, sanitation and recreational 
facilities, and also ignored the acute social problems of Africans living on the margins of 
urban life.39  
During the opening of the Tatham Memorial Pavilion, Sir Patrick Duncan, the Governor-
General of South Africa commented:  
For too long had the Europeans forgotten the needs of the native who had 
come to town to work for them; too long had the natives’ amusement been 
overlooked. The grounds would enable the natives to live like a human 
being and would provide for him the sport that the Europeans required 
themselves.40 
Duncan’s comments were indicative of the shift in the PMBC’s approach towards the 
provision of recreational facilities for Africans during the 1930s. The PMBC had succumbed 
to pressure from some local residents to control African leisure time. In addition, similarly to 
Johannesburg’s Non-European Affairs Department (NEAD), the PMBC had begun attempts 
to retribalise ‘natives’ through the promotion of sporting codes such as ngoma dance, 
amalaita, and stick fighting.41 However, the retribalisation project did not have much appeal 
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as football had already become popular among rank and file urban Africans. In addition, as 
Charles Ambler has argued in the case of Northern Rhodesia, whites also feared an African 
popular culture that would ‘thrive beyond the discipline of the workplace’ and suggested that 
more emphasis should be put on football.42 Peter Alegi has argued that ‘football was a shared 
cultural medium through which people involved in formal and informal social groups 
connected across racial, economic, ethno-linguistic, and political lines.’43 Football also 
emerged as the most popular sporting code among Africans, mainly in Natal and on the 
Witwatersrand, and it provided an opportunity to ‘cope with the dislocation of urbanisation 
and build vital alternative networks.’44 The PMBC viewed the management of African leisure 
time as a matter of considerable importance with the expansion of the city’s industrial base 
and increasing urbanisation, and also given that the white neighbourhoods had raised their 
complaints about ‘blacks congregating at the market square on Sundays.’45    
Complaints from the white population about Africans in the Central Business District (CBD) 
made the PMBC extremely worried that if Africans’ leisure time was unregulated they might 
be exposed to political influences, mainly by the Communist Party.46 R. E. Stevens succeeded 
in convincing both the PMBC and the Native Commissioner to increase the number of 
recreational grounds and to regulate Africans’ use of the Market Square.47  
The control of access by Africans to the CBD was further necessitated by the discontent of 
the white community about their supposed conduct. Reverend Heerden, a minister of the 
Dutch Reformed Church complained to the PMBC of the ‘noise’ caused by Africans on the 
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Market Square on Sunday afternoon and requested that ‘steps be taken to abate the 
nuisance.’48 In addition, a certain Rub Meyer of Greytown complained that ‘there are just as 
many Natives and Indians as white people, and unless our wives and daughters are to be 
trampled underfoot, they have to make way for these Natives and Indians.’49 Meyer went to 
the extent of threatening the Town Clerk that if the City Council was unable ‘to defend the 
rights of the white man’ they were prepared to do so themselves and they had the support of 
the entire white population.’50 A similar sentiment was shared by a certain M. J. Houston of 
Boshoff Street who urged the city council to ‘do something about natives who congregate at 
the corner of Loop and Boshoff Streets who were disturbing’ white residents.51  
In response to these demands, the PMBC adopted a new approach towards the provision of 
recreational facilities to Africans. The new approach created favourable conditions for the re-
emergence of the MDNFA. In 1932 Stevens acknowledged that there had been repeated 
MDNFA applications for the use of football grounds. Stevens approached the PMBC to lease 
a site which was owned by SA Railways and Harbours to be utilised as a football ground for 
Africans.52 The PMBC approved the recommendation and the sporting grounds were leased 
to the MDNFA for a period of a year, to be renewed annually. By June 1933, although 
Stevens requested that the Native Administration Committee consider fencing the grounds so 
that the association would be able to ‘take a gate and acquire funds’, he remained reluctant to 
recommend serious improvements to the football grounds as the NAD had no security of 
tenure.53 It was against this background that he recommended to the Town Clerk that the 
PMBC should consider acquiring these sports grounds from the SA Railways and Harbours 
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Department. Stevens emphatically argued that the ‘native recreational grounds will always be 
required in connection with the Department and as years go by will doubtless be more 
difficult to obtain.’54 The PMBC gave Stevens and the Town Clerk permission to negotiate 
the purchase of the sport grounds by the Municipality, which they both prioritised. However, 
the SA Railways and Harbours Department turned down the proposal from the PMBC, 
indicating that it intended to ‘carry out the housing of non-Europeans’ for its employees.55 
Despite this setback, the ongoing correspondence between Stevens and SA Railways and 
Harbours demonstrates that he had committed himself to the development and provision of 
sport fields for Africans.56 By the end of the 1930s the PMBC had allocated the Berg Street 
and Fitzsimons Road Native Sports grounds for the exclusive utilisation by Africans and also 
allocated an annual grant.57  
The control of African football in Pietermaritzburg 
The 1940s marked a turning point in the administration of African football in 
Pietermaritzburg. The relationship between the MDAFA and the PMBC soured over its 
radical stance and the involvement of Gwala and Selby Mazibuko. The fact that relations 
between the PMBC and MDAFA became acrimonious was attributed to Gwala’s political 
affiliation as he was known to be a member of the Communist Party and a trade unionist. In 
addition, the PMBC was already suspicious of African football associations and groups as 
they had already mushroomed in Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town as radical 
alternatives to the conservative and collaborating ‘Bantu’ associations.58 This was 
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exacerbated by the involvement of the ‘African’ associations in Johannesburg in the glittering 
Moroka-Baloyi Cup in the early 1940s. Dr A. B. Xuma, then president-general of the ANC, 
had suggested to Dr James Moroka, ANC executive member and president-general between 
1949 and 1952, and Richard Baloyi, South Africa African Football Association’s (SAAFA) 
treasurer-general and an Alexandra businessman, that the Cup be established.59 By 1944 the 
Cup had grown to the extent that Baloyi was able to use it to organise a historic match to 
raise funds for the ANC.60 Against this background, the PMBC was suspicious of the 
MDAFA’s radical and often combative stance and was reluctant to lease grounds to the 
association or provide it with an annual grant similar to one that went to the MDNFA.  
Moreover, as was evident in the memorandum to the Minister of Justice, by the mid-1940s 
the state had already begun to use its intelligence agents to construct a criminal identity of 
Gwala that was to become ‘prima facia (sic) evidence to prosecute him and anticipated his 
possible removal from society.’61 Furthermore, as Robert Archer and Antoine Bouillon have 
argued, after the victory of the National Party in 1948, the relationship between sport and 
social control became more sinister as the state overtly politicised sport by prohibiting 
interracial games while promoting sport codes that sought to ‘retribalise’ urban Africans.62  
The PMBC was upset about the confrontational approach the MDAFA had adopted. It was 
always at loggerheads with the PMBC due to its independent and Africanist stance.63 The 
MDAFA accused the PMBC of manipulating African football and using its power to 
maintain an official monopoly over all African sports in the city. This issue had already been 
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raised by the breakaway group in Johannesburg in the early 1930s.64 Bang, the manager of 
the NAD, later commented: 
This association, led by T. H. Gwala and S. Mazibuko, has caused this 
Department so much trouble including frivolous legal actions and so much 
time has been spent in clearing up and writing about petty disputes 
brought up through obstructionist tactics, that this opportunity of making it 
‘toe’ the line should not be lost.65 
The PMBC responded to the radical stance of the MDAFA by favouring the MDNFA. 
During the 1944 soccer season, the MDAFA was allocated only one day of access to the 
soccer grounds while the MDNFA had a year-long lease. The radical stance that the MDAFA 
adopted was to some extent a response to the level of provocation by the administration under 
Stevens, and its biased and patronising decisions. Until 1946, the MDAFA attempted to shape 
itself to fit in with the PMBC’s requirements. In 1946, for example, it opted not to contest the 
use of football grounds in Fitzsimons because it wanted to avoid conflict with the PMBC and 
was hoping to use the football ground in Sobantu.66 Nevertheless, the PMBC was unwilling 
to change its attitude to the MDAFA.  
While there is a dearth of historical records that linked Gwala to soccer before 1947, Truman 
Magubane remembered that Gwala ‘had a passion for football and he knew its rules very 
well.’67 Magubane said that Gwala did not play football due to his busy schedule as a trade 
union organiser and office bearer of about ten trade unions, but attended football matches 
regularly. Gwala identified weekend soccer matches as a platform for grassroots mobilisation 
and the arena of political consciousness. It is for this reason that even when Gwala was 
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moved to organise workers in Durban during the late 1940s, he spent his weekends in 
Pietermaritzburg.  
On 9 August and 13 September 1947 the MDAFA held special meetings to ‘consider certain 
allegations against the executive.’68 Gwala emphasised that these meetings were 
characterised by robust debates, intimidation, and major confrontation.69 The MDAFA 
meeting of 13 September 1947 was concluded with a resolution to expel T. A. Nene and H. 
A. Mkize. Gwala and Selby Mazibuko were elected to the executive as secretary and 
president respectively.70 Nene had been elected president of the MDAFA at its annual general 
meeting in February 1947. Nene and Mkize appealed to the Natal African Football 
Association (NAFA) which rescinded the resolution to expel them and ordered that they be 
reinstated immediately. But the Gwala-Mazibuko faction appealed against the decision of the 
NAFA to the SAAFA.  
The simmering tension between the two factions of the MDAFA reached boiling point in 
November 1947 when they were unable to reach consensus on which team was to play in the 
semi-finals of the Governor General Shield Competition (GGSC). The GGSC had been 
established in 1935 when ‘King George V and the Governor General of South Africa, [Sir 
Patrick Duncan], proposed to donate a Shield on which would appear the King’s head in 
silver bas-relief, to the native of the location of Cape Town as a challenge shield for native 
association football clubs.’71 The Mayor of Pietermaritzburg ‘kindly accepted’ the offer and 
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extended it to all ‘natives’ of the Province of Natal and the trophy was posted by a passenger 
train on 29 April 1935.72  
During the mid-1930s, there were two organisations controlling ‘native’ football in Natal, the 
Natal Bantu Football Association and the Natal African Football Association. Stevens 
suggested that a committee should be established to be responsible for drawing up fixtures 
and rules governing the competition comprised of representatives from both organisations 
and ‘one European.’73 After the committee was established it arranged that the competition be 
played in Durban, Ladysmith and Pietermaritzburg. However, as no playing grounds were 
available in Durban while Ladysmith could not provide an enclosed ground to allow the 
committee to take a gate [collect gate entrance fees], Pietermaritzburg had, ‘with the greatest 
difficulty, to bear the brunt of financing teams from Ladysmith and Durban to keep up their 
fixtures in the semi-finals and finals which had to be played in Maritzburg.’74  
The reluctance by Durban and Ladysmith to host the competition required that Stevens had to 
request the PMBC to make funds available for the competition to take place. By 30 
November 1936 the PMBC provided the last funding. It was the last year the competition was 
played, even though the Mayor of Pietermaritzburg had authorised that the competition be 
open to Pietermaritzburg and District teams only.75 Despite their short duration, these efforts 
demonstrated a concerted effort by the PMBC to control African leisure time.76 Moreover, 
through the GGSC, the local state had attempted to amalgamate the ‘natives’ football 
associations.’ However, this was rejected by the Durban and District African Football 
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Secretary Board of Control, GGS Competition to the Manager, NAD, 17 May 1937. 
73 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from R. E. Stevens to the Town Clerk, 13 May 1935.  
74 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from the Secretary Board of Control, GGS Competition to the Manager, NAD, 
17 May 1937. 
75 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, minutes of the Pietermaritzburg Native Administration Committee, 30 June 1937. 
76 Merrett, ‘Social Control and Communal Resistance’, 49. 
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Association, which represented a stronger section of the NAFA, and which believed that the 
MDNFA’s constitution was ‘modelled upon Europeans’ ones.’77 There is no archival 
evidence about whether the committee was able to develop rules for the GGSC. It seems that 
it was the lack of rules that resulted in the 1947 controversy.  
As the PMBC’s interests in African leisure time grew at the beginning of the 1940s, the 
Maritzburg Bantu Football Association, which had withdrawn from the MDNFA in 1926, 
wrote to Stevens expressing its loss of confidence in the board of the GGSC and requested his 
office to take ‘full control of the competition.’78 In response to this plea, the Mayor gave 
‘authority to Stevens to appoint a certain Mr S. W. Pape to act as a neutral chairman of a 
meeting comprising of both the Bantu Football Association and the African Football 
Association.’79 Although various meetings were held under Pape’s chairmanship, these were 
in vain. It was not until March 1945 when W. M. Anderson, the Deputy Mayor, suggested 
that the office of the NAD ‘should take control of the competition’ that the competition was 
resuscitated under the direct control of the PMBC.80 In 1946, both associations were 
requested to put forward two teams to compete, and the competition was staged successfully.  
While the PMBC had ‘celebrated’ the souring tensions within the MDAFA, it failed to take 
into account the impact on the staging of its prestigious GGSC. When the PMBC invited two 
teams from ‘the Bantu Football Association and from the African Football Association’ for 
the 1947 GGSC season, it received a letter from Gwala identifying the two teams eligible for 
the semi-finals, and from J. A. Mkize who wrote in the capacity of acting secretary and 
                                                 
77 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from the General Secretary of the Durban and District African Football 
Association to the Honorary Secretary of the Governor General’s Shield Committee, 26 August 1936.  
78 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from John Zulu, President of Maritzburg Bantu Football Association to the 
Manager, NAD, 16 April 1942.   
79 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, memorandum regarding Governor-General’s Shield, undated, 1. 
80 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, memorandum regarding Governor-General’s Shield, undated, 1; minutes of the 
Native Administration Committee, 12 March 1945. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
113 
treasurer of the MDAFA.81 The PMBC found itself having to choose between two officials 
who were purporting to speak on behalf of the MDAFA. Gwala’s faction favoured the ‘Stars 
of Hope’ while Nene’s faction favoured the Standards. The semi-finals had been set for 15 
November 1947 with the finals on 29 November 1947. Stevens wrote to Gwala that: 
I have to advise you that in view of all the information at the disposal of 
this department, at present it is proposed to recognise Mr. T. A. Nene as 
being the Honorary President of the association and Mr. J. A. Mkize 
acting Secretary and Treasurer. In the latter capacity Mr Mkize has sent 
forward the names of the two teams which are to take part on the above 
competition.82 
On 12 November 1947 Gwala’s faction of the MDAFA held its special general meeting 
which authorised Selby Mazibuko, P. Kumalo and T. H. Gwala ‘to take [legal] action to 
restrain the Council [PMBC] from recognising the recommendation put forward by T. A. 
Nene and J. Mkize in respect of the rights of the Standard Club and the Assegai Club.’83 
Gwala’s faction applied for a court order against the PMBC’s recognition of the ‘the Standard 
Club’ and to restrain T.A. Nene and one J. A. Mkize from acting as office bearers of the 
MDAFA.84 The Court granted an interim interdict as Mazibuko had argued that if played, the 
semi-finals would cause ‘irreparable injury’ to his association.85  
On the morning of the semi-finals, 15 November, Stevens claimed he had not received court 
papers as he had attended the official opening of the nursery school at Edendale. At about 
12:45 p.m. he claimed to have been handed a ‘file of papers containing typewritten sheets and 
in one of which [he] read that [he] was summoned to appear on the 21st [November] to show 
cause why [the PMBC] should not be interdicted from playing in the competition in the 
                                                 
81 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, memorandum regarding Governor-General’s Shield, undated, 2. 
82 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from Mr R. E. Stevens to Mr. T. H. Gwala, 4 November 1947. 
83 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, affidavit of Selby Mazibuko, 14 November 1947.  
84 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, court order, case no. 2366/1947.  
85 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, affidavit of Selby Mazibuko, 14 November 1947. 
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manner decided upon.’86 Stevens claimed to have discussed this matter with the Town Clerk 
and they both agreed that ‘in the circumstances no steps should be taken to prevent the 
matches taking place, which [had] already been arranged that afternoon and were due to 
commence in an hour or so time.’87 While Stevens regrettably claimed to have overlooked the 
last line of the memo which read that this was an interim interdict, it is difficult to believe 
that both senior officials of the city were unaware of the court application. When the semi-
finals were about to start, Gwala and his supporters ‘turned up at the ground and threatened 
violence if the teams who were there attempted to play, so no match took place.’88 When the 
matter was heard, the court found that Stevens had been incorrectly cited as an administrator 
of the GGSC instead of the Mayor. The application of Gwala’s faction was therefore 
dismissed on technical grounds, with costs, and the new date for the competition was set for 
29 November 1947.89 In a desperate act of vindictiveness, less than a month after the court 
dismissed the Gwala faction’s application, Stevens had already advised the Town Clerk that 
‘should there be any difficulty in collecting these costs it might be possible to have a writ 
issued in respect of the properties’ of Gwala and Samson Hadebe at Ockert’s Kraal and 
Msimangville respectively.90 There is no evidence that the writ was ever issued and the costs 
were never paid.  
Determined to ensure that the GGSC not take place, Samson Hadebe, Manager of the Stars of 
Hope and an executive of the MDAFA, secured an interim interdict on 29 November 1947 
against the administrator of the GGSC to prevent Standard Club from participating in the 
tournament. Again, the semi-final had to be postponed pending a court judgment. This led to 
another legal dispute about the election of office bearers of both factions and contention 
                                                 
86 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, memorandum regarding Governor-General’s Shield, undated, 3. 
87 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, memorandum regarding Governor-General’s Shield, undated, 4. 
88 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, memorandum regarding Governor-General’s Shield, undated, 4. 
89 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, F. B. Burchell, ‘Litigation re football matches GG’s Shield’, 30 July 1948. 
90 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from R. E. Stevens to the Town Clerk, 8 December 1947. 
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about which team was on the top of the MDAFA log.91 Technically speaking, the dispute 
about the team at the top of the log was a result of the GGSC committee failing to develop 
clear rules to govern the competition since 1935. However, the dispute was about far broader 
issues than the absence of clear competition rules. Through these two legal actions, Gwala 
took the liberation struggle and working class resistance onto the football field. Football 
administration and the game itself became a field of struggle in which resistance politics was 
expressed.  
The PMBC’s attorney F. B. Burchell filed opposing affidavits from A. E. Hirst, R. E. 
Stevens, W. M. Anderson, Theodore Nene and G. Tshezi on 3 December 1947.92 In his 
affidavit George Tshezi stated: 
S. Mazibuko, P. Kumalo and T. H. Gwala are leading a portion of the 
members of the Association against the lawful authority of Nene the 
lawful President and the attitude of these men in preventing the 
completion of the Governor-General’s Shield Competition is causing 
annoyance and unrest among the Bantu Native population of Maritzburg.93 
The Mayor sought to discredit Gwala’s faction of the MDAFA as follows: 
The Maritzburg and District African Football Association has not made 
itself a party to this application as second application in that any meeting 
held by a section of the members…has no locus standi to pass such 
resolution and there is no proof whatsoever before the Court that 
Mazibuko, Kumalo and Gwala have been properly appointed to the offices 
alleged to be held by them or that the meeting itself was lawfully 
competent to pass and put into effect such resolution.94 
The court found in favour of the PMBC and Gwala’s faction was again ordered to pay costs. 
The semi-final match was eventually played at the Edendale Sports Ground on 13 December 
1947. As Stevens said, ‘in order to ensure that the semi-final match did not result in a breach 
                                                 
91 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, affidavits Simon Hadebe, P. Kumalo and S. Mazibuko, T. H. Gwala, 29 November 
1947, and affidavits George Tshezi and Theodore Nene, 3 December 1947. 
92 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, respondent’s attorney’s notice of the intention to oppose the interdict, 3 December 
1947.   
93 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/3/342, file 199/14, affidavit of George Tshezi, 3 December 1947. 
94 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/3/342, file 199/14, affidavit of A. E. Hirst, 3 December 1947.  
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of the peace it was necessary to secure the assistance of the District Commandant of the 
Police who supplied about twenty members of the police and a pick up.’95 This show of force 
intimidated Gwala’s supporters. Stevens reported that when the opposition Natives [Gwala’s 
faction] saw this show of force they disappeared from the ground and the match was played 
without any further incident.96 The finals were held at the Fitzsimons Road Stadium Grounds 
on 20 December 1947. The dispute between the two factions of the MDAFA had become so 
heated that Gwala described it as a situation ‘that threatens bloodshed.’97  
While these internal legal processes were taking place, Nene and Mkize mobilised their 
faction of the MDAFA to hold a special annual general meeting. The Nene-Mkize faction 
refused to recognise the Gwala and Mazibuko faction as it claimed that they were ‘never 
lawfully or constitutionally elected.’98 During the proceedings of its meeting on 27 January 
1948, the Nene-Mkize faction, which claimed to be a constitutional body of the MDAFA, 
resolved to ‘suspend’ Gwala and Mazibuko from the executive.99 The Gwala-Mazibuko 
faction anticipated being suspended and disregarded this resolution. The constitution of the 
MDAFA required the members to elect the executive at its annual general meeting. Both 
factions held their own annual general meetings on 8 February 1948. The Nene-Mkize faction 
held its meeting at the City Hall and elected T. A. Nene as president, while Gwala’s faction 
met at Berg Street Hall and re-elected Gwala as its honorary secretary.100 The Nene-Mkize 
faction’s holding of its annual general meeting at the City Hall displayed its close relationship 
with the PMBC and its middle class orientation. By contrast, the meeting at the Berg Street 
                                                 
95 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/3/342, file 199/14, letter from R. E. Stevens to the Town Clerk, 9 January 1948.  
96 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from R. E. Stevens to the Town Clerk, 9 January 1948.  
97 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from T. H. Gwala to Town Clerk, 14 April 1948. 
98 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, affidavit of George Tshezi, 3 December 1947.  
99 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from T. A. Nene to the Manager NAD, 16 April 1948. 
100 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from T. H. Gwala to the Town Clerk, 14 April 1948, letter from T. A. Nene to 
the Manager NAD, 16 April 1948. 
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Hall represented the subaltern cultural and working class orientation which was in line with 
Gwala’s political consciousness.  
Gwala claimed to have been legitimately elected by a ‘required quorum after due and timely 
notice of such meeting had been given to all members of the association.’101 He claimed his 
faction’s annual general meeting was the legitimate one since he had sent notices in due time 
to all members and accused ‘the opposing faction for failure to attend and electing Mr 
Raymond Kuzwayo as their secretary at a separate meeting, whereof they were given no 
notification.’102 Nene claimed ‘all clubs including Gwala’s had been duly invited to attend a 
meeting’ which elected him and said that Gwala and Mazibuko were absent.103   
The SAAFA took six months to adjudicate this dispute. In June 1948, it ruled against Nene- 
Mkize faction.104 Having been informed about the decision of the SAAFA to uphold the 
expulsion of Nene and Mkize, H. M. Molife, president of the NAFA wrote to the NAD as 
follows: 
I wish to inform you that my Association is not prepared to accept any 
decision by South Africa African Football Association upholding the 
appeal on behalf of the MDAFA, as represented by the suspended 
members. My association still recognises the MDAFA under the 
Presidency of Mr. Nene and I hope that you will not be influenced by any 
letter sent to you directly or otherwise unless it has been communicated 
direct to you by us through the MDAFA which is affiliated to the Natal 
African Football Association and whose President is Mr. T. A. Nene, and 
Secretary is Mr. R. Kuzwayo, both of Maritzburg. The Association under 
Messrs. Mazibuko and T. Gwala is not recognised by my Association and 
is considered a rebel association.105  
                                                 
101 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from T. H. Gwala to the Town Clerk, 14 April 1948. 
102 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from T. H. Gwala to the Town Clerk, 14 April 1948. 
103 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from T. A. Nene to the Manager NAD, 16 April 1948. 
104 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from T. H. Gwala to the Town Clerk, 1 July 1948; letter from D. R. Twala, 
Honorary Secretary of the SAAFA, to H. T. Gwala, 30 June 1948.  
105 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342, file 199/14, letter from H. M. Molife to the Manager: Native Administration Department, 6 July 
1948. 
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Molife’s defiant letter was an attempt to influence the NAD not to recognise Gwala and 
Mazibuko’s faction even though SAAFA, a national body to which NAFA was affiliated, had 
already made a ruling. This indicated a conspicuous display of the hatred intended to 
disconnect Gwala. Because the PMBC was aware of Gwala’s politics, it sided with the Nene-
Mkize faction, even though the MDAFA was not its favourite football organisation.106 Until 
the end of 1949, the NAFA failed to recognise the Gwala-Mazibuko MDAFA faction even 
though the SAAFA had made a ruling on the matter.107 In the meantime, teams of the 
MDNFA played the GGSC finals without MDAFA participation. 
The beginning of the 1950s heralded a shift in Gwala’s politics of connectedness and the 
state’s attempts to disconnect him. The NAFA changed its position towards the MDAFA. It 
recognised Gwala’s faction while the PMBC questioned his authority to be involved in 
Pietermaritzburg’s football fraternity since it claimed he was domiciled in Durban. By March 
1950, both factions of the MDAFA submitted their requests to be granted permission to use 
soccer grounds during the season and for an annual grant to maintain the fields. Faced with 
pressure from the Gwala-Mazibuko faction, the PMBC attempted to reconcile the two groups, 
but the Gwala faction recused itself from the process. Gwala and Mazibuko insisted that they 
could not trust the adjudicator to be impartial as he had unilaterally been appointed by the 
PMBC.108 The PMBC, however, attributed the deadlock to Gwala and Mazibuko’s political 
identities as they were ‘officials of an organisation whose avowed object is the winning of 
national freedom for the African people and the inauguration of a people’s free society where 
racial oppression and persecution will be outlawed and the African freed from white 
                                                 
106 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from the NAD Manager to the Town Clerk, 16 March 1950. 
107 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/342 letter from H. M. Molife to Manager NAD, 6 July 1948. 
108 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from T. H. Gwala to the Town Clerk, 20 March 1950. 
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domination.’109 The PMBC refused to provide an annual grant to the MDAFA; instead it 
opted to take over the maintenance of soccer grounds itself.  
The NAFA had planned to hold its annual general meeting on 18 April 1950, excluding 
Gwala and Mazibuko as delegates representing the MDAFA. Gwala obtained an interim 
interdict restraining the NAFA from holding its AGM without him and Mazibuko being 
present.110 In compliance with the court order, the NAFA held its AGM on 22 April 1950 
with Gwala and Mazibuko in attendance. Gwala managed to convince the majority of the 
delegates that his faction stood for the interests of Africans in Pietermaritzburg. After some 
intense deliberations, the majority of the delegates resolved that they would recognise 
Gwala’s faction of the MDAFA as an official body and further recognised Gwala and 
Mazibuko as ‘duly appointed representatives on the Council of the Maritzburg and District 
African Football Association.’111 The NAFA Council requested the MDAFA to ‘let bygones 
be bygones and take all steps to bring about friendship and harmony among all Africans who 
support Football in Maritzburg and District.’112 The NAFA’s recognition meant that the 
Gwala and Mazibuko faction was in legitimate control of the MDAFA and it committed itself 
to end the stalemate that had crippled the operations of the MDAFA since 1947.  
Despite this recognition, the PMBC denied the MDAFA access to soccer grounds because R. 
E. Stevens emphatically urged the Council not to recognise MDAFA as it was a front for the 
Communist Party.113 In spite of NAFA officially informing the PMBC about its decision to 
recognise Gwala and Mazibuko’s MDAFA, and considerable pressure from the NAFA and 
                                                 
109 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from D. N. Bang to the Town Clerk, 16 March 1950. 
110 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, Order of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Natal Provincial Division, 6 
April 1950. 
111 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, Resolution of the NAFA Council meeting, 22 April 1950. 
112 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from R. E. Stevens to the Town Clerk, 16 March 1950. 
113 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from T. H. Gwala to the Secretary, NAFA, 11 May 1950; PAR, 
3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from R. E. Stevens to the Town Clerk, 16 March 1950. 
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lawyers representing the MDAFA, the PMBC maintained that it had ‘never recognised the T. 
H. Gwala section of the African Football Association since they broke away from the T. A. 
Nene section.’114 D. N. Bang, who had succeeded R. E. Stevens as NAD manager, continued 
with efforts to challenge Gwala by contesting his authority in Pietermaritzburg affairs on the 
grounds that Gwala was ‘domiciled in Durban’ and ‘had no authority to be in 
[Pietermaritzburg] city.’115 Bang seems to have taken a more extremely antagonistic position 
than his predecessor tinged with personal hatred of Gwala. He described him as a ‘jealous 
native’ who was not exempted from pass laws, even though Gwala had been exempted in 
1945.116 Bang recommended that the PMBC should never provide access to soccer grounds 
for the MDAFA as long as Gwala was on its executive. Gwala described his relationship with 
Bang as ‘intimidating.’117These efforts by officials of the local state represented attempts at 
discrediting Gwala from football and society.  
In June 1951 O. A. Nkwanyana, the assistant secretary of NAFA, appealed to the PMBC to 
recognise the new office bearers of the MDAFA and to provide soccer grounds ‘in view of 
the pressing nature and congestion on the fixture.’118 Nkwanyana pointed out that the NAFA 
was keen to unite the two factions of the MDAFA and had ‘called the sections concerned and 
attempted or endeavoured to have elections of office bearers in the presence of all 
Pietermaritzburg football lovers, but unfortunately one section failed to co-operate and this 
was the Nene section.’ He emphatically indicated that the NAFA did not want to allow few 
individuals to ‘impede the whole progress of sport.’119 Despite Nkwanyana’s commitment to 
                                                 
114 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from H. M. Molife to the Town Clerk, 13 May 1950; PAR, 3/PMB, 
4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from D. N. Bang to the Town Clerk, 15 May 1950. 
115 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from D. N. Bang to the Town Clerk, 15 May 1950. 
116 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from D. N. Bang to the Town Clerk, 15 June 1950; NAR, SAB, 
2234/01/1367, exemption certificate of Harry Gwala, 3 May 1945. 
117 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from T. H. Gwala to The Secretary, Natal African Football 
Association, 11 June 1950.  
118 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from O. A. Nkwanyana to the Town Clerk, 8 June 1950. 
119 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter from O. A. Nkwanyana to the Town Clerk, 8 June 1950. 
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building unity within the MDAFA and indications that the two sections had started to work 
together, the PMBC was adamant in its refusal to give Gwala and Mazibuko’s faction of 
MDAFA access to soccer grounds in the city and an ad-hoc grant.120   
Apart from PMBC records of decisions about funding and access to soccer grounds, 
surviving archival records do not provide a vivid picture of the MBFA at this time. It is not 
clear whether it had elections and who the office bearers were, especially during the 1950s. 
This observation can also be made about Nene’s faction of the MDAFA, but the Gwala 
faction’s activities were adequately documented. In February 1951 the Gwala faction held its 
elections with Mazibuko as president and Gwala as secretary.121  
At the same time Gwala was also elected to the executive committee of the NAFA and 
seconded to represent NAFA at the executive of the South Africa African Football 
Association.122 After the election Gwala informed delegates that the MDAFA was on a better 
footing and, to try to ensure that such problems did not arise in the future, its constitution had 
to be overhauled. During 1951, the MDAFA hosted the Port Elizabeth Touring Soccer Team. 
As part of Gwala’s non-racial stance, the trip involved playing with an Indian soccer team. 
When the Port Elizabeth team was in Pietermaritzburg, Gwala organised that it should be 
taken on a tour of ‘Maritzburg sub-economic housing scheme in Sobantu.’123 This visit had 
more to do with the politics of native urban housing than soccer. Gwala admitted that the visit 
to Sobantu would show its similarities with New Brighton.  
                                                 
120 PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, minutes of the Native Administration Committee, 15 May 1950, 30 May 
1950.  
121 Other officer bearers were, P. P. Mbuli (assistant secretary), S. T. Kumalo (treasurer), M. Gule (first additional member), 
P. H. Kumalo (second additional member), W. Ciliza (organiser), see, PAR, 3/PMB, 4/4/2/140, file 242/3, G95/BJC, letter 
from T. H. Gwala to the Manager, Native Affairs Department, 12 February 1951 
122 Staff reporter, ‘Maritzburg District African Football Association’, Ilanga Lase Natal, 31 March 1951; Staff reporter, 
‘Natal African Football Association Ukhetho, 1951’, Ilanga Lase Natal, 28 April 1951. 
123 Staff reporter, ‘Maritzburg and District News’, Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 June 1951. 
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By the end of 1951, the PMBC indicated that it would not provide permission to use football 
grounds or an ad-hoc grant to the MDAFA because of outstanding audited financial 
statements. While the MDAFA had already predicted the PMBC’s stance and decided to host 
its football matches in Sobantu sport grounds, lack of financial support from the PMBC 
crippled its operations. In addition, after the promulgation of the Suppression of Communism 
Act, Gwala began to fight with the state for his name not to be included in the list of people 
associated with the now-disbanded Communist Party. Due to these political complexities, 
Gwala did not make himself available to be elected to the executive of 1952 and, as stated in 
the previous chapter, he was subsequently listed and banned in April 1952. This led to the 
collapse of his faction of the MDAFA as Mazibuko also disappeared from the political 
fraternity.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated that Gwala politics of connectedness began to germinate 
during the 1940s. As with other political leaders such as Luthuli and O. E. Msimang, Gwala 
did not confine his politics to party politics; instead he used football as an arena for 
promoting political consciousness. But Gwala defined himself differently because his politics 
intertwined both class and liberation struggles, since he was an active member of both the 
Communist Party and the ANC. This chapter has situated Gwala’s role in the administration 
of football in Pietermaritzburg and Natal within the broader political and class struggles of 
the 1940s. His involvement in football shows the extent to which football transcended class 
boundaries and made connections with the broader politics of mass mobilisation. Gwala’s 
acrimonious relations with the PMBC were an expression of the broader political concerns 
that characterised protest politics in Pietermaritzburg during the 1940s and 1950s. The cause 
of conflict between Gwala and the PMBC was not because of his alleged politicisation of 
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football, rather because the PMBC intended to control sport and use it as its political tool, 
something that Gwala’s association strongly resisted. Throughout the 1940s, the PMBC 
insisted in its reports that ‘sport amongst natives was encouraged’ and repeatedly downplayed 
antagonism with MDAFA by empathically stressing that ‘as usual the behaviour of the 
natives in Pietermaritzburg [had] been exemplary.’124 The PMBC’s support of one faction of 
the MDAFA which was opposed to Gwala was part of a broader state strategy of ‘divide and 
rule.’  
The chapter has demonstrated how the PMBC’s paternalistic interest in the provision and 
concerns of African leisure time was often challenged and this provided a forum the 
emergence of political consciousness. Despite the PMBC’s efforts to use football to defuse 
political mobilisation, Gwala continued to attract wide support and following across the 
spectrum of football teams and administrators.  
The MDNFA’s relations with the PMBC were strongly affected by the Council’s ability to 
control space and resources. This weakened its influence and its relationship with the PMBC 
remained collegial, thus making it a proxy for white paternalism. This chapter has also 
demonstrated how football enabled African migrants to Pietermaritzburg were able to forge 
collective identities and class consciousness that provided the platform from which grassroots 
political activism was born. Furthermore, it has demonstrated how football became a major 
sport among urban dwellers and how it became inextricably connected to the wider social and 
political transformation that characterised the evolution of Gwala’s politics of connectedness.  
                                                 
124 Pietermaritzburg Corporation Yearbook, 1950, 79.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
The radicalisation of Harry Gwala and politics of disconnectedness,     
1960-1977 
Introduction 
At its national conference in December 1960, the underground Communist Party reviewed 
the significance of the events of the State of Emergency earlier that year as well as how the 
emergency was experienced. Conference delegates remarked that the government had passed 
from the stage where it was attempting to control and combat the peoples’ movement by 
parliamentary-style rule whenever the government felt itself powerfully challenged.1 The 
Party concluded that in the light of such blatant repression, the people’s movement could no 
longer hope to continue along the road of exclusively non-violent forms of political struggle. 
It decided that the Central Committee should ‘take steps to initiate the training and equipping 
of selected personnel in new methods of struggle.’ These steps would thus prepare the 
nucleus of an adequate apparatus to lead struggles of a more forcible and violent character.2 
This shift towards the ethos of violence was vital to the germination of Harry Gwala’s 
political militancy.  
This chapter examines how the shift in the state’s application of physical and psychological 
violence was applied against Harry Gwala. It further shows how South African courts became 
a tool to isolate Gwala from the political movement.3 It argues that proceedings before the 
                                                 
1 UWL, HLP, Kasrils Papers, A3345, A6.1.4.1, memorandum, undated. I am grateful to Professor Tom Lodge for sharing 
this document with me.  
2 UWL, HLP, Kasrils Papers, A3345, A6.1.4.1, memorandum, undated; for an in-depth discussion on role of the Communist 
Part in the South Africa’s armed struggle see, T. Karis, ‘Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa’, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2, 1983; S. Ellis and T. Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and South African Communist 
Party in Exile (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 95-102; H. Barrell, ‘Turn to the masses: The African National 
Congress’ strategic review of 1978-79’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.18, No.1 (Special Issue: Social History of 
Resistance in South Africa), 1992, 64-92.  
3 M. Lobban, White Man’s Justice: South African Political Trials in the Black Consciousness Era (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), 174.  
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South African courts became acts of revenge by the state while political activists such as 
Gwala used them as theatres of struggle. It demonstrates how the state’s continuous attempts 
to disconnect Gwala from his political base were a way of inflicting perpetual pain against 
him.4 The chapter further points to the extent to which South African courts became forms 
through which the state attempted to define Gwala as a criminal. In addition, I show how 
Gwala used the same courts as sites of resistance.  
This chapter locates Gwala’s shift towards militancy as a direct response to excessive 
violence and provocation by the state, having endured a period of systematic disconnection 
through being banned. Gwala’s actions must be understood in the wider political context of 
the state’s approach to the liberation movements from 1960. Furthermore, this chapter 
examines how Gwala strategically used the court’s objectification and construction of 
criminality to reconfigure the identity of the freedom fighter. This chapter focuses on 
Gwala’s three trials between 1960 and 1977, and places them within the paradigm of a legal 
heritage of political trials in South Africa. It also seeks a new understanding of political trials 
as both tools of political exclusion and as theatres of struggle.5  
Political militancy and the shift to armed struggle 
Harry Gwala’s life, politics and political trials he endured during the period 1960-1977 
require us to appreciate the context that necessitated this shift to violence. This period was 
marked by a broader shift within both the ANC and Communist Party from non-violent, 
peaceful, mass-based politics to armed struggle. There were various reasons behind this shift. 
                                                 
4 For a discussion of how the silences in history see D. W. Cohen, Combing of History (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), 54.  
5 P. Lalu, ‘Sara’s Suicide: History and the representational limit’, Kronos, No. 26, 2000, 89. Mamdani discusses the question 
of the perpetuation of subjectivity and domination, see M. Mamdani, Define and Rule: Native as a Political Identity 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012); M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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The state had already demonstrated its willingness to mobilise the law against its opponents 
with the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 and other oppressive laws. Raymond 
Suttner traced the roots of the formal launch of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) on 16 December 
1960 back to as early as 1953 when the ANC agreed secretly that a ‘plan be drawn up to 
enable the movement to operate underground in the likely event that it would be banned.’6 
Stephen Ellis also argued that the ‘viciousness that led to the dissolution of the Communist 
Party caused many activists of other persuasions to fear that similar draconian measures 
would soon be used against them.’7  
Meanwhile, when Walter Sisulu was provided with funds from the World Federation of 
Democratic Youth, a Soviet organisation, to embark on a trip to Romania, Poland, Russia and 
China in 1953, Nelson Mandela asked him to ‘discuss the possibility of armed struggle with 
[the] Chinese.’8 Sisulu duly raised the matter with the Chinese who cautioned that the armed 
struggle should only be undertaken when the conditions were right. Govan Mbeki observed 
that by the end of the 1950s ‘the rank and file membership of the ANC, especially the youth, 
were increasingly insisting that the policy of non-violence had had its day and was no longer 
practicable in the face of the harsh measures which the government was meting out to 
peaceful African protests.’9  
                                                 
6 Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa, 18.  
7 S. Ellis, ‘The Genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle in South Africa, 1948-1961’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
Vol. 37, No. 4, 2011, 659. 
8 Sisulu, Walter and Albertina Sisulu, 164. For a detailed discussion of the armed struggle see, Magubane, ‘Introduction: The 
political context’; B. Magubane, P. Bonner, J. Sithole, P. Delius, J. Cherry, P. Gibbs and T. April, ‘Turn to the Armed 
Struggle’, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa: Volume 1 (1960-70),  (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2004); S. Ellis, 
‘The Genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle’; R. Suttner, ‘African National Congress (ANC) Underground: From the M-Plan 
to Rivonia’, South African Historical Journal, Vol. 49, 2003; V. Shubin, ANC: A View from Moscow (Johannesburg: Jacana, 
2008); N. Mandela, The Struggle is My Life (London: International Defence Aid Fund, 1986), B. Turok, Nothing but the 
Truth: Behind the ANC’s Struggle Politics (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2003); T. Lodge, Mandela: A Critical Life (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
9 G. Mbeki, The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa: A Short History (Cape Town: David Philip and Mayibuye Centre, 
1992), 90; Mosiuoa Lekota also discusses the complexities of initiating an armed struggle see M. P. Lekota, Prison Letters to 
a Daughter (Johannesburg: Taurus Publishers, 1991), 130.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
127 
Similarly, Harry Gwala remarked that by the end of the 1950s it was clear that the state was 
‘not willing to accommodate peaceful means that were put forward by liberation movements 
and this required that new methods of communicating views of the oppressed classes had to 
be devised.’10 Gwala said that the state’s violent reaction to peaceful demonstrations in 
Sharpeville and Langa on 21 March 1960 was an indication that the ANC had to change the 
way in which it engaged the apartheid government. The aftermath of the Sharpeville and 
Langa massacres led to the declaration of the State of Emergency and the subsequent banning 
of the ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).   
Gwala’s work in the underground political operations of the ANC, Communist Party and MK 
enables us to understand his militancy and the state’s continuous attempts to disconnect him 
from society and mainstream politics. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, from the 
mid-1940s, as Gwala became a ‘nuisance to the authority of government’, the state began to 
mobilise its powers to isolate him through public humiliation, exclusion and a banning order 
in 1952. However, from 1960, the state changed its approach towards Gwala as it began to 
mobilise its coercive powers and the courts as apparatuses of exclusion. Gwala’s views 
underwent evolutionary modification as he shifted from being a radical to a militant in his 
political approach and relationship with the state.11 
As I have shown, Gwala had been aware of the resuscitation of the Communist Party as early 
as 1954 but he felt excluded as he had not been given further information other than to start 
Marxist discussion groups and a cell in Pietermaritzburg.12 Gwala was offended by being 
excluded from the Communist Party and this resulted in the growth of ‘dissatisfaction among 
                                                 
10 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala.  
11 Kgalema Motlanthe, address at the inaugural Harry Gwala Memorial Lecture, Bulwer, 30 November 2013 (unpublished). I 
thank Kgalema Motlanthe for sharing the transcript with me.  
12 Members of the Pietermaritzburg cell were: Selby Mazibuko, Bobby Pillay, Moses Mabhida and Golam Rasool, see 
Sylvia Neame interview with Harry Gwala. 
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other rank-and-file members’ as there had been a clear indication that the Communist Party 
had been resuscitated.13 As a result, Gwala speculated about the influence and the role of 
Bruno Mtolo and Solomon Mbanjwa who had been recruited to the Communist Party in the 
1950s. Gwala questioned their legitimacy as he argued that they had no institutional memory 
or in-depth political knowledge, and he remained very suspicious of them.14 It was not until 
1962 that Gwala re-joined the Communist Party, having only been active in the underground 
operations of the ANC and trade unions after it was dissolved in 1950. As Brian Bunting has 
argued, the outlawing of the ANC brought about closer cooperation between the Communist 
Party and the ANC than had ever previously existed.15 It was through this renewed 
cooperation that Gwala was able to play a vital role in the underground operations of MK.  
The South African state’s coercive and punitive capacity emerged as greater than that in any 
African society, even those under colonialism.16 This situation was worsened by the 
promulgation of apartheid laws during the 1950s and 1960s that provided a greater range of 
tools to suppress political opposition and criminalise the state’s opponents. The court was one 
of these tools of repression and the assertion of apartheid power. The state’s trials against 
Gwala in 1961, 1964 and 1976 provide an opportunity to understand the extent to which the 
courts tried to isolate and criminalise Gwala. Nonetheless, these also reveal how Gwala 
refused to be the victims of the court system and apartheid.17  
                                                 
13 Everatt, The Origins of Non-racialism, 81; Magubane, et al., ‘Turn to the Armed Struggle’, 69; B. Bunting, Moses Kotane, 
South African Revolutionary: A Political Biography (Cape Town: Mayibuye Books, 1998), 272. 
14 Sylvia Neame interview with Harry Gwala; Mxolisi Dlamuka, interview with Truman Magubane. Mtolo and Mbanjwa 
later became the key state witnesses during the Rivonia trial, the State’s sabotage trial against Gwala in 1964, and the 
Pietermaritzburg treason trial in 1977. In order to ensure that Gwala’s views on Bruno Mtolo during the 1989 interview were 
not influenced by the fact that Mtolo became the key state witness during the Rivonia trial, I interviewed Truman Magubane 
who was Gwala’s contemporary from the 1960s. Magubane confirmed Gwala’s suspicions of Mtolo during the 1960s prior 
to the Rivonia trial. See Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Truman Magubane.  
15 Bunting, Moses Kotane, 257.   
16 M. Chanock, The Making of South African Legal Culture, 1902-1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 41; F. Rueedi, ‘Narratives on Trial: Ideology’. 
17 R. L. Abel, Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle against Apartheid, 1980-1994 (New York: Routledge, 1995), 10; 
P. E. Alexander, Alan Paton: A Biography (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1995), 330-331. 
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The historiography of political trials in South Africa has focused largely on the 1956 Treason 
Trial, the 1963 Rivonia trial, the 1985 Delmas trial and the 1986 state trial of Andrew 
Zondo.18 A closer examination of Gwala’s trials enables us to understand the complex history 
of MK operatives in Natal and how the state made collaborators become tools to punish its 
opponents. The state’s political trials against Gwala yield new ways of approaching South 
African history and enable us to deepen our understanding of connectedness and 
disconnectedness and the use of the law as sites of repression and struggle.19  
The state’s trails against Gwala fit the argument put forward by Rueedi and Lane that treason 
trials are a space in which the state legitimised repression while delegitimising extra-
parliamentary opposition by defining it as militant and violent.20 While the use of court 
proceedings evidentiary records for historic reconstruction has been the subject of a robust 
debate among academics, these remain important sources, despite their shortcomings. While 
witnesses were either ‘deliberately incriminating the people against whom they testified, or if 
they were the accused, saving themselves from possible prosecution’, they nevertheless are 
‘invaluable narratives of the time.’21 Gwala’s use of the trials as an arena of communicating 
his political and class identities to a much wider audience provides an opportunity to 
understanding the challenges he faced and elements of his political thought.   
                                                 
18 For a detailed discussion on political trials, see P. Lalu and B. Harris, ‘Journeys from the Horizons of History: 
Text, Trial and Tales in the Construction of Narratives of Pain’, Current Writings, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1996; C. H Albertyn, ‘A 
Critical Analysis of Political Trials in South Africa, 1948-1988’, PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1991; P. Lane, 
‘Heroes as Ordinary People: A Social and Cultural History of Political Imprisonment in South Africa, 1960-92’, PhD thesis, 
University of Essex, 2009; Rueedi, ‘Narratives on Trial’. For a discussion on the legal proceedings, evidence and history see 
C. Ginzburg, ‘Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 18, No. 1, 199; W. Anderson, 
‘The Past on Trial: Birmingham, the Bombing, and Restorative Justice’, California Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, 2008; P. 
Harris, In a Different Time: The Inside Story of the Delmas Four (Cape Town: Umuzi Publishers, 2008); J. Dlamini, Askari: 
A Story of Collaboration and Betrayal in the Anti-Apartheid Struggle (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2014); F. Meer, The Mis/Trial 
of Andrew Zondo (Durban: Institute for Black Research, 1998). 
19 K. Mann and R. Roberts, ‘Introduction’, in K. Mann and R. Roberts (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth NH: 
Heinemann, 1991), 35.  
20 Rueedi, ‘Narratives on Trial’; Lane, ‘Heroes as Ordinary People’.  
21 J. Sithole, ‘The ANC Underground, Armed Actions and Popular Resistance in Pietermaritzburg and the Surrounding Natal 
Midlands Townships’, in SADET, The Road to Democracy, Vol. 4, 225; B. Bozzoli, Theatres of Struggle and the End of 
Apartheid (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2004), 18. For a detailed discussion on the use of court records as historical 
sources see, R. Ross, Beyond the Pale: Essays on the History of Colonial South Africa (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand 
University Press, 1994). 
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Gwala, political trials and repression  
The ‘ferocious security clampdown’ that followed the Sharpeville and Langa massacres on 21 
March 1960, and the subsequent banning of both the ANC and PAC on 8 April of the same 
year, meant that the era of extra-parliamentary non-violent protests had ended because many 
leaders were detained.22 By the end of April 1961 the African National Congress Voice, a 
bulletin of the ANC, released a statement calling for the release of ‘South African men and 
women’ who were detained in various prisons in South Africa.23 Gwala’s name was among 
those listed as having been detained in Pietermaritzburg.24 As Merrett has argued, the state 
used detention as a ‘tool of political control’ and intimidation.25 Gwala had been politically 
active after the expiry of his banning order in 1958. He had been involved in re-establishing 
trade union structures, especially the Howick Rubber Workers’ Union and as Secretary of the 
local Pietermaritzburg committee of SACTU from 1959 until 1962.26 In addition, he had been 
assisting to mobilise support for the ‘£1 a Day campaign’ and working closely with the 
Pietermaritzburg’s ANC Women’s League. Given his political history, Sarmcol management 
prohibited Gwala from entering its premises to conduct trade union activities of the Howick 
Rubber Workers’ Union (HRWU). The HRWU had been launched on 8 March 1960 and 
elected Gwala as its secretary.27  
As the Special Branch was monitoring Gwala’s movements, Constable Bernard Zuma was 
aware of the establishment of the HRWU and the subsequent election of Gwala as its 
                                                 
22 M. Gunther, ‘The National Committee of Liberation (NCL)/African Resistance Movement (ARM)’, in SADET, The Road 
to Democracy, Vol.1, 193; Fran Buntman interview with Harry Gwala, 20 June 1994, Pietermaritzburg, Robben Island 
Interview Collection, UWC-Robben Island Mayibuye Archives. 
23 Document 61: “Congress Fights On…Release the Detainees!!!” Statement in the African National Congress Voice: An 
Occasional Bulletin, No.1, April 1960, in T. G. Karis and G. M. Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary 
History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1990: Challenge and Violence, 1953-1964, Vol.3 (Johannesburg: Jacana, 
2013), 531-535.  
24 Other names included: Mr. P. Brown, Dr Chetty, Dr Motala, Mr Meidner, Mr D. March and Dr Omar.    
25 C. Merrett, ‘Detention Without Trial in South Africa: The Abuse of Human Rights as State Strategy in the Late 1980s’, 
Africa Today, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1990, 60.  
26 PAR, RSC, 1/1/1004, Vol. 32, Record 11, CC 108/76, State vs Harry Gwala and 9 others, evidence of Harry Themba 
Gwala.  
27 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Bernard Zuma. 
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secretary. Prior to the declaration of the State of Emergency and the banning of the ANC and 
PAC, the state had already adopted a violent approach to dealing with liberation movements. 
This resulted in the arrest of Gwala on 18 March 1960 after the Minister of Justice had issued 
permission. Gwala was kept in detention until July.28 He was charged for wrongfully and 
unlawfully failing to comply with requirements by being a member of the Howick Rubber 
Workers’ and Industrial Union and taking part in their activities.29  
It was during Gwala’s detention in Pietermaritzburg that he and other detainees began to 
discuss seriously the option of the armed struggle before the announcement of the formation 
of MK as the ‘feeling was that there was no way forward without it.’30 Gwala took advantage 
of the state’s punitive systems that were meant to restrict him and used them as arenas in 
which to wage a struggle. The charges were eventually dropped at the end of July 1960 as the 
state had not gathered sufficient evidence to prosecute. Nevertheless, detention provided 
Gwala with a platform to discuss the armed struggle with other detainees and to define the 
political path he was to follow after the establishment of MK in December 1961.31 
The reinstatement of the charges against Gwala in 1961 meant the beginning of the state’s 
use of the courts to disconnect him. Between 1960 and 1977, Gwala faced three trials 
including the 1976 trial for alleged treason which carried the possibility of being sentenced to 
death. These trials should be examined within the historical fabric of South African society 
and be placed alongside other trials that were perceived as political trials. They became a tool 
to seclude Gwala from his political base and to force behaviour on Gwala that would conform 
                                                 
28 NAR, DOJ papers, file no. 2/50/53, declassified secret correspondence from the Secretary of Justice to the Commissioner 
of the South African Police, 31 August 1960.  
29 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, indictment by the Attorney-
General of Natal.   
30 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala.  
31 NAR, DOJ papers, file no. 2/50/53, declassified secret memorandum from the Commissioner of Police to the Minister of 
Justice, 11 December 1961. 
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with state regulations and the reproduction of domination in South Africa.32 In other words, 
these trials became a direct means of political control and focused mainly on power exercised 
by the state on its subjects, rather than a legal sphere of rights and protection.  
Gwala, isolation and the 1961 trial 
On the morning of 28 December 1960, Gwala was arrested while at an ‘African restaurant’ in 
Otto Street in Pietermaritzburg as the state had decided to reinstate earlier charges.33 By this 
time, the state intelligence agencies had gathered enough evidence through its informers and 
Special Branch to prosecute Gwala. He appeared at Howick Magistrate Court on the same 
day and was released on a bail of £25 with conditions, among them having to report to the 
Pietermaritzburg Central Police Station in Loop Street every day between 9am and 10am.34 
Surviving trial documents reveal that both the state and the defence appeared in the Howick 
Magistrate’s Court on 11 January 1961 to state their cases. The state argued that although 
Gwala was instructed to resign from being an office bearer of the Howick Rubber Workers’ 
Industrial Union (HRWIU) as part of the conditions of his banning order, he had contravened 
this condition by participating in the activities of the HRWU.  
The evidence presented by the state was to the effect that Gwala had addressed various 
meetings with the workers at Howick, with the 8 March and 15 September 1960 meetings 
highlighted as critical ones.35 During the trial, the state’s witnesses, many of whom had been 
part of the Union’s executive along with Gwala, had been induced into testifying as a result 
of intimidation and torture, gave evidence that purported to incriminate Gwala, suggesting 
                                                 
32 For a detailed discussion, see Albertyn, ‘A Critical Analysis of Political Trials’, 49.  
33 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Frederick Wilhelm 
Jansen van Rensburg. 
34 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, report of L. Nel (Magistrate of 
Howick) on conditions of Gwala’s bail, 28 December 1960. 
35 NAR, DOJ papers, file no. 2/50/53, declassified secret report of L. C. Hofmeyr, Counsel for the State, to the Secretary of 
Justice, 30 August 1961.  
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that he had been central in organising the emergence of the HRWIU at BTR Sarmcol.36 The 
state’s key witness, Clemence Gumede, had worked at Sarmcol for 26 years and had been a 
member of the executive of the 1952 Union.37 His testimony attempted to reinforce the 
impression that the 1960 Union was a continuation of the 1952 one since the ‘the purpose and 
ideals of the Howick Rubber Workers Union [were] the same as those of the former Union.’38 
Through Gumede’s evidence, the state argued that the HRWU and HRWIU were in fact one 
union, and that Gwala had therefore breached the condition of his banning order that required 
him to resign as an office-bearer, officer and member of the HRWIU.  
Another key state witness was Frans Ross. Ross had been employed at Sarmcol for 15 years 
and was an executive member of the 1952 and 1960 unions.39 In his evidence, Ross referred 
to Gwala’s prohibition from Sarmcol premises and said that the HRWU’s meetings were held 
under the tree outside the factory. Ross said that Gwala had ‘addressed meetings of the Union 
and told workers how to become members of the Union and that if the employer were to be 
approached everybody must come together and speak as one voice.’40 The evidence presented 
by Ross and Gumede highlighted the links between the unions and the broader politics of 
liberation. It emphasised that Union meetings were sometimes attended and addressed by 
Jacob Zuma in his capacity as an ANC activist in Natal.41  
During the trial the state sought to prove that Gwala was linked to the HRWU as he had been 
responsible for the issuing of membership cards and the collection of monthly 
                                                 
36 Dlamini, Askari, 171. 
37 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Clemence Gumede; D. 
Bonnin, ‘Two Generations of Worker Leadership: The Histories and Traditions of the Sarmcol Workers’, unpublished paper 
presented to the History Workshop Conference, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987.  
38 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Clemence Gumede. 
39 Other members of the executive in the ‘new’ Union were Clemence Gumede, Felix Ngcobo, Joseph Nduli and Gwala. All 
had been members of the previous Union. PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 
904/61, evidence of Frans Ross. 
40 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Frans Ross. 
41 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Clemence Gumede. 
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subscriptions.42 Furthermore, the state witnesses linked Gwala with all the Union meetings 
that had taken place under the tree. As Bernard Zuma, a ‘Bantu’ Detective Constable, 
explained: 
On the 8th March 1960, it was after 6 p.m. There are trees there but there is 
one particular big tree. The meeting was held just below the big tree. I 
know where the entrance to the Rubber factory is. The main entrance to 
the factory is out of sight from the tree. I say accused [Gwala] addressed a 
meeting.43  
Constable Zuma further testified: 
It was the 15th September 1960. This meeting was after 5 p.m. This 
meeting was held near the Railway Station, Howick, below the big tree. In 
relation to the meeting held in March this one (Sept. meeting) was held at 
the same place. I remember the names of some other people who attended 
the meeting. They were: the accused [Gwala], Clemence Gumede, Ross, 
Felix and Shabalala. Accused said people must unite and go to their 
employers and ask for money £1 a day.44 
Constable Zuma’s testimony illustrated the extent to which the Special Branch had been 
meticulously following Gwala. Moreover, this evidence was the culmination of the process of 
criminalising Gwala and imposing a constructed identity upon him as one who failed to abide 
by the law.  
Gwala and his lawyer M.D. Naidoo had developed a strategy of ‘frustrating the judiciary 
processes.’45 Towards the conclusion of the trial, Naidoo applied for the ‘discharge of the 
accused as the state had no case.’46 Gwala’s application was refused by the court, and thus he 
‘elected to be tried by a Judge’ while the state’s evidence became a preparatory examination 
for the Supreme Court case.47 After extensive consultation between Naidoo and the 
                                                 
42 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Mr. Naidoo. 
43 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Bernard Zuma. 
44 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, evidence of Bernard Zuma. 
45 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala.  
46 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, report of L. Nel (Magistrate of 
Howick) on conditions of Gwala’s bail, 22 February 1961.    
47 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, report of L. Nel (Magistrate of 
Howick) on conditions of Gwala’s bail, 22 February 1961.    
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prosecution, Gwala’s bail was extended with the condition that he was not permitted to 
interfere with witnesses.  
The trial, in the Supreme Court, resumed on 7 August 1961. The state submitted that Gwala 
had taken part in the activities of the Howick Rubber Workers’ Industrial Union. In view of 
the fact that the ‘new’ Union did not have the word ‘industrial’ in its name, Gwala’s 
representative argued that he had not committed any crime since the Howick Rubber 
Workers’ Union was only established in 1960, and he had not been instructed to resign from, 
or participate in its activities under his 1952 banning order. The court held that the state had 
not established beyond reasonable doubt that the ‘new’ Union was the same one to which the 
1952 banning order referred. Gwala was found not guilty and acquitted.48  
Harry Gwala’s acquittal embarrassed the state which was determined to disrupt him and stifle 
his influence on Natal politics. Correspondence between senior officials of the Departments 
of Police and of Justice suggested that Gwala’s acquittal was a cause of serious concern as 
the circumstances under which he was exonerated applied to banned individuals in general.49 
It was against this background that the acting Secretary of Justice recommended that ‘when a 
person is banned from becoming an office bearer, an official or member of any kind of 
organisation, the nature of this body must not be specified in the notice.’50  
The Department of Justice’s view was that the problem that had arisen in the court judgement 
on Gwala could have been avoided if such a general ban were to be imposed. While this view 
was supported by the Commissioner of the South African Police, the Minister of Justice, 
                                                 
48 PAR, RSC, 1/1/384, CC 134/1961, the State vs Themba Harry Gwala, case no. 904/61, report of L. Nel (Magistrate of 
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Counsel for the State, to the Secretary of Justice, 30 August 1961. 
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Coetzee, and the Commissioner of the South African Police, indistinct date.   
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Johannes (John) Vorster, was adamant that no changes to the earlier system of banning 
should be implemented.51 However, after seeking a legal opinion, Vorster was convinced that 
a general ban was the only option to avoid the embarrassment similar to the state’s trial on 
Gwala.52   
Meanwhile, the Minister of Justice was determined to ban Gwala from participating in the 
trade union activities, and so he sought the support of the Minister of Labour as required by 
the Suppression of Communism Act.53 After securing the support of the Minister of Labour, 
Vorster approved the condition of Gwala’s banning order which emphasised that he should 
be prohibited from becoming an ‘office bearer, official or member of a trade union whether 
registered or not’, and ‘not to participate in its activities.’54 As a consequence, on 18 
December 1961 Gwala was served with a new banning order which prohibited him from 
participating in any trade union activity. While the Secretary of Justice noted Gwala’s 
‘acquiescence’ after he had been banned, he commented: 
Since the restriction that is currently in place in respect of Gwala came 
into effect, it seems he is behaving quietly. He was very active. He has not 
requested the removal of his name from the list. In our view, this says a lot 
and this should probably be interpreted as meaning that his sympathy 
continues to lie with communists and that he will return to his old ways as 
soon as he is no longer subject to his restriction.55 
The Minister of Justice, with support from the Commissioner of Police, gave his approval for 
Gwala’s restrictions to be ‘replaced with a more severe type of a ban and that an area of 
                                                 
51 NAR, DOJ papers, file no.2/50/53, declassified secret correspondence from the Minister of Justice to the Secretary of 
Justice, 10 October 1961.  
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restriction with associated bans should be imposed.’ These would prohibit him from 
attending any gathering for a period of five years.56 Gwala’s movements were now restricted 
to the magisterial area of Pietermaritzburg, and these restrictions set the scenes for tighter 
measures to isolate Gwala.   
Rethinking political militancy  
The question of whether it was the Communist Party or the ANC that took the decision to 
engage in an armed struggle has been a subject of debate among academics. It is not the 
intention of this section to engage in this debate. However, the shift to the armed struggle and 
the formation of MK had a tremendous influence in Gwala’s politics of connectedness.57 The 
state’s use of violence, the banning of the ANC on 8 April 1961 and increasing restrictions of 
his political mobility provoked Gwala to think that ‘there was no way out except meeting 
force with force.’58 This shift in the political tactics he adopted marked a more radical and 
militant attitude towards the state.  
After the state had imposed more severe restrictions on Gwala, it was satisfied about his 
‘acquiescence.’ Unknown to the state, Gwala was actively involved in the recruitment of 
cadres in Pietermaritzburg for training by Bruno Mtolo on how to use explosives and 
subsequently to receive military training outside the country.59 While I am mindful that 
Mtolo’s narrative can hardly be regarded as a reputable source of scholary, his evidence 
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enables us to understand the intricacies that underpinned the underground operations in Natal. 
Mtolo claimed that Gwala was very fond of him during the early 1960s and ‘whenever [he] 
went to Pietermaritzburg [he] slept at his place or called [Gwala] to get few points which he 
would like to put across to the workers at SACTU meetings.’60 Anton Xaba confirmed that 
between 1962 and 1963 Gwala was responsible for the identification and recruitment of 
cadres in Pietermaritzburg to attend Mtolo’s training sessions on the use of explosives and to 
be sent outside the country to receive military training for MK activities.61 Eric Mtshali 
recounts that he and other trade unionists, including Gwala, were well placed to recruit ‘the 
best out of the working class’ to MK, and ‘therefore people who went out [of the country] for 
military training during that period of the 1960s were mostly workers.’62  
While the impact of the police raids on the underground headquarters of MK at Liliesleaf 
farm on 11 July 1963 has been described as catastrophic to the underground operations at a 
national level, it was the arrest of Mtolo in Kloof, near Pinetown, on 3 August that enabled 
the state to crack down on MK operatives in Natal. After some brief interrogation, Mtolo 
became an informer and disclosed the underground network of MK in Natal. Gwala was 
among those who were arrested after Mtolo had become a state collaborator. After serving a 
lengthy period in solitary confinement which was marked by torture, Gwala was charged for 
contravening the Suppression of Communism Act and the Unlawful Organisations Act for 
‘aid[ing] the undergoing of training outside the Republic or obtaining information from a 
source outside the Republic which could be used in furthering the achievement of any of the 
objects of the African National Congress also known as Mkhonto We Sizwe.’63 Although 
Gwala had been a key figure in building underground MK military structures in 
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61 Ruth Lundie interview with Anton Xaba.  
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Pietermaritzburg and recruiting cadres for MK, he denied involvement in MK activities and 
pleaded not guilty. 
Meanwhile, the state was determined to clamp down on anyone involved in MK. It argued 
that because there was a danger that Gwala would ‘interfere [with] or intimidate witnesses’ 
he should be tried summarily without a preparatory examination.64 During the trial, which 
lasted for three months, Gwala was represented by a certain Mr Wilson. It has not been 
established who was responsible for paying for Gwala’s defence lawyers. The state’s 
argument was based on the evidence of Mtolo and Solomon Mbanjwa. Mbanjwa had been 
arrested and also turned state witness. He testified that William Msimang, William Kanyile, 
Bernard Mhlongo, Anton Xaba and Samson Nene, who had been arrested in Northern 
Rhodesia, now Zambia, and handed over to the South African authorities, were people who 
had been recruited by Gwala.65 Msimang, Kanyile, Mhlongo, Xaba and Nene had been part 
of the second group of MK recruits that left the country through Bechuanaland, now 
Botswana, and were due to travel through Northern Rhodesia on their way to Tanzania. 
However, travel in Northern Rhodesia was not safe, and the group was arrested by the British 
colonial authorities and deported to South Africa. There they stood trial and were 
subsequently imprisoned in Leeuwkop Prison, north of Johannesburg.66 Meanwhile, on 11 
June 1964, on the strength of evidence from Mtolo and Mbanjwa, Judge Kennedy found 
Gwala guilty and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment on Robben Island.67 
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In an act that showed his resilience and his determination to resist prison isolation, Gwala 
applied for leave to appeal.68 It appears that Gwala did not have legal representation for his 
court appearance as he appeared in person in court on 24 June 1964 to apply for leave to 
appeal. He requested that the matter be adjourned so that he could find satisfactory evidence 
and legal counsel to represent him in order to present evidence more effectively. In the 
meantime, his wife Elda had already made contact with A. J. McGibbon and Brokensha 
attorneys to represent him in this matter.69  
Gwala’s appeal was based on a denial that he had been involved in the recruitment of the five 
imprisoned cadres. In the meantime, Msimang, Kanyile, Mhlongo, Xaba and Nene had been 
transferred to Pietermaritzburg gaol where they reconnected with Gwala. It appears that they 
orchestrated a plan to deny that they were recruited by Gwala for the purposes of military 
training outside South Africa.70 Their affidavits formed the major part of Gwala’s application. 
They claimed under oath that they ‘were pointed out to the police by one Solomon Mbanjwa 
as being persons recruited by Harry Gwala.’71 Gwala argued that ‘evidence contained in the 
said affidavits [was] material and adversely [affected] the credibility of both Solomon 
Mbanjwa and Bruno Mtolo, whilst substantiating [his] own evidence.’ He requested that an 
appeal application be granted as ‘another court having such evidence before it might take a 
different view and so arrive at a different verdict.’72 Gwala’s denial exposed the dangers of 
relying on court documents as sources of evidence because these may comprise manufactured 
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and rehearsed statements that were devoid of truth. Anton Xaba later admitted that he had in 
fact been recruited by Gwala in January 1963 and Truman Magubane also admitted that 
Gwala was actively involved in MK recruitment during the early 1960s.73 
The judgment of Judge Kennedy on 17 August 1964 to grant Gwala leave to appeal provided 
Gwala with temporary false relief as the state could not move him to Robben Island as it 
intended to do.74 Subsequently, he applied to be granted ‘bail pending the hearing of his 
application’, to which the state objected.75 The court denied bail and he remained in 
Pietermaritzburg gaol while his attorneys prepared the appeal. The appeal was heard on 10 
November 1964 and the judgment delivered on 24 November. Judge J. A. Beyers found the 
evidence of Mbanjwa and Mtolo was most reliable and conclusive and described Kanyile, 
Mhlongo, Xaba and Nene as ‘wholly unreliable deponents’ and not credible.76 Judge Beyers, 
with Judge Rumpff and Judge Williamson concurring, dismissed Gwala’s appeal. This meant 
that the state’s attempts to disconnect Gwala had succeeded and soon it started the process of 
transferring him to Robben Island. Harry Gwala, prison number 238/65, was admitted to 
Robben Island on 7 June 1965.77  
Connectedness and Gwala’s release from Robben Island 
The ‘smashing of the early underground’ activities of the MK and the subsequent arrest of 
some ANC leaders and the escape by others into exile resulted in a lull in activities.78 After 
the Rivonia trial, the leadership of the ANC was either in exile or in prison. While on Robben 
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Island, Gwala was able to circumvent harsh conditions in prison and established links with 
the Rivonia trialists who had assumed leadership of the ANC in prison. Oral sources suggest 
that although prison conditions were appallingly oppressive, Harry Gwala was able to 
establish linkages with other political prisoners from various political organisations.79  
Upon the release of an ANC political prisoner, the leadership of the ANC on Robben Island 
would instruct this member either to leave country or to wait for further instruction. When 
Gwala was released from Robben Island, the leadership gave him instructions to remain 
inside the country and to resuscitate the underground cells in Natal.80 However, Gwala found 
the political and security conditions ‘extremely precarious’ to undertake any political 
operations. He remarked: 
When I was released in [June] 1972 I found that people were scared. There 
was a lull. SACTU/ANC/SACP leadership has either been jailed or exiled. 
There were no political structures that existed at a local level.81 
Correspondence between the Department of Bantu Administration and Development 
(DBAD) and the Commissioner of the South African Police indicated that preparations for 
Gwala’s further disconnection started before his release from prison.82 The DBAD proposed 
that while ‘strong restrictions be ordered after Gwala’s release from prison’, it was prepared 
to ‘arrange employment possibilities locally.’83 When Gwala was released from prison, he 
was served with a five-year banning order which carried more severe restrictions than 
previous orders. This time Gwala was ordered not to participate in any manner in the 
preparation, compilation, printing, publication and transmission of any publication.  
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In an attempt to frustrate Gwala, mindful that he had trained as a teacher, the state prohibited 
him from ‘giving any educational instruction in any manner or form to any person other than 
a person of whom [he was] a parent.’84 Furthermore, he was not allowed to have any visitors 
other than a medical practitioner, his mother and mother-in-law, Margaret Nettie. Acting on 
the recommendation of the Commissioner of Police, the Secretary of Justice proposed to the 
Minister of Justice that Gwala be properly constrained, that restrictions be implemented, and 
that the Magistrate of Pietermaritzburg be authorised to approve exceptions.85 In addition, he 
was ‘banned from leaving his home at any time except between 6 am and 6 pm, [from] 
entering any Bantu area except Edendale, and [from] entering any factory.’86 
Gwala viewed the state’s tightening of restrictions and offers of employment by the state as a 
strategy to pacify him and make him a collaborator.87 By 1973 the Secretary of Justice was 
disappointed that Gwala refused to work for the KwaZulu Government because he claimed 
that state employment would be against his principles.88 In the meantime, Gwala applied for 
the relaxation of his restrictions in order to enable him to be away from home until 7 pm, to 
enter Sobantu, Imbali, Ashdown and Slangspruit, and to enter the premises of Leon’s Dry 
Cleaners in Pietermaritzburg. The Commissioner of Police recommended to the Minister of 
Justice that Gwala’s application be declined as it would ‘put him in a position to continue his 
incitement among the Bantu, with which he has been engaged in for years.’89 
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Although the Minister of Justice did not support the relaxation of Gwala’s restrictions, the 
Chief Magistrate of Pietermaritzburg granted him permission to enter the premises of Leon’s 
Dry Cleaners and African townships on conditions that it would be within the timeframes set 
out in the banning order. The Chief Magistrate did not consider that Gwala would use this 
time for his political activities. He operated his ‘business’ using a van which the South 
African Council of Churches (SACC) Pietermaritzburg had bought for him in January 1973.90 
While Gwala involved himself in numerous activities that were against the conditions of his 
banning order, in some instances he made the state believe that he was abiding by the 
conditions of his banning order. He wanted the state to believe that its control mechanisms 
were effective and he was abiding by them.91 Despite being closely monitored by the Special 
Branch, Yunus Mohammed observed that Gwala became increasingly involved in the 
underground structures of MK.92 Nevertheless, it was not until early 1974 that Gwala’s 
underground operations began to yield positive results.  
Connectedness and the resuscitation of the underground activities in Natal  
Kgalema Motlanthe has characterised the resuscitation of the ANC underground structures in 
Natal during the early 1970s as ‘a very crucial moment in the history of the armed struggle.’93 
After the SACTU, ANC, and SACP underground structures inside the country had effectively 
been wiped out during the 1960s, there were new opportunities in the 1970s as the first group 
                                                 
90 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Lindiwe Gwala; PAR, RSC, 1/1/1004, Vol. 32, Record 11, CC 76/74, State vs Harry 
Gwala and others, evidence of Harry Themba Gwala. 
91 On 21 August 1974 Gwala applied to the Chief Magistrate of Pietermaritzburg to attend his late mother’s ritual ceremony 
which was to be held at Swayimane, in the district of New Hanover. The event was to be held on Saturday, 31 August 1974. 
He requested to attend the ceremony from Friday, 30 August since the beast was to be slaughtered on that day as per custom. 
Permission was granted on condition that on his arrival he reported his departure to the Station Commander at 
Pietermaritzburg Police Station and that on his arrival in the New Hanover district he also reported to the Station 
Commander. Furthermore, he was instructed not to carry any passenger other than his family and he abide by the conditions 
of his banning order, see NAR, DOJ papers, file no. 2/1/53, correspondence between Themba Harry Gwala and the Chief 
Magistrate of Pietermaritzburg, 21 and 29 August 1974. 
92 M. Ntsodi interview with Yunus Mohammed.  
93 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Kgalema Motlanthe, 13 February 2013, Highstead (the Deputy President’s official 
residence in Cape Town). Motlanthe served as State President of the Republic of South Africa from September 2008 to May 
2009 and later served as Deputy President between 2009 and 2014.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
145 
of ANC activists who had been imprisoned at Robben Island were released. This group, 
including Gwala, had an ‘impact on thinking and culture of youth activists’ in Natal.94 It 
established the Natal-Swaziland network which became an exit route for those who were 
leaving South Africa to join MK in exile.95  
Jabulani Sithole, Sifiso Ndlovu, Martin Legassick and Derby Bonnin concur that Gwala’s 
release from prison had a significant impact on workers’ political consciousness in the Natal 
Midlands, especially at Sarmcol, as it reminded them of the old days of struggle and of the 
necessity of worker organisation and unity.96 Nevertheless, at a broader political level, Gwala 
remarked that ‘political apathy and consciousness’ made it difficult to re-establish proper 
underground networks because many people were despondent and scared of the Security 
Branch.97 A number of factors led to the improvement in political morale in Natal during the 
early 1970s. This included the growth of student militancy which was driven by the South 
African Students’ Organisation (SASO), and the subsequent students’ strike at the University 
College of Durban-Westville in January 1972, the emergence of the Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM), especially the launch of the Black People’s Convention (BPC) in mid-
1972 at Edendale, and the 1973 Durban strikes.98 In addition, the release of Jacob Zuma on 
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29 December 1973 had a significant impact on the re-establishment of the ANC underground 
structures in Natal between 1974 and 1975.99 As Karis and Gerhart have suggested, despite 
the lull of the mid-1960s, the early 1970s were characterised by the intensification of political 
conscientisation, and the ‘banned liberation movements with their commitment to armed 
struggle gained rapidly in appeal.’100  
By 1972, SASO leaders had scoured their social surroundings for usable forms of 
organisational support.101 The Association for the Educational and Cultural Advancement of 
the African (ASSECA), headed by M. T. Moerane, also editor of The World, a widely read 
township newspaper, became one of the organisations that SASO targeted. Although 
Moerane did not allow ASSECA to be reoriented by SASO, he remained supportive of 
political cooperation with other like-minded organisations.102 As discussed previous, 
Moerane and Gwala had worked together to establish the Natal CYL during the 1940s. In 
mid-August 1971, Moerane and William Nkomo had been elected to be part of the team that 
organised the Edendale consultative meeting to discuss the establishment of the BPC, which 
comprised over 26 African organisations that were operating outside government-initiated 
bodies. This position gave him influence over various organisations in Natal.103 The BPC was 
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formally launched at Edendale in July 1972, a month after Gwala’s release from prison, with 
Reverend Mashwabanda Mayutula as an interim secretary general. Although Gwala did not 
attend the launch, he was ‘properly briefed by Moerane’ and welcomed the BPC as an 
integral role-player in raising the levels of political consciousness.104   
As Thomas Karis and Gail Gerhart have argued, the BCM, with its appeal for an independent 
and assertive African culture, aroused enthusiastic support from many people. In Natal, the 
Theatre Council of Natal (TECON), a politically committed Indian drama group which had 
tried to cultivate white donors and audiences, decided in 1972 to devote itself exclusively to 
performing for blacks. Cultural expression became a major political tool for the Black 
Consciousness Movement to popularise itself and cultivate Africanness.105 Furthermore, 
artistic performances that emerged during 1972 and 1973 conveyed a political message, 
veiled or explicit. For example, Shanti, a play by Mthuli Shezi performed in Natal and 
Transvaal townships in 1973, told an improbable story of an Indian woman whose African 
lover fled South Africa to join the guerrilla army of the Mozambique Liberation Front, 
FRELIMO.106  
These developments created an unprecedented level of political consciousness that presented 
fertile ground for Gwala to start an internal operation to recruit young people to leave the 
country for military training with MK.107 Furthermore, the independence in 1974 of Angola 
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105 Karis and Gerhart, ‘From Protest to Challenge’, Vol. 5, 136; Julie Fredrikse interview with Saths Cooper.   
106 Karis and Gerhart, ‘From Protest to Challenge’, Vol. 5, 136. 
107 www.sahistory.org.za/people/jacob-gedleyihlekisa-zuma, accessed, 31 December 2015; Mxolisi Dlamuka, interview with 
Kgalema Motlanthe. Other key individuals in the unit were Jacob Zuma, Joseph Nduli, affectionately known as Mpisi, and 
Joseph Mdluli. Nduli played a vital role in establishing links with the Swaziland network of the exiled ANC. He was one of 
the first generation of MK recruits and was part of the Luthuli Detachment. He was trained in the Soviet Union and lived in 
Tanzania. Nduli participated in the Wankie operation and was the only one who succeeded in crossing into South Africa, 
going as far as Natal, thereafter operating underground between Swaziland and South Africa. Joseph Mdluli was together 
were Gwala, responsible for recruitment mainly from the townships of Umlazi, KwaMashu, Sobantu and Edendale, and 
organising transportation of recruits to the border between Natal and Swaziland. In many cases Mdluli was personally 
involved in transporting recruits from Durban and Pietermaritzburg’s townships, see Macmillan, The Lusaka Years, 111-126.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
148 
and Mozambique was a major psychological boost for African political conscientisation and 
removed ‘major portions of the geographical buffer zone that had separated South Africa’ 
from the independent African countries.108 By mid-1974, Gwala had made contact with 
Albert Dlomo who was at that time based in Swaziland and working closely with Moses 
Mabhida.109 It was Dlomo who introduced Gwala to Sylvia and Peter Gamedze, Swazi 
nationals whose business was used as a front for delivering ANC messages between Natal 
and Swaziland. Between 1974 and 1975, Sylvia Gamedze was a conduit of communication 
from the Natal ANC underground and the Swaziland-based ANC. Sylvia, born in 
Pietermaritzburg, was married to Peter Gamedze. Peter had farms in Swaziland, and Sylvia 
managed her business between Pietermaritzburg and Manzini.110 
It was through Sylvia Gamedze that Mabhida and Dlomo were able to advise ‘Gwala and 
Jacob Zuma network to establish units in line with the M-Plan, Mandela Plan.’111 
Furthermore, Sylvia Gamedze also smuggled money from Dlomo and Mabhida to Gwala, 
which was used to cover the expenses of transporting recruits to the border between Natal 
and Swaziland.112 Gwala admitted receiving money from Sylvia Gamedze, but disputed that 
it was to further the political ends of the ANC. He emphasised that it was ‘used for organising 
SACTU and also sent to those who were taught trade union work to cover their wages and 
other activities.’ This concealed the fact that the money covered costs that were associated 
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with the recruitment of MK cadres and their transportation to the Natal-Swaziland border.113 
By October 1974, after having divided Natal into 12 units, Gwala, Anton Xaba, Truman 
Magubane, Joseph Mdluli and Azaria Ndebele facilitated the transportation of the first group 
of recruits through Peter and Sylvia Gamedze.114 This group consisted of 12 cadres who 
travelled in two groups of six. The groups were to be received by Joseph Nduli and Cleopas 
Melayibone Ndhlovu on the Swaziland side of the border after which they would be taken to 
their next destination.115  
Gwala’s network of recruits came mainly from his trade union activities of the 1960s, 
especially those he had worked closely with at Howick. Among these were Moses Bhengu 
and Sipho Kubheka. Gwala and Bhengu had been activists of the Rubber Workers’ Union in 
1960 and, when Gwala was banned, Bhengu became the secretary.116 In 1974 Gwala and 
Bhengu reconnected through Truman Magubane. Bhengu became active in recruiting youth 
to join MK in Sobantu. He occasionally received money from Gwala to cover travelling 
expenses.117 Truman Magubane had introduced Kubheka to Gwala when they both worked 
closely in the Pietermaritzburg local office of SACTU in 1961.118 Gwala reconnected with 
Kubheka after his release from prison. By that time Kubheka was working at Edendale 
Hospital. As discussions about the recruitment for MK intensified Gwala used his laundry 
business as a front to visit Kubheka more often at the hospital.119 Gwala remarked that 
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discussions between him, Truman Magubane and Kubheka extended to the broader politics of 
the 1970s in Natal and KwaZulu. The topics they discussed included the ‘unveiling of a 
memorial or a tombstone to the late Chief Albert Luthuli at Groutville’, the establishment of 
KwaZulu, and the role of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. While Truman Magubane and Kubheka 
were against Buthelezi accepting the establishment of the KwaZulu Bantustan, Gwala 
‘defended him.’120  
By the end of October 1975, the network of Gwala and Jacob Zuma had played a vital role in 
facilitating the exit of over fifty recruits from Natal while Sylvia Gamedze ensured that there 
was an active communication line between Gwala, Dlomo, Mabhida and Joseph Mdluli.121 In 
addition, it was this network that organised a student trip to Swaziland in 1975 during which 
several key SASO activists from Natal University’s medical school were recruited to the 
ANC. Among these were Diliza Mji, Norman Dubazane, Faith Matlaopane and Nkosazana 
Dlamini. These recruits later became prominent in the leadership of student organisations and 
clandestine operations of both the ANC and MK in Natal. The recruitment of these student 
leaders indicated a new strategy, meaning and direction: the steering of the student movement 
towards identification with the aims, ideology, and leadership of the ANC.122  
Meanwhile, the Security Branch infiltrated the network and converted Samson Lukele into a 
collaborator. Lukele was the one who was responsible for driving recruits from Natal to the 
boarder of Swaziland. The interrogation of Lukele and Joseph Nduli uncovered the network 
of Gwala and Jacob Zuma.123 In addition, while under interrogation, Joseph Nduli divulged 
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the names of Kgalema Motlanthe and Stanley Nkosi as those responsible for recruiting in 
Johannesburg.124 Subsequently, Motlanthe and Nkosi were interrogated in Johannesburg, 
arrested in 1976, and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on Robben Island.   
 Disconnectedness and Gwala’s 1976 trial  
On the morning of 30 November 1975 members of the Special Branch arrested Gwala at his 
house together with his wife, Elda, for ‘participating in terrorist activities in contravention of 
the Terrorism Act of 1967 as amended.’125 They were taken to the Special Branch section on 
the second floor of Loop Street Police Station. They were separated, severely tortured, and 
kept in solitary confinement. Gwala remembered that: 
From December 12 to December 14 1975, I was subjected to a continuous 
questioning without sleep by various members of the Security force. From 
the type of questioning it became clear to me that the police were only 
interested in a particular type of answers. On the last day I was threatened 
that this type of treatment would be imposed again unless I supplied these 
certain answers.126  
Gwala was subsequently moved to the Town Hill Police Station which was mainly for 
‘cooperative’ detainees. However, after it became clear that he was ‘not willing to cooperate’ 
with his interrogators, he was sent back to Loop Street. Gwala remarked that: 
When I arrived there I had continuous hay fever and tight chest together 
with wheezing at night. The blankets supplied were not fit for human 
beings…on January 12, 1976, I acquired a better blanket but it was so 
infested with lice that in one night I destroyed fifty.127  
There is no evidence that Gwala divulged any information that related to his underground 
activities. As a result of his lack of cooperation, his elder daughter, Lulu Gwala, who Gwala 
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defined as ‘an acute asthmatic’, was also detained on 7 January 1976 for six months.128 
Gwala further believed that:  
The reason for my daughter’s detention is that (a) in 1974 she sold goods 
for one Mrs Peter Gamedze of Swaziland (b) In May 1975, I sent her 
together with one Thuthukile Mabhida to deliver letters to the said Mrs 
Gamedze at Machibise (c) In June 1975, while she went to Mrs 
Gamedze’s mother’s home to give Mrs Gamedze money for the goods she 
had sold in 1974 I gave her a letter to hand over to Mrs Gamedze (d) That 
Mrs Gamedze in her statement to police alleges that in November 1975 I 
sent my daughter either to collect from her a letter or deliver a card with a 
list of names.129 
By the end of January 1976, Gwala had been tortured to the extent that he applied to have his 
‘will drawn up as he feared’ for his own health and his life as well as those of his family.130 
The Special Branch inflicted increased levels of torture that attempted to force Gwala and 
others suspects to cooperate.131 Anton Xaba, also arrested on 30 November 1975, told the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that police surrounded his house, rounded up 
all six members of his family and took them to Loop Street Police Station. Xaba said he was 
taken upstairs where he was systematically assaulted, tortured and interrogated for two days. 
He bled heavily and lost consciousness a number of times. His torture included being dangled 
out of the window by his feet while the policemen swung him backwards and forwards and 
banged his head against the wall. His arm was broken in the process. At one point during the 
torture, he said he could hear the screams of his wife in the adjoining room. On his second 
day of torture, Xaba’s hands were cuffed behind his back and he was suspended from the 
ceiling like ‘meat in the butchery.’132  
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From 30 November to 19 December 1975, over 20 people were arrested and placed in 
solitary confinement in connection with their involvement in the Gwala and Jacob Zuma 
network.133 Among the detained were Willian Fano Khanyile, Anton Ndoda Xaba, John 
Vusimuzi Nene, Vusimuzi Truman Magubane, Matthews Makholeka Mayewa, Azaria 
Ndebele, and Zakhele Elphas Mdlalose and they were charged together with Gwala. Also in 
the net were Herold Bekisisa Nxasana, Abion Alfred Duma, Sylvia Ntombikayise Gamedze, 
Peter Bhekimpi Gamedze, Moses Bhengu, and Sipho Kubheka, all of whom turned state 
witness.134 As the raids continued, the Security Branch detained Joseph Mdluli on 18 March 
1976 and proceeded to ‘torture him to death within 24 hours.’135  
The Special Branch had assembled a team of senior officers from Natal and Johannesburg to 
detain all those suspected of being involved in the Gwala and Jacob Zuma network. Zuma 
managed to escape the county in December 1975. By end of February 1976, the Security 
Branch had detained over 50 people it suspected of involvement. Even though Jacob Zuma 
had left the country, the Special Branch was still determined to detain Joseph Nduli and 
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Cleopas Ndhlovu, even though they were residents of Swaziland, having been given political 
asylum.136   
On 18 March 1976, Jacob Zuma had given R1000 to Samson Lukele which he was supposed 
to give to Joseph Mdluli.137 Jacob Zuma was not aware that Lukele had become a state 
collaborator. Once Joseph Mdluli had been murdered, Lukele made a scam arrangement to 
give back the money to Joseph Nduli and Cleopas Ndhlovu on 25 March 1976, and hand over 
another group of recruits from Natal. Joseph Nduli and Cleopas Ndhlovu went to the spot at 
the border fence where they had agreed to meet. However, because of ‘marshy terrain’, they 
could ‘not bring the motor vehicle closer to the border fence.’138 As they walked closer they 
‘noticed that a stationary motor vehicle on the Piet Retief-Pongola road was flashing its 
parking lights on and off.’ Joseph Nduli and Cleopas Ndhlovu ‘flashed twice with the torch’ 
and the motor vehicle moved closer to the fence.139 At a closer distance Joseph Nduli and 
Cleopas Ndhlovu called out “Mbuzi-Mbuzi”, the agreed signal, and a voice answered “Ja”.140 
After a brief discussion, Lukele indicated that they were recruits who had to cross the border. 
To the astonishment of Joseph Nduli and Cleopas Ndhlovu, ‘people started to emerge from 
the vehicle’, climbed through onto the Swaziland side of the fence, and apprehended them.141 
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After the arrest of Joseph Nduli and Cleopas Ndhlovu, the state consolidated its charged sheet 
and issued an indictment with Gwala as accused number one.142  
All ten accused were held incommunicado for the duration of their detention until they were 
brought before the court on 14 May 1976.143 By refusing to grant bail, and detaining the 
accused in various police cells and in police stations far removed from their families, the state 
was trying to mitigate the risk of the accused presenting a unified, well considered legal 
defence.144 In addition, since the ‘accused had extremely shortened visits from their families, 
it became difficult for their families to reach consensus’ on who was going to be their 
attorney.145  
The state’s trial against Gwala in 1976 must be seen in the context of the political 
developments that had unfolded between 1975 and 1976. In August 1975, three months 
before Gwala’s arrest, the state had brought a major political trial against Sathasivan (Saths) 
Cooper and eight others, also referred to as ‘the SASO Nine.’ The trial became the most 
publicised legal confrontation since the Rivonia trial whose proceedings had lasted for 16 
months.146 Cooper was found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison. While the state was 
preparing for the trial, the student uprising began in Soweto in June 1976 and culminated in 
countrywide protest and resistance. As these ‘events caught the government off guard’ it was 
determined to respond in a harsh manner in order to send a strong warning to those 
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disregarding its authority.147 In addition to the use of violence to suppress the uprising, the 
state was mindful that the old methods of political control could no longer ensure political 
stability, so it used the trial of Gwala to reaffirm its authority.148  
The 1976 trial was important in the state’s attempts to curb political resistance, to reassure its 
white constituencies of its ‘capacity to maintain law and order and to gain the favour of 
public opinion.’149 Paradoxically, Truman Magubane asserts that the ‘1976 trial presented the 
liberation movement with an opportunity to expose the cruelty of the apartheid system and to 
defend their human rights and dignity as legitimate citizens of South Africa.’150  
In order to understand the trial, it is vital that circumstances that predated the modalities of 
imprisonment and political interrogation and the subjectification of Gwala and nine other co-
accused be examined closely. As a trial of such nature required a strong defence, the ANC in 
exile and families of the accused made arrangements with two legal firms – Navanethem 
Pillay & Company and A. J. Gumede & Phyllis Naidoo Attorneys – to represent Gwala and 
his nine co-accused and act as instructing attorneys for the trial.151 This resulted in a feud 
between the two firms which were competing for recognition, resources and political 
prominence.152 Gwala was concerned that ‘Phyllis Naidoo had no experience to handle 
political trials as she had just emerged from house arrest and she impeded [them] from taking 
a line of defence that [kept] the integrity of the organisation intact.’153 To resolve the feud, 
the ANC office in London issued an instruction that Navanethem Pillay & Company be the 
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instructing attorney while Phyllis Naidoo of A. J. Gumede and Phyllis Naidoo Attorneys was 
assigned to be in charge of administering the welfare arrangements for the detainees and their 
families.154 Relations between Navanethem Pillay and Phyllis Naidoo were acrimonious as 
they continued to disagree how welfare funds were to be handled.155  
Due to the nature of the trial, it attracted wide publicity in local and international media as 
trialists were facing the possibility of a death sentence if found guilty. The trial’s complexity, 
the charges against the accused, and the fact that it was expected to go on for a long time 
convinced the ANC it was necessary to raise an adequate amount of dedicated funding for the 
trial. The ANC approached the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) for financial 
support.156 IDAF committed itself to cover the legal costs of the defence and to provide for 
the welfare of the detainees and their families.157 It appointed Carruthers and Company, a 
London based legal firm, to administer the funding for the Gwala and Others trial and to 
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liaise with the defence team in South Africa. By the end of the trial IDAF had spent 
R205 899.44 on welfare and R229 294.40 on legal costs.158  
The defence counsel was led by advocates G. B. Muller, senior counsel, and C. R. Nicholson, 
junior counsel. In addition, Mxenge Attorneys, R. I. Arenstein and N. C. Abrahams also 
assisted the defence team.159 The defence applied for the postponement of the trial as it 
notified the court that it intended to initiate a ‘trial within a trial.’160 At the centre of the 
defence’s argument was whether the court had jurisdiction to try Joseph Nduli and Cleopas 
Ndhlovu, accused number 9 and 10 respectively, as it contended that these accused had been 
‘illegally kidnapped from Swaziland and arrested unlawfully.’161 The defence attempted to 
delegitimise the state’s case and exposed the extent to which it disrespected the human rights 
of freedom fighters. Despite the confirmation by Swazi authorities that both Joseph Nduli and 
Cleopas Ndhlovu had been granted political asylum the application was dismissed by the 
court.162  
After several postponements due to the reluctance of the Special Branch to provide 
statements of the accused to the defence team, the trial started in August 1976. Advocate 
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Rossouw, the Deputy Attorney-General of Natal who was highly trusted by A. J. Krog, 
Natal’s Attorney-General, led the prosecution.163 The state alleged that the accused had 
‘participated in terroristic activities in contravention of the Terrorism Act of 1967 as 
amended.’164 The prosecutor argued that during the period 1 November 1973 to 25 March 
1976, Harry Gwala and other accused had been members or active supporters of the ANC. 
Through their involvement they had ‘sent or received messages to or from representatives of 
the ANC in Swaziland.’165 Furthermore, the state argued that they had received ‘subversive 
literature from members of the ANC in Swaziland’ and they distributed and studied its 
content.166 The state’s narrative was centred on the allegation that Gwala and other accused 
conspired to overthrow the government by ‘procuring people to undergo training outside the 
borders of the Republic.’167 As Albertyn has argued the state approached the trial as a 
punitive measure in response to the political upheavals that had culminated in the 1976 
uprising.168  
The state knitted together various strands of evidence drawn from documents that were 
obtained during the raids conducted at Gwala’s house and at those of the other accused. The 
state presented a list of over 80 witnesses it intended calling to testify. The coercive and 
punitive capacity of the state became evident as its list of state witnesses comprised 
collaborators, askaris and persons who had been detained in solitary confinement for over 
three months, and who had been severely tortured, and turned into state witnesses.169 Among 
                                                 
163 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Truman Magubane; PAR, RSC, 1/1/991, Vol. 19, Record 12, CC 108/76, State v Harry 
Gwala and 9 others, correspondence from Radcliffe Caluza, 30 August 1976.  
164 PAR, RSC, 1/1/1001, Vol. 29, Record 1, CC 108/76, State v Harry Gwala and 9 others, The Indictment, 14 May 1976.   
165 PAR, RSC, 1/1/1001, Vol. 29, Record 1, CC 108/76, State v Harry Gwala and 9 others, The Indictment, 14 May 1976. 
166 PAR, RSC, 1/1/1001, Vol. 29, Record 1, CC 108/76, State v Harry Gwala and 9 others, The Indictment, 14 May 1976. 
167 PAR, RSC, 1/1/1001, Vol. 29, Record 1, CC 108/76, State v Harry Gwala and 9 others, The Indictment, 14 May 1976. 
168 Albertyn, ‘A Critical Analysis of Political Trials’, 458.  
169 PAR, RSC, 1/1/991, Vol. 19, Record 12, CC 108/76, State v Harry Gwala and 9 others, affidavit of Frans Kunene, 8 
February 1977; for a detailed discussion on the use of punishment in the South African legal system in the late 1980s, see 
Merrett, ‘Detention without Trial in South Africa’, 53-66; J. Alexander and G. Kynoch, ‘Introduction: Histories and 
Legacies of Punishment in Southern Africa’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2011); R Roberts and K 
Mann (eds.), Law on Colonial Africa (Portsmouth NH: Heinemann, 1991).   
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
160 
these were Leonard Nkosi, Bruno Mtolo, Kubheka and Frans Kunene.170 Kubheka had been 
close to Gwala. During the TRC, Kubheka told the Commission that he was detained and 
tortured on a number of occasions by the Pietermaritzburg Special Branch during 1975 and 
1976. He said he was subjected to severe mental torture and a month in solitary confinement, 
was stripped naked and assaulted. While being tortured he was told that he had to turn against 
the ANC and be a state witness in the pending Gwala treason trial. If he refused to cooperate, 
he would be thrown off a moving train.171  
In an affidavit after the trial, Kunene confessed how, in addition to having been tortured in 
various police solitary confinement cells in Camperdown, Plessislaer and Hammarsdale 
Police Stations, the conversion to become a state witness was applied to him:    
After about two months at Hammarsdale I was taken to the Howick Police 
Station. There I was kept in a single cell for solitary confinement. When I 
first got to Howick I was not given water with which to wash for about a 
month. The food, although unpleasant, was adequate and I have no real 
complaints about it. After about five months in prison at Howick, I with 
four other persons (whom I subsequently discovered were also being held 
in connection with the Pietermaritzburg Terrorist Trial), was taken to 
Thornville Police Station. There we met about 25 other Black people. I 
discovered there that these other people were also being held in 
connection with the same trial. The others had apparently come from 
different prisons within the vicinity. At Thornville that night we, the 
detainees, were treated to a film show by the Police. We saw a film about 
chimpanzees dressed up in human clothing and performing various antics. 
After the film show was over we were all given alcohol to drink. There 
was Zulu beer and Cane Spirits. I had plenty of liquor and became quite 
intoxicated. All, or most, of other detainees also got drunk. We were each 
given a pocket of twenty cigarettes of a brand of our choice. After this 
event which ended at approximately 11 p.m. I together with the other 
detainees who had been held in Howick was taken back there.172 
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Kubheka and Kunene’s experiences suggest that state witnesses were harassed, intimidated 
and coerced to implicate the accused, and the majority of them were detained by the Special 
Branch and kept in solitary confinement.173 Some of the state witnesses had been involved in 
the underground operations and had participated in Gwala’s underground operations. While 
the motive for collaboration has been unclear for certain other witnesses and later askaris, 
state witnesses during the Gwala trial ‘testified in fear of their own lives.’174  
The state brought experienced and trained witnesses to court in order to ensure that it was 
able to link Gwala and the other accused persons with the military activities of the ANC and 
MK and with the activities of others who were already serving lengthy prison sentences. One 
such witness was Bruno Mtolo. During the Rivonia trial (1963-64), the state trial of Billy 
Nair, Curnick Ndlovu and 17 others (1964), and the state trial of Gwala (1964) the courts 
found Mtolo to be a skilled and reliable witness.175 By bringing a skilled and trained witness, 
the state wanted to strengthen its case that the accused had been involved in subversive 
operations. Despite these measures by the state, witness testimonies contained biases, 
contradictions, and, at times, blatant lies.176  
The defence presented a list of over 100 witnesses. The defence team adopted the ‘narratives 
of redemption’ argument which focused on two aspects.177 Firstly, it sought to divorce Gwala 
and other accused from involvement in recruitment for MK, thus projecting the most legally 
benign view possible of the ANC while at the same time making ‘maximum use of the 
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courtroom as a political platform.’178 The defence countered the state’s argument by 
attempting to affirm that Gwala and the accused had been involved in the resuscitation of 
trade unions, especially SACTU.179 Thus, Gwala asserted that letters between him and 
Mabhida were mainly centred on trade unions since both had worked together in SACTU in 
Natal during the 1950s and 1960s. Gwala testified that: 
This letter stated that he [Mabhida] had for long time made an effort to 
contact me but that he had received no reply from me and that Dhlomo 
had come and told him about the efforts to revive SACTU and…. That he 
would be glad if there were efforts made to revive SACTU because there 
was great need for it to be revived.180 
During the trial, Gwala further argued that his political activities were ‘provoked by the 
injustices that were imposed on African workers and the state had made it difficult for them 
to be protected.’181 Thus, Gwala claimed he had been a victim of an unjust political 
environment that was created by the apartheid minority government.182 The defence did not 
reject the state’s allegation that Gwala had facilitated the transportation of people to cross the 
border to Swaziland. However, the defence’s constructed narrative was that people who 
crossed the border were to receive training in trade unionism and attended trade union 
conferences. It denounced the allegation of their involvement in the political activities of 
MK. Towards the end of its argument, the defence subpoenaed Selby Msimang, a veteran 
politician who had been a founder member of the ANC in 1912 but who joined the Liberal 
Party and then Inkatha Ye Nkululeko YeSizwe, ‘to justify the ANC’s commitment to 
nonracialism and better South Africa.’ Msimang’s testimony focused mainly on the extent to 
                                                 
178 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Truman Magubane; Karis and Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 5, 148. 
179 PAR, RSC, 1/1/1004, Vol. 23, Record 11-12, CC 108/76, State v Harry Gwala and 9 others, evidence of Themba Harry 
Gwala.  
180 PAR, RSC, 1/1/1004, Vol. 23, Record 11-12, CC 108/76, State v Harry Gwala and 9 others, evidence of Themba Harry 
Gwala. 
181 PAR, RSC, 1/1/1004, Vol. 23, Record 11-12, CC 108/76, State v Harry Gwala and 9 others, evidence of Themba Harry 
Gwala. 
182 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
163 
which the ANC had strived for peaceful means of attaining liberation for Africans, and on the 
illegitimacy of the apartheid system.183  
The trial judge admitted that Gwala’s evidence showed that while he communicated with the 
people he was alleged to have recruited, he claimed to have ‘pursued a noble course and he 
gave evidence in a bold, often aggressive manner, trying to score points off the prosecutor 
when the opportunity presented itself.’184 Furthermore, the judge stated that: 
However, apart from the simulation to which we have already referred, his 
[Gwala’s] demeanour was not such as to indicate that he was an untruthful 
witness. That does not mean, of course, that he made a favourable impression 
upon us – he did not.185 
Secondly, the defence’s strategy was to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the methods the state 
had used to solicit statements from the accused.186 The defence argued that the witnesses 
upon whose evidence the state relied had been forced to testify because their interrogators 
had applied high levels of torture and intimidation. As Lobban has argued, nearly half of the 
court’s hearing time was taken up with police torture ‘as witness after witness told of the 
torture they had suffered at the hands of the police.’187 Furthermore, the defence argued that 
the accused had been forced to write ‘a particular version’ of information in their statements 
as they had been threatened and feared for their own lives.188 The defence said the accused 
had been severely tortured while in solitary confinement, and referred to the death of Mdluli 
in police custody.  
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The 532-page judgment was eventually delivered on 14 and 15 July 1977. As with Shahid 
Amin’s argument in relation to the Chauri Chaura incident in India, the judge provided a 
harmonious narrative for the discordant accounts by the accused. These became tools of 
building both political and legal precedent.189 Despite the defence’s argument that Gwala and 
other accused had not participated in the recruitment of people to undergo military training 
outside the country, the judge found that ‘it had been proven beyond reasonable doubt that 
Gwala and other accused received subversive literature and letters which referred to the 
recruitment of youth for training in Mozambique.’190 Furthermore, the judge found that 
Gwala had ‘committed a conspiracy when he procured Mandla Sikosana, Edgar Zondi, Mtu 
Khumalo, R. M. Hadebe, Vicky Khumalo, Caiphas Nene and George Mkhize to undergo 
military training abroad.’191 With the exception of William Khanyile, who was acquitted of 
all the charges, all the other accused were found guilty. Through the trial and the judgment, 
Gwala was disconnected and criminalised. With the exception of Sipho Kubheka, Philemon 
Mokoena and Harold Nxasana, the judge discharged all accomplices from liability for the 
offences mentioned in the indictment.   
All the accused appeared briefly on the morning of 25 July 1977 to plead in mitigation of 
sentence, and the judge handed down the sentences on the same afternoon. The judge argued 
that when ‘deciding upon the sentences to be passed on each accused’ he had been guided by 
the legal precedent that ‘punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime, be fair to 
society.’192 The judge said that he had taken into account personal circumstances of each of 
the accused as well as their family circumstances. At 57, Gwala was the oldest of the 
accused. It is not clear to what extent the judge took into account his age or the fact that his 
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family depended on him. The judge emphasised that Gwala had ‘admitted previous 
convictions for offences involving subversive activities’, thus implying that he was a serial 
offender.193 According to the judge, ‘in view of the nature of their crimes, they must be 
sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, but in their cases the punishment must be designed 
to reform as well as to prevent and deter.’194 The judge said that he ‘had given careful 
consideration to all that Mr Muller had said on their behalf [the accused], but [thought] that 
[he] would be failing in [his] duty if [he] was to pass the lenient sentences that he [Muller] 
suggested.195 Gwala was sentenced to life imprisonment.196  
Soon after the sentences were handed down, Gwala and the other accused instructed their 
attorney to apply for leave to appeal against their convictions and sentences.197 Advocate 
Nicholson handled the application as Advocate Muller would not attend to the case because 
there was a dispute concerning unpaid legal fees for May and July 1977. The matter was 
referred to the Society of Advocates of Natal which resolved that Advocate Muller was 
entitled to the full fee due for May, and half his fee for the month of July.198 The state 
opposed the application. After hearing the grounds for appeal on 28 July 1977, the judge 
found that ‘this case rests upon finding of fact and credibility’ of witnesses.199 The judge was 
convinced that the accused showed no remorse for their actions and was not persuaded that 
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there had been misdirection in the case. The judge did not accept the defence submission that 
the sentences were ‘disturbingly inappropriate or severe as to induce a sense of shock.’200 
While he agreed that the sentences indeed severe, he was convinced that the severity was 
justifiable as they were ‘not imposed in a spirit of anger but only after the most anxious 
consideration.’201 The judge dismissed the application for leave to appeal because he did not 
believe that there was a reasonable prospect of the court of appeal holding that he had 
‘exercised [his] discretion unjudicially or improperly in imposing the sentences.’202  
The state had learned from earlier political trials that high-profile trials had a tendency to 
draw unwelcome media attention. Gwala and some other accused were well aware of this 
since they had been on trial before. By the conclusion of the trial in July 1977, Gwala and the 
other accused had managed to attract considerable publicity. Through their behaviour in court 
they conveyed a potent message of defiance towards white authority.203 Mindful of the 
gallery visitors, at times, they emerged from the cells beneath the courtroom robustly singing 
struggle songs and making the clenched fist salute. On entering the dock, they occasionally 
bellowed Amandla! (power) in unison at the startled spectators in the gallery.204   
After the appeal was dismissed, the state fast-tracked arrangements to move Gwala and eight 
others to Robben Island. Gwala and the other accused decided to petition the Chief Justice.205 
Gwala soon instructed Navanethem Pillay and Company to inform the ANC and IDAF about 
this intention and the consequent need for further funding for legal fees.206 The petition was 
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based on the ‘severity of the offences and the sentences imposed.’207 Gwala’s defence argued 
that the judge was ‘misdirected’, since the defendants’ ‘lack of remorse was taken into 
account in assessing a proper sentence.’ The petitioners persisted in asserting their innocence. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the state through its witness had been concocted and 
the ‘police had been allowed to have control over unconvicted prisoners.’208 Available 
archival records, though incomplete,209 suggest that the petition was successful.210 In a letter 
of request to the IDAF to fund the legal costs of the appeal, Navanethem Pillay said: 
As we have stressed in the past that our clients stand an excellent chance 
of success on appeal. The fact that the Chief Justice had allowed leave to 
appeal both on merit and on sentence is a clear indication of our client’s 
prospects of success. In the nature of this case, clients should have the best 
available Counsel to argue the appeal.211  
It is against this background that Navanethem Pillay instructed Messrs. Webber and 
Newdigate Attorneys of Bloemfontein to be the appellants’ attorneys. The appeal was set for 
hearing on 18, 19, 21 and 22 February 1980. As a result of the feud between Navanethem 
Pillay and Phyllis Naidoo, raising the funds to finance the appellants’ legal team was a 
challenge.212 At one point, the IDAF was reluctant to make payments for the outstanding trial 
and appeal costs because of difficulties with getting the two instructing attorneys’ firms to 
account for funds spent, especially welfare funds. Due to the IDAF’s reluctance to cover 
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other costs of the appeal, the services of senior counsel had to be dispensed with since there 
was no guarantee that the IDAF was going to accept the financial liability.213  
On 28 March 1980, the Appellate Division delivered the judgment which dismissed the 
appeal of Gwala and eight others against their conviction and sentences. When Navanethem 
Pillay visited Gwala to inform him about the outcome of the appeal, she recorded that ‘Gwala 
was tremendously disappointed’ as he had hoped that the appeal would be successful.214 
Nevertheless, Gwala asked Pillay to convey his ‘appreciation to the IDAF for its financial 
support throughout the trial including welfare’ to their families.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the evolution of Gwala’s politics towards a militant stance was a 
culmination of the state’s provocation and determination to disconnect him from his politics. 
Gwala’s politics cannot be studied in isolation from the historical shifts within the ANC and 
the manner in which the state handled challenges to its authority, particularly from March 
1960. Gwala’s militant politics and the state trials are part of the complex narrative of the 
history of the armed struggle, particularly in Natal. The state’s trial of Gwala demonstrates 
the state’s use of ‘excessive violence’ and the modalities of power and discourse that 
sustained apartheid.215 The political circumstances of the period from 1960 to 1977 inevitably 
made Gwala’s political path more militant, with ‘historically driven beginnings and a 
middle.’216 The trials became a contest of ideas between two cohesive but rival political 
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positions, white assumptions of superiority on the one hand, and the assertion of black 
resistance on the other, both of which were clear expressions of race and politics.  
This chapter has constructed a historical image of Gwala within the broader political context 
of the armed struggle and state political trials. The state’s trial of Gwala became a site of a 
countervailing discourse, a site of establishing historical narratives that simultaneously 
questioned the authority of the apartheid state and legitimised the liberation struggle. The 
trials present the paradox of the oppressive South African state using the law in politically 
biased courts to deny justice to the majority. These trials were characterised by state censure 
intended to disconnect and vilify Gwala, but which instead aided the liberation movement’s 
efforts through providing publicity, thus gaining much-needed public sympathy, international 
expressions of solidarity, and widespread exposure of the brutality of apartheid.    
While the 1960s’ state trials of Gwala were crucial in the local struggles of Pietermaritzburg 
and Natal, their coverage was eclipsed by the Rivonia trial on the one hand, and limited by  
the state’s system for censoring media reporting about political trials on the other.217 This 
chapter has shown how the political conditions of the 1970s were characterised by the 
reinvigoration of popular struggles by independent trade unions which led to the 1973 
Durban strikes, the release of political prisoners who had been imprisoned, mainly at Robben 
Island, during the 1960s, and the emergence of radical student movements in the mid-1970s. 
This suggests that the had a profound influence on the way the state dealt with Gwala’s 
politics of connectedness during his 1976 trial.  
This chapter has examined how the prosecution’s construction of events in court proceedings, 
its selection of witnesses, many of whom had been subjected to torture and coercion, and the 
                                                 
217 C. Merrett, A Culture of Censorship: Secrecy and Intellectual Repression in South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 
1994), 55.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
170 
presentation of unreliable evidence interferes with the process of writing history. Gwala’s 
trials show how the courts provided a crucial and uncritical platform for the state to 
criminalise opposition to its authority. For this reason, the production of historical knowledge 
obtained through the close examination of court records should be balanced by a clear 
understanding that evidence presented before the courts in such circumstances served to 
reproduce a particular political viewpoint.  
The chapter has constructed narratives that display Gwala as a victim of state torture and 
disconnectedness. The three trials discussed in this chapter are framed as being parts of a 
wider system of political control with specific and diverse political and ideological impact on 
Gwala’s life. Gwala’s trials became the state’s means to eliminate its political foes, and 
should be understood within a wider battle for political dominance. These and other trials 
became an expression of power, and a tool of control that reduced the law to being an 
instrument for the state to exercise political power, and ‘getting to know the enemy and 
rendering him harmless.’218  
The trials had a different impact on Gwala’s political status. The imprisonment provided him 
with an opportunity to participate in robust political discussions with the ANC leadership and 
political prisoners at Robben Island about the dialectics of socialism and nationalism within 
the ANC. Although the state disconnected Gwala by imprisoning him, he gradually gained 
public sympathy that would later become vital in the process of rebuilding the ANC branches 
after its unbanning in 1990. This served to re-establish and reconfirm Gwala’s identity as a 
‘lion of Pietermaritzburg, a theme that is explored in detail later.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Harry Gwala’s prison lives 1965-1988 
Introduction 
Robben Island and the memory of its political prisoners occupy a pivotal role in the 
chronicles of the South African liberation history. The corpus of ex-political prisoners’ 
memoirs by Nelson Mandela, Ahmed Kathrada and others highlighted the cruelty of the 
apartheid system and the ability of political prisoners to overcome adversity.1 Although 
Mandela and Kathrada appear to be dominant figures in the narratives of Robben Island, 
Harry Gwala’s role, albeit complex, has not been examined to the same extent. Gwala 
participated in developing an intellectual framework that sustained political consciousness 
and connected ordinary prisoners with the political and intellectual worlds of both the ANC 
and the Communist Party.2 This chapter seeks to address this lacuna by examining Harry 
Gwala’s roles while he was imprisoned at Robben Island.  
The first part of this chapter examines the germination of Gwala’s complex roles in football 
and political education on Robben Island. Gwala’s devotion to football (albeit slightly) and to 
political education, ingeniously transformed the jail and forged wider unity amongst political 
prisoners. Simultaneously, Gwala fought to reform harsh conditions, the result of which was 
to facilitate the development of political intellectualism and the recognition of Robben Island 
as a ‘university’ within the liberation struggle.3 Although conditions of repression contributed 
to the psychological homogeneity and political respectability among the prisoners, it was 
Gwala’s series of lectures on ‘the Man and his Country’ which he presented underground, 
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that provided a political and philosophical induction to the theoretical intellectualism of the 
liberation struggle. Gwala’s lectures, coupled with the political work of Martin Legassick, 
were part of the broader intellectual project that sought to reorganise the production of a new 
kind of political cadre of the liberation movement.4 As a result, Gwala earned himself 
accolades as ‘a respected Marxist, intellectual and a theoretician of the struggle.’5 It was this 
robust intellectualism which, at a later stage, provided the impetus for reforms within the 
prison administration and later even negotiations to end apartheid.  
The second part of the chapter examines how Gwala’s family, mainly Elda, his wife, and later 
Lulu Gwala, his eldest daughter, dealt with his long absence. Since the imprisonment of 
Gwala in 1964 some white liberals in Pietermaritzburg took a personal interest in him and in 
his family’s welfare.6 After the re-imprisonment of Gwala in 1975, Elda organised the wives 
of other prisoners into a support group of which she became a leader. The last section 
explores the conditions of Gwala’s deteriorating health while in prison; epistolary exchange 
with members of the family, relatives and those who sympathised with his prison and medical 
conditions; and the mounting pressure from various organisations, national and international, 
that petitioned the prison authorities, the Minister of Justice and the State President to release 
Gwala unconditionally on medical grounds. This chapter argues that in spite of his 
imprisonment and isolation, Harry Gwala made use of prison conditions to advance the 
process of mobilisation, unity and political connectedness.  
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Gwala, connectedness and football  
On 7 June 1965, Harry Gwala was admitted to Robben Island to serve an eight-year term of 
imprisonment imposed by the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court. Gwala claimed to have been 
informed ‘vaguely’ by his ‘comrades’ that Robben Island was the worst prison, but it was 
only when he arrived there that ‘he realised what they were talking about.’7 Between 1965 
and 1988, Gwala’s life was shaped by the state’s imposition of high levels of isolation from 
society as he served two terms at Robben Island in this time. In 1987 he was transferred to 
Pietermaritzburg and Westville prisons. The state’s incarceration of Gwala at Robben Island 
was designed to isolate and disconnect him and locate him in an environment which would 
exclude him from having any political influence and render him harmless.8 Gwala’s 
pragmatism, however, enabled him to adapt to the prison conditions as he involved himself in 
sport and political education during both his first term of imprisonment and part of his second 
term.9 He remarked: 
I must say that political education did not depend on the harshness of the 
authorities. It was a matter of do or die. It was underground work. We 
were subjected to underground work before we went to prison. So in 
prison it was a continuation of that, so we had no problem with the 
restrictions imposed on us because we carried out our political activities.10 
 
The arrival of Gwala on Robben Island in 1965 coincided with the growing influx of 
prisoners, mainly young, and with increasing demands by prisoners to have access to 
recreational facilities. Chuck Korr and Marvin Close have documented how prisoners 
themselves overcame their trepidation and launched a campaign in 1964 to demand that 
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prisoners be allowed out in the fresh air for exercise.11 As football had already taken centre 
stage in the lives of ordinary people by that time, mainly blacks, the group of young prisoners 
that arrived at Robben Island in 1964 and 1965 were football fanatics. Among them was 
Dimake Malepe, a PAC activist who was also a respected full-time football player in Cape 
Town. 12 Prisoners’ interest in football, that started as kickabouts in cells in 1963, brought 
‘much needed fun into the prisoners’ lives.’ This interest in football grew steadily, and 
received a boost with the arrival of Malepe on Robben Island.’13 As interest grew, the desire 
to play on a proper outside pitch intensified even though prison rules prohibited them from 
talking with another, let alone gather groups. As early as 1964, prison authorities had 
prohibited the use of pencils and board games such as chess and draughts. Given the 
tightening of security restrictions on recreational activities, prisoners knew that if they want 
to play football on an open pitch, prison rules would have to be changed. This seemed to be 
an impossible scenario, given the rigid nature of the prison managers.  
Although Gwala did not initiate the demand to be allowed to play football, Monde 
Mkhunqwana remembers that he played a role in the campaign.14 To Gwala, the struggle to 
play football was not just an issue of access to recreation. He saw it as a tool of political 
mobilisation. Having been involved in football politics in Pietermaritzburg and Natal during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, Gwala used the campaign as a tool to rebuild political morale 
that had been crippled by restriction and victimisation on Robben Island.  
Prisoners were prohibited from campaigning or raising issues as a group. However, because 
prison management wanted to show the international community that it was following 
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reasonable rules and regulations, they established a forum where prisoners were allowed to 
raise their ‘complaints’ and ‘requests.’15 These sessions were held every Saturday morning. 
Even though prisoners considered these sessions to be worthless, they agreed to formally 
raise their football request with prison management. From December 1964, prisoners 
engaged in a campaign to be allowed to play football on Robben Island by raising the same 
request individually, again and again.16 This ‘request’ infuriated prison management and 
those who raised this request were punished by having their food rations withheld on the 
following weekend.  
This campaign continued throughout 1965 with neither side being willing to back down. The 
intransigence of prison management had advantages for prisoners. For the first time, the 
prisoners experienced a sense of collective cohesion which transcended political lines of 
division and this unity of purpose shaped the nature of prisoners’ resistance on Robben 
Island.17 When the International Red Cross (IRC) was allowed to visit Robben Island in 1966, 
prisoners raised the same request. From 1966, Helen Suzman began to visit Robben Island 
and communicated with Nelson Mandela. Mandela discussed with her the prisoner’s request 
to be allowed to play football.18 Under pressure from Helen Suzman and the IRC, the excuse 
that allowing prisoners to play football was a security threat quickly lost credibility. By 
December 1967, Robben Island prison managers granted permission for prisoners to play 
football for 30 minutes every Saturday.19 This victory for the prisoners laid the basis for 
political cooperation, especially between ANC and PAC prisoners.  
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Robben Island prison management had underestimated the will of prisoners to continue 
playing. Having granted permission, the prison authorities did not think that football would 
last more than two months.20 In an attempt to expose the inability of prisoners to organise 
football matches, one Saturday, prison management unexpectedly ‘strode into cell block four 
and chose two teams of prisoners at random from those who had volunteered to play.’21 To 
their surprise, prisoners took this opportunity to name their teams Rangers and the Bucks. 
The prison management had cleared an open area next to the prison block to be used as a 
pitch. Prisoners played barefoot and in their uniforms. This 30-minute match marked the 
beginning of football on Robben Island which precipitated the formation of other clubs, 
formalisation of management structures, a competitive football league, recording the rules of 
the game (based on FIFA rules), and formalising the establishment of the Makana Football 
Association (MFA) in June 1969.22  
The records of the MFA records reveal the highest level of precision, with meticulously kept 
documentation. These records provide the opportunity to access the ‘community self-
perceptions’ of life on Robben Island at a particular time. Unlike prison memoirs and 
interviews, the records were produced for the use of prisoners themselves, not for an outside 
audience.23 They contain a sense of vulnerability, precariousness and nostalgia about the lives 
of prisoners and their relationship with the prison authorities. In addition, these records 
demonstrate the complexity of maintaining sporting standards in prison conditions, both in 
the administration as well as in the games themselves.  
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Other prisoners had played football before they were imprisoned, but Harry Gwala was an 
exception. He had not played football but, as shown previously, had been part of local and 
provincial football administrative bodies in Natal. As a skilled football administrator, he had 
experience in writing the rules and interpreting them during disputes. Gwala participated 
actively in the processes that led to being granted permission to play football on Robben 
Island. Perhaps, Gwala had anticipated football would have a positive impact in raising 
political consciousness on Robben Island. He was concerned about the possibility of 
prisoners losing political direction as a result of the impact to harsh prison conditions.24  
Besides being involved in writing the rules, Gwala was also active as a referee, and 
sometimes as a linesman. Korr and Close assert that Gwala made being a referee into a 
‘calling.’25 His hardline stance as a referee on the application of the rules of football and 
ensuring on the spot interpretation of these rules earned him much respect among political 
prisoners on Robben Island. Gwala’s political background as a communist influenced his 
understanding of the relationship between football and prisoners. In line with his politics of 
connectedness, he used football as a tool to educate prisoners about the collective political 
consciousness of the working class across the world. He hosted discussions on the history of 
football and discussed current football developments in other countries such as Hungary, 
Spain and Poland.26  
By the beginning of 1972, football on Robben Island had expanded and was becoming more 
complex to manage because of political rivalry and competition between the clubs. Because 
Gwala’s political stance was well known and he was a member of the Bucks FC, he was also 
accused of being biased by other groupings within the Robben Island football fraternity. On 8 
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April 1972, Rangers FC lodged a complaint that Harry Gwala’s refereeing decisions were 
biased because he was a member of the Bucks FC and because his decisions unfairly 
favoured teams dominated by ANC members.27 After the Referees’ Union (RU) informed 
Gwala about these allegations, he tendered his resignation as a referee because he ‘was tired 
of being accused of favouritism.’28  
The management of the MFA was shocked by Gwala’s decision and recommended that the 
RU should establish a commission to establish the ‘deeper causes’ behind his resignation. 
The commission established that allegations against Gwala could not be substantiated.29 
Furthermore, the commission found that Gwala’s membership of the Bucks FC had not 
influenced his refereeing decisions and that he had consistently applied the laws of football 
without favour.30 Gwala felt vindicated by the commission’s finding. He believed that 
referees had shown the ability to distance themselves from their own clubs and rejected even 
the hint that his decisions on the field were based on anything other than his clearest 
judgement and his understanding of the rules of football.31 When the commission and the 
wider Robben Island fraternity withdrew its aspersions against his integrity. Gwala tore up 
his resignation letter to signify that he would continue serving as a referee.  
By the time of his release in June 1972, Gwala had instilled a strong culture of complying 
with the rules of football and respecting the decisions and instructions of the referee. Because 
Gwala was using football as an opportunity to conduct clandestine political education, he was 
also mindful that it was equally important to instil the doctrine of respect for the authorities in 
                                                 
27 UWC-RIM Mayibuye Archives, MCH 64-14-1-133, Robben Island Sport Collection, letter from the Secretary of the 
Rangers FC to the Secretary of the MFA, 8 April 1972.  
28 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala; Korr and Close, More Than Just a Game, 164. 
29 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
30 UWC-RIM Mayibuye Archives, MCH 64-14-1-206a, Robben Island Sport Collection, Report of the Referee Commission, 
29 May 1972.  
31 Korr and Close, More Than Just a Game, 164.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
179 
order to sustain the underground operations of the liberation movement. Gwala admitted that 
football did a lot to bring them together, ‘PAC or what.’32 In certain instances, Gwala 
remembered, clubs were not formed along political lines. At times, clubs were formed to 
represent a block where prisoners lived.33 Concerning the success of football to bring about 
political tolerance among political prisoners, Gwala remarked: 
So we found that as times went on, there was more understanding, in 
particular between ANC and PAC. But what was significant there, is that 
according to the information we used to receive, when you put people who 
belong to different political organisation together in prison they fought 
among themselves. But there was not a single fight among us. I always 
admire that.34  
 
Inter-political connectedness and prison literacy  
Raymond Suttner has characterised Robben Island as an institution that contributed to the 
formulation of political intellectuals.35 Robben Island had a profound influence on the 
liberation struggle and the inculcation in the ANC of a culture of intellectual engagement, 
something which had been dominated largely by the Communist Party. Gwala’s 
imprisonment signalled the establishment of Robben Island as an institution of intellectual 
and political clout within the borders of South Africa, and this was to play a central role in 
communications with the external missions in London and Lusaka. Through Gwala’s 
stewardship, the juxtaposition of political and educational processes enabled Robben Island 
to produce political intellectuals, some of whom became strong independent thinkers within 
the ANC. 
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There are contradictory views on how Harry Gwala became involved in political education. 
Ahmed Kathrada argues that Gwala ‘wasted little time in starting Marxism classes.’36 
Kathrada posits that Gwala started these classes in order to establish cells of the Communist 
Party. In addition, according to Kathrada, although Gwala’s classes had stimulated interest 
among many Communist Party prisoners, ANC prisoners who felt excluded were unhappy. 
The matter was referred to the uppermost leadership, the High Command.37 After intense 
discussions, the High Command informed Gwala that there was no objection to his classes, 
but suggested that these should form part of the existing ANC political education syllabus for 
a wider group of ANC cells. Kathrada notes that Gwala accepted this instruction of the High 
Command, although reluctantly. 
Gwala’s own admission suggests that when he arrived at Robben Island in 1965, he became 
aware that both the ANC and the PAC had already ‘developed underground political 
structures, even though scanty, that suited prison conditions.’38 In his interviews, Gwala has 
not provided any indication that he did not initially join existing ANC cells. Rather he 
attempted to establish Communist Party ones. Perhaps, as Martin Legassick and Thula 
Simpson have argued, the leadership role that the Communist Party had taken in the 
establishment of the armed struggle might have caused Gwala to want the Party to have a 
strong presence on Robben Island.39 Having joined the Communist Party two years before 
joining the ANC, Gwala was preoccupied with class consciousness throughout the time he 
was involved ANC leadership structures. 
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Contrary to Kathrada’s view, Gwala said that after his arrival on Robben Island, he was 
‘immediately co-opted into the Disciplinary Committee (DC) of the ANC.’40 The DC, as the 
highest decision making body in the general cells, carried out all the political work of the 
ANC on Robben Island, including reaching political decisions. It communicated with the 
High Command, which consisted on the Rivonia prisoners in the isolation cells. Furthermore, 
it was the DC that was in charge of correspondence and developing codes that became 
embedded in the clandestine culture of Robben Island.41 ANC prisoners in each cell 
organised themselves in smaller units under the leadership of a unit leader, who was under 
the direct command of the General Section leadership. As a member of the ANC, Gwala 
automatically belonged to an ANC cell unit. However, because of the repressive prison 
conditions, Gwala remarked that despite having a unit leader ‘you would not know anything 
or who else was involved, except those who were with you in your unit.’42 Monde 
Mkhunqwana recalled that, in the harsh conditions of repression during the mid-1960s, 
Gwala encouraged prisoners to have ‘discussions at every time during lunch time.’43  
Debates became a tool to negotiate the conditions of cooperation between the ANC and the 
PAC. Dikgang Moseneke remembered that the arrival of large groups of ANC prisoners from 
1964 brought a new political culture at Robben Island, which had been previously dominated 
mainly by PAC prisoners. The arrival of the ANC prisoners meant that there was potential for 
meaningful and instructive debate about the prisoners’ political positions.44 Robust as they 
were, Moseneke argues that these debates brought prisoners from different political 
persuasions closer to each other and disputes between PAC and ANC prisoners were 
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uncommon. Where disputes occurred, in most cases these involved ‘PAC or ANC prisoners 
alone because of differing over something and that built up to frustration.’45 Sedick Isaacs 
remarked that he ‘later discovered that in adversity people’s differences evaporate and 
disappear and that’s probably what was in the process of happening’ on Robben Island.46 He 
emphasised that later on ‘those differences became virtually non-existent and there was some 
time where organisations had intergroup meetings. It was only when conditions became 
slightly better that people separated again into their respective organisations.47 Moseneke 
posits that both the PAC and ANC adopted strategies directed at dealing with prison 
conditions to curb potential conflict between prisoners. These were ‘strategies of survival, 
which inevitably brought about greater cohesion, even between both the PAC and the 
ANC.’48 Gwala argued that repressive prison conditions and the need for political education 
eclipsed, to a large extent, glaring political differences between the ANC and PAC. 
Nevertheless, relations between the ANC and PAC political prisoners deteriorated during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.  
Gwala remembered that the DC asked him and Stephen Dlamini to start underground 
political classes.49 Gwala’s background as a trained teacher and having participated in the 
Communist Party schools between 1943 and 1944 positioned him well to play a vital role in 
the conceptualisation and implementation of this initiative. Classes were meant to deal with 
the history of the struggle, political economy, the Freedom Charter, and the policies of the 
ANC and the Congress Alliance. However, Gwala and Stephen Dlamini found a large 
population of old, non-literate prisoners who could not understand ‘abstract terminologies’, 
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so they decided to organise literacy education.50 In spite of deplorable conditions of 
repression, there was ample time to study. In maximum security on Robben Island lights were 
kept on all night so that prison authorities could monitor cells without hindrance.51 Prisoners 
took advantage of the light to study at night. By the end of 1965, the PAC had undertaken a 
similar literacy project for its own prisoners.52 Later, the idea of separate literacy classes for 
PAC and ANC members was abandoned and these classes were merged.  
Harry Gwala, Stephen Dlamini and Moseneke were pivotal in the conceptualisation of 
Robben Island literacy project. The authorities did not know that literacy classes were taking 
place, and Moseneke recalled how prisoners had to produce their own teaching and writing 
material: 
The normal cement container, right. We’d take those, cut off the ugly 
corners, take the cleaner part. I remember it did have about five, six sheets 
inside to make it strong, stick, and its thin little sheets inside. You tear this 
up, the clean part, you get all the cement off, the cement dust off it, cut it 
up into that size, a book size, bind it, get some wire and bind the rear, 
number the pages and mark it English exercise book, or whatever. And 
through that method and we had guys like me, I was still in standard eight 
then and I taught guys who were doing standard zero.53 
Robben Island management only approved literacy education for prisoners in 1966. By that 
time, the prisoners’ own literacy project was at its heights. Moseneke remarked that ‘in a 
matter of three to four years we had actually wiped off illiteracy on Robben Island, 
completely.’54 Everybody could read and write at least in his mother-tongue. And ‘we moved 
on, and issued little wonderful stickers for every step that he would have passed, and the 
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heading always being ‘The University of Robben Island’ would go onto it, to give people all 
sorts of little things and all these written on cement paper.’55  
In 1968, the prison authorities agreed to allow prisoners to study at tertiary level and many 
prisoners enrolled at the University of South Africa (UNISA) to further their studies. Many 
prisoners, like Moseneke, registered at UNISA for the BA degree, but Gwala did not, for 
reasons that are not clear. He first enrolled for BA degree studies during the mid-1980s.  
While there was a high level of cooperation between the PAC and the ANC on Robben 
Island, the political tensions of the late 1960s and 1970s should not be underestimated. While 
there were many pockets of cooperation, efforts to build unity within the prison proved to be 
extremely challenging.56Although Gwala emphasised how ANC and PAC prisoners 
‘respected one another, played together, and did all sort of things together, including 
organising a hunger strike together’, he was emphatically clear that the notion of reconciling 
political differences was never a matter of discussion.57 Exasperated by the PAC’s sometimes 
condescending opinions on the Communist Party and ANC, Gwala decided ‘it was high time 
we enlighten the PAC polemically.’58 As a result, a debate in the general section was 
organised ‘one evening’ in 1967 with three speakers on each side. Gwala, Stephen Dlamini 
and Milner Ntsangani represented the Communist Party/ANC group, but there is no evidence 
of who represented the PAC group. Gwala remarked that the debate left the PAC ‘very badly 
bruised’ and it never again entered a formal debate.59 Political differences re-emerged during 
the mid-1970s, but these were less intense than before.  
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After the robust debates that Harry Gwala and Stephen Dlamini hosted with members of the 
PAC on Robben Island during the late 1960s, political education at the prison appears to have 
ground to a halt after Gwala’s release in 1972. Football had become more prominent than 
political education because of the restrictive nature of the Robben Island environment. 
During the early 1970s, especially after the release of Gwala, there is no historical evidence 
to suggest that there was any further robust political education on Robben Island. Political 
education only regained momentum after the 1976 uprising which brought a new calibre of 
prisoners to the Island. 
Gwala’s connectedness, the 1976 uprisings, and political education 
Noor Nieftagodien has argued that developments of the 1970s placed South Africa at the cusp 
of a new political era.60 By June 1976, the complex combination of social and political forces 
resulted in an eruption that caught both the underground structures of the liberation 
movement and the state by surprise, dramatically shifting the attention of the international 
community on the festering problem of apartheid in South Africa.61 In the aftermath of the 
uprising, there was an exodus of youth into exile and into prison, mainly into Robben Island. 
The prison population at Robben Island exceeded it capacity. This coincided with the 
beginning of Gwala’s second term of imprisonment on Robben Island in 1977. When Gwala 
arrived, he observed that some of the new inmates were youth who had little political 
orientation and understanding of the liberation struggle and political theory. This, Gwala 
believed, necessitated that new approaches be implemented in a severely restricted 
environment.62 
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Kgalema Motlanthe, also imprisoned in 1977 at Robben Island, emphasised that the new 
prisoners who had been arrested because of their participation in the 1976 uprising posed 
complex challenges for political education on Robben Island.63 He noted that some prisoners 
who were brought to Robben Island because of their involvement in the 1976 revolts many 
had been arrested and tried for activities relating to the student uprising, yet were in fact 
looters who had nothing to do with politics.64 Because Gwala had been on Robben Island 
before, he already knew the prison setting. He quickly assessed the situation and clustered 
new prisoners according to their cell groups, he immediately identified the need to establish 
political education as a tool to address the political lacuna and to educate new prisoners about 
the struggle of liberation, its history, and its political purposes. Gwala argued that: 
When comrades were incarcerated on Robben Island, a crying need was 
felt for a theory that would correctly interpret the world. In order to 
organise this theory for our own comrades, this required material which 
we lack, consequently we had to rely on memory.65  
It was in this context that Gwala’s ‘Man and his Country’ lectures began and were 
disseminated. As George Mashamba remembered, Gwala’s lectures became the source of 
knowledge as prisoners were prohibited from access to any political literature.66  
Vincent Diba recalled that when he arrived at Robben Island, Gwala asked him whether he 
was aware that the Freedom Charter was the first step towards socialism.67 This indicated the 
extent to which Gwala’s lectures juxtaposed key historical moments within political 
developments in South Africa. Through the ‘Man and his Country’ lectures, Gwala was able 
to teach prisoners the history of the ANC, its links with class struggles, and how the South 
                                                 
63 Fran Buntman interview with Kgalema Motlanthe.  
64 Fran Buntman interview with Kgalema Motlanthe; Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Kgalema Motlanthe.  
65 T. H. Gwala, ‘Foreword’, in G. Mbeki, Learning from Robben Island: The Prison Writings of Govan Mbeki (Bellville, 
Cape Town: Mayibuye Books, 1991), vi.  
66 George Mashamba, lecture delivered at the Harry Gwala memorial lecture, 2 September 2015, Moses Mabhida Stadium, 
Durban. I am grateful to Sinothi Thabethe, Director of Durban’s Local History Museums, for sharing documents relating to 
the lecture as well as media reports related to the lecture.  
67 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Vincent Diba.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
187 
African liberation struggle was ‘linked to the global struggles to overthrow capitalist system, 
in the case of South Africa, apartheid, and to establish the people’s democracy based on 
socialist ethos.’68 ‘Man and his Country’ was available to all prisoners regardless of their 
political affiliation and became the de facto curriculum of political education at Robben 
Island. Through these lectures, Gwala earned the title of ‘umuntu omdala’, a wise elder, 
which showed the respect he was accorded in prison. Indeed, Gwala was older than the 
majority of prisoners and associated himself with the Rivonia trialists in the isolation cells.  
The ANC and Communist Party frequently differed in their interpretation of the role of 
African nationalism and class consciousness in the struggle.69 This was apart from the other 
differences between leaders of the High Command such as over the role of Chief Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi. Although their complex relationship had reached a level of political maturity by 
the 1970s, their political differences were often accompanied by robust debates that 
degenerated into acrimony. Gwala and Govan Mbeki held leftist radical ideas focused on the 
class dynamics of the oppressed. While they did not denounce the role of African nationalism 
in the liberation process, their focus on class struggles widened divisions between the ANC 
and the Communist Party on Robben Island.70 Mandela acknowledged the coexistence of 
multiple interpretations of the liberation struggle and the relationship between class and 
African nationalism in the ANC and the Communist Party. He remarked: 
We were constantly engaged in political debates. Some were dispatched in 
a day, others were disputed for years. I have always enjoyed the cut and 
thrust of debating, and was a ready participant.71  
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One of the earliest and longest-running debates concerned the relationship between the ANC 
and the Communist Party. Gwala, Govan Mbeki and other political prisoners who had been 
trained in socialist countries believed that the ANC and the Communist Party were one and 
the same.72 Gwala believed that because the Communist Party was not a separate entity on 
Robben Island, this meant that it had been incorporated into the ANC in a manner that did not 
constitute a merger; rather they co-existed with one another. This debate was never resolved 
until a secret document was prepared for the leadership in Lusaka which confirmed the 
separation of the parties.73 The argument eventually withered away among the leadership on 
Robben Island.  
The admission of Gwala on Robben Island for his second prison term, the release of young 
prisoners, marked by their literary training and the conception and dissemination of Gwala’s 
‘Man and his Country’ lecture series positioned Robben Island as a centre of intellectual and 
theoretical debates. These were able to respond to the changing international political 
landscape. This resulted in the crystallisation of conceptions of the struggle about the 
centrality of the ANC leadership in the struggle for the liberation of South Africa. As a result, 
many prisoners, especially non-political and non-ANC prisoners, became exposed to the 
collective theoretical paradigms of the struggle, and ‘crossed over’ to the ANC. Suttner 
asserts that ‘Man and his Country’ resulted in the broadening of abstract theoretical ideas of 
socialism that had not been clear before.74 This was attributed to Gwala’s ability to interpret 
Marxism in vernacular languages and situated it in the South African context. Kathrada has 
argued that two outspoken groups emerged, the ‘communists’, under Gwala and Mbeki, and 
the ‘nationalists’ under Mandela.75 Kathrada reminds us that these terms were loosely applied 
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as some communists did not agree with Gwala and felt more comfortable in the nationalist 
camp.  
The notion of symbiotic unity between the ANC and Communist Party caused a robust 
debate. Gwala and Mandela held divergent interpretations of the struggle and its aftermath, 
and how the Freedom Charter fitted within the broader transformation of global political 
practice. This fuelled further disagreement that became quite polemical. The Marxist group of 
Gwala and Govan Mbeki believed that the South African liberation struggle was no longer 
the for attainment of ‘national’ democracy, rather to achieve the ‘people’s democracy’, which 
was a euphemism for socialism.76 As Diba has remarked, Gwala believed that the post-
democratic dispensation, modelled along the lines of the Freedom Charter, was going to be a 
socialist one.77  
By the beginning of 1978, the debate had reached a crescendo which obliged the High 
Command to request its secretariat to draft a discussion document to give political direction 
to wide-ranging controversies that had emerged within cell discussions because these were 
considered to have divisive effects on the unity of the liberation movement.78 The secretariat 
duly produced the discussion document, entitled ‘Inqindi-Marxism,’ which encouraged 
prisoners to study Marxism and to remind themselves of the distinction between the national 
and class struggles. However, this did not succeed in calming the political divisions between 
the two camps. The leadership of B section, mainly Gwala, felt the document lacked an 
understanding of key developments within the Communist Party since it had been drafted by 
individuals who had been in prison for the previous 15 years, and were therefore detached 
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from the grassroots. The High Command conceded that the document had shortcomings and 
that broader consultation with the prison population was necessary, especially those in B 
section.79 It was against this background that the High Command requested Ahmed Kathrada 
to consolidate responses that had been received.80  
Harry Gwala’s critique of the Mandela camp and the ‘Inqindi-Marxism’ document was based 
on his belief in non-racialism and class consciousness. According to Gwala, African 
nationalism was based on the conditions of the pre-liberation phase of the struggle, and these 
could not be used to reshape society after liberation.81 For Gwala, the role of African 
nationalism was to unite Africans in the struggle against national oppression. He warned the 
nationalists’ camp that while African nationalism should be recognised as a driving force for 
the struggle, they should be careful not to give it too much weight as it had the potential to 
belittle the role played by Indians, coloureds and white democrats, all of whom had fought 
alongside the African people.82Gwala was against the policy of separate development, a 
stance that would later result in direct conflict with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. The 
emphasis on studying Marxism and history in the Kathrada document was largely influenced 
by Gwala and his ‘Man and his Country’ lecture series. Gwala’s stress on internationalism 
and history manifested itself as a belief that it was necessary to study the struggles of 
revolutionary movements in other parts of the world that had experiences that were similar to 
the South African context.  
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While the ‘Inqindi-Marxism’ document did not succeed in bridging political divides in 
Robben Island politics, it managed to create an awareness of the need to link class struggle 
and national struggles. The debate seemed to have subsided after the transfer of Mandela to 
Pollsomoor prison in 1978. After the ‘Inqindi-Marxism’ discussions, Gwala’s political theory 
seemed to undergone a metamorphosis. He began to show new political thinking that leaned 
towards the realisation of the need to have the Communist Party as a separate entity, perhaps 
different from the ANC. His views were formulated during on-going political discussions 
about the role of dialectical materialism and the Communist Party developing a distinct 
political philosophy which sought the effective transfer of power to the working class.83 
However, he remained committed to the ANC and its processes of bringing social and 
political change in South Africa. Kgalema Motlanthe remarked that Gwala’s political 
education generated heightened political consciousness, which, in turn, served as the surest 
way to build a complete cadre armed with the necessary revolutionary philosophy to play a 
proper role in changing their own conditions.84 Despite differing with Gwala, Mandela 
remarked: 
Mphephethwa was a great “political teacher” who taught generation after 
generation of struggle. Many of today's leaders drank from the deep well 
of Mphephethwa’s political wisdom. But such was the nature of his 
teaching that the products of his education, would themselves develop into 
political giants in their own right; using the tools he gave them to develop 
independent thought and analysis. 85 
Gwala’s identity, family welfare, and non-racial mobilisation 
The imprisonment of Gwala from 1964 was part of the state’s strategy to exclude him from 
his political support. This exclusion severely affected Gwala’s family as his wife was left 
alone to raise their four children and she occasionally faced harassment by the Special 
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Branch.86 The precarious financial and social circumstances of Gwala’s family drew public 
sympathy from white liberals and other interest groups. In 1967, a certain Mary Corrigall of 
Alexandra Road in Pietermaritzburg wrote to Helen Suzman concerning Gwala’s wife’s visit 
to Robben Island.87  
Corrigall lamented that ‘Elda had visited Robben Island once since her husband was 
imprisoned in 1964 and a second visit was being arranged.’88 Her concern was for Elda’s 
disappointment that, after having ‘travelled so far from Pietermaritzburg that she was allowed 
less than half an hour with her husband.’89 Corrigall urged Suzman to request the Minister of 
Prisons to allow the wives of political prisoners who have travelled long distances to have 
additional visiting time. Suzman committed herself to taking up the issue of Gwala and to 
persuade the ‘Minister to allow longer visits to the wives of men on Robben Island.’90  
Corrigall’s correspondence with Suzman indicated the existence of a level of connectedness 
between Gwala’s wife and a certain group within the white liberal community that seriously 
empathised with her plight.  
While Corrigall’s political affiliation is unknown, perhaps she was part of a wide network of 
white liberals in Pietermaritzburg who took a particular interest in the plight of Gwala and his 
family. It is not clear how long her connection with Gwala’s family lasted. Makhosazana 
Gwala remembers Elda’s plight as extremely difficult living under poverty-stricken 
conditions without even a home after they had been forcibly removed from Ockertskraal in 
the mid-1960s, after its declaration as a whites-only area.91 Gwala’s release in 1972 provided 
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a temporary relief for the financial difficulties of the family as he started a laundry ‘business’, 
even though this was a front for his clandestine political activities. This did not last as he was 
re-arrested in November 1975. The family found itself, again, in financial difficulty situation.  
Elda’s reaction to the family’s plight this time was different to what it had been in the 1960s. 
Two factors influenced her reaction. She had learned that she could not rely on Gwala’s 
extended family for support since none had the financial means to do so. Gwala’s siblings, 
mainly Caiphas Bhukuda, were often followed by the Special Branch, and they were 
therefore reluctant to be associated with Elda and her children.92 In 1977, Gwala asked Elda 
whether she was struggling and she responded by saying ‘there [was] nothing I am struggling 
of, you prepared me for everything before you left.’93  
Secondly, unlike during the 1964 trial when Gwala was charged alone with little media 
attention, the 1976 trial brought an unprecedented level of public interest that served to 
connect the families of the detainees. This drew public sympathy and international agencies 
which were willing to provide welfare support. Having been exposed to the clandestine 
political operation in Natal, Elda led the wives of the detainees to form a support group that 
sought to mobilise local and international aid to sustain their families and to keep the 
memories of their husbands in the public mind once they had been sentenced.94 The 
prominence of Gwala’s trial and the nature of the international aid discourse at the time made 
it easier for Elda and the wives of other accused men to mobilise political, legal and welfare 
support from interested groups and individuals, both locally and internationally. Already 
IDAF had committed itself to cover the legal and welfare costs of the detainees and their 
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families, giving them hope. Nevertheless, correspondence from Elda indicated that IDAF’s 
welfare support was insufficient to cover normal family expenses.95  
Gwala had established cordial relations with Pietermaritzburg’s white liberals due to his 
stance on non-racialism.96 Among these was Peter Brown who had been a co-founder of the 
Liberal Party of South Africa in 1953 and its leader from 1958 to 1964. After Brown’s 
banning order expired, he devoted his life to liberal causes which included assisting the 
families of activists who has been banned, detained or imprisoned for their political 
activities.97 In January 1976, Elda asked Brown to assist the Xaba and the Nene families.98 
Having been involved with the South African Institute of Race Relations, Brown was aware 
of the Dependants’ Conference (DC), an ecumenical project of the South African Council of 
Churches (SACC). He asked Angela Pringle, Director of the DC whether ‘there is anything 
[that] can be done to help in Pietermaritzburg.’99 Pringle informed Brown that she had 
already given welfare funds to Phyllis Naidoo and indicated that the DC ‘had little 
information of the state of things in Pietermaritzburg and had no mobile worker to look into 
things.’100 In the absence of a DC field worker in Pietermaritzburg, Pringle asked Brown to 
be recognised as ‘intermediaries of DC’ to avoid setting up ‘rival systems.’101 Although other 
families were already receiving welfare assistance through IDAF, these grants were 
insufficient to cover their expenses, so they called on Brown for assistance.  
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While Brown was in the process of sourcing funds for the families of the accused, he had 
started to get closer to them to better understand their economic circumstances. He 
discovered that most of the families were struggling financially as the accused men had either 
been the only family member in employment or unable to make financial contributions to 
meet family needs.102 In addition to school expenses and rent, it appeared that most families 
had hire purchase commitments which, since their husbands had been taken into detention, 
could not be met with IDAF’s support. Brown approached Amnesty International to assist the 
struggling families, especially the Gwalas and Magubanes. During his visits, he provided 
advice to ‘prioritise rent, food, school fees, and if anything was left over, a small payment on 
their hire purchase accounts.’103 Seeing that most of the families were in miserable debt, 
Brown went as far as meeting ‘hire purchase firms, who, after such meeting, demonstrated 
willingness to understand Brown’s plea to reduce monthly instalments.’104  
By the end of February 1976, Brown had established contact with Phyllis Naidoo who had 
been assigned by IDAF to manage welfare funds for the families of the accused. Brown had 
become a ‘point of support’ in Pietermaritzburg, and the SACC started to raise funds from 
various benevolent groups and individuals.105 Among the initial donors was the Sunday 
Tribune which offered R10 to go to John Nene’s family.106 John Nene’s case was unique 
because in addition to his request for support for his wife and children, he also asked for 
support to cover rent for his mother at Machibisa in Edendale.107  
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As Cardo points out, by March 1976 Brown had ‘rallied a small group of ex-liberals into 
action.’108 This group included key liberals such as John Aitchison and Peter Kerchhoff who 
would later become founder members of the Pietermaritzburg DC. They extended their 
network to liaise with the Amnesty International offices in Sweden and West Germany. 
While Brown took a personal interest in Gwala’s family and would, at a later stage, often pay 
out of his own pocket for Elda to visit Gwala once he had been transferred to Robben Island, 
he did not neglect the plight of other detainees’ families.109  
At the beginning of the interaction, Amnesty International was reluctant to comply with 
Brown’s request because it ‘concerned itself with prisoners who [were] imprisoned because 
of their religious, political and moral beliefs and they should not have used or advocated 
violence.’110 Brown’s predicament was that detainees were not yet formally charged, but it 
was clear that the state was going to charge them for sabotage. However, Brown persuaded 
Amnesty International to agree that Gwala and other detainees were victims of apartheid’s 
discriminatory policies and their detention was a human rights violation.111 Having been 
persuaded by Brown, Amnesty International agreed to offer support to the families of 
Magubane, Gwala, Meyiwa, Xaba, Nene and others.112 In addition, Brown occasionally 
appealed to Pietermaritzburg liberals and local businesses to assist the wives of the detainees. 
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D. M. Craib, director of the Natal Witness, remarked that he was ‘impressed by Brown’s 
appeal’ to contribute to the fund for the dependants of the detainees.113 On behalf of the Natal 
Witness, Craib sent a donation by cheque which was not disclosed in his letter. Local and 
international support included sending money to cover additional expenses, settling hire 
purchase debts, as well providing clothes and education for their children.114  
Until the end of 1977, the DC work in Pietermaritzburg was facilitated by Brown, and Elda 
was the de facto leader of the detainees’ wives. Norman Abraham dealt with the legal and 
financial aspects of support, while Bunty Biggs arranged for family members to visit Robben 
Island.115 Biggs had been a social worker who helped establish a child welfare section of the 
Edendale Welfare Society in 1958.  
While there was no doubt about Brown’s ability to facilitate the activities of the DC, the 
Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches (PCC) decided it was about time that it played a role in 
line with an SACC resolution. In January 1978, members of the PCC’s Commission for 
Justice and Reconciliation (JRC) met and agreed to act as the local DC, with Reverend Bob 
Clarke as chairperson.116 Although Brown was not elected to a leadership position, he 
continued to play a pivotal role in facilitating visits by families to Robben Island. Elda seems 
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to have preferred communicating with Brown directly and he would subsequently bring 
Gwala family matters to the DC’s attention during its monthly meetings.117  
Prison visits, epistolary networks, and connectedness  
As soon as Harry Gwala was admitted to Robben Island prison in 1977, he embarked on 
broader struggles that were characterised by a striving for connectedness. These included his 
political education inside the prison, attempts to undermine prison authority and, from 1980, 
the role of his family in frustrating the existing structures of prison control. In addition to his 
clandestine political education series, Gwala identified prison visiting hours as another arena 
of his struggle. After Mary Corrigall’s 1967 request to allow Gwala’s wife more visiting time 
since she had travelled all the way from Pietermaritzburg, Gwala challenged the prison 
authorities to extend visiting hours and allow prisoners to send and receive more than two 
letters a month.118 On 4 November 1977, Gwala applied for permission to be allowed a one-
hour visit by his wife. In addition, he also applied to see her together with his daughter, Lulu, 
‘who could not visit at any other time due to her employment.’119 In addition, on 13 
November, Gwala submitted a written complaint about letters that had been sent to him but 
he had not received. He had been informed by the prison censor that ‘there were two letters 
that were due to him but since he had received the required number due for September and 
October, he would [only] be given those letters in December.’120 He contended that since he 
had been in prison from August, he should be permitted to receive six letters retrospectively, 
two per month for the three months he had been incarcerated. Again, the prison censor 
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declined his request, thus isolating him from the outside world. By 1979, he was still at 
loggerheads with the prison’s censor about letters he was not receiving and others that were 
not received by the people they had been addressed to.121  
From as early as 1977, records of the Department of Prisons suggest that Elda and Lulu 
visited Gwala more than three times a year. In addition, they exchanged letters, within the 
prescribed limits. Elda and Lulu’s letters of application for prison visits have a collegial and 
respectful tone.122 This might have been due to the fact that they still had hope that Gwala’s 
conviction and sentence would be overturned by the Appellate Division. After the Appeal 
Court upheld the conviction and sentence in 1980, the tone of their letters, now also in the 
name of Lindiwe, became more confrontational, uncooperative and to a certain extent, 
abrasive.123 When Lindiwe’s application to visit Gwala missed one digit of her identity 
number, Elda displayed anger that she had received a call from the Special Branch to ask 
whether Lindiwe was in fact her child.124 She abrasively asked the Commanding Officer at 
Robben Island why her daughter’s application had been sent to the police. She demanded that 
the permit be granted because ‘Lindiwe had a right to visit her father.’125  
The second incident also involved Lindiwe. She had been granted permission, through Omar, 
Vassen and Company attorneys, to visit Gwala on 16 and 17 January 1982. However, when 
she arrived at Robben Island, she found that the visit had been cancelled because Gwala had 
refused the prison’s instruction to communicate with his daughter in English.126 Gwala 
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refused because they were native speakers of Zulu and he insisted on speaking Zulu. Gwala 
was determined to be allowed to speak his native language to his family because other 
prisoners were allowed to ‘converse in Xhosa and others in Sotho.’127 As Lindiwe was due to 
travel to Pietermaritzburg on 26 January, Dullah Omar ‘requested that she should be 
permitted to see her father on 23 and 24 January and that she be permitted to converse in their 
vernacular.’128 After the prison authorities ‘persuaded’ Gwala to converse in English or 
Xhosa, the visit took place on 22 January. Gwala’s insistence on conversing in his mother 
tongue forced the Robben Island authorities to recruit Zulu intermediaries to avoid 
unnecessary tension. Nevertheless, by 1984 Gwala’s family was still given permission to visit 
him ‘on condition that they converse in English and/or Xhosa as the Zulu language was 
unfortunately not permitted.’129  
During the 1980s the Gwala family found itself in extremely difficult financial 
circumstances. As discussed in the previous chapter, IDAF had already indicated its 
displeasure about the manner in which its welfare funds were being managed, resulting in 
high levels of hostility between Phyllis Naidoo and Navanethem Pillay. As IDAF was 
winding up its welfare grant to those involved in the trial of Gwala and 9 others, the DC had 
to take over responsibility for all the financial support required by these families. In addition 
to ensuring that school fees were paid and the families had sufficient food, the DC also 
committed itself to facilitate families’ visits to Robben Island. Having to brief attorneys 
Omar, Vassen, Sonn and Abercrombie to communicate with Robben Island prison 
management concerning the visit of each family further increased the costs of providing 
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support.130 Elda revealed the dire financial situation of her family when she wrote to IDAF to 
request assistance to supplement what she was receiving from the DC.131 She lamented: 
The amount is however, not enough for me to be able to pay my children’s 
school fees which this year came to R187.00. I enclose the account and I 
hope your clients will be able to send me a cheque to cover the above 
amount.132 
The Gwala’s family financial woes were complicated by the state’s attitude towards Lulu. 
During Gwala’s detention in 1976, Lulu was also detained for eight months. Because the state 
believed that she was part of her father’s clandestine political network she was often harassed 
by the Special Branch.133 As a result she ‘found it difficult to find employment.’134 In 
addition, Lulu had had two children, Nonhlanhla and Xolani, whom Elda was obliged to 
support since the DC’s stipend did not cover grandchildren of the detainees.135 There is no 
archival evidence that IDAF was able to respond to her plea.  
The decision of the DC to appoint Omar, Vassen, Sonn and Abercrombie attorneys might not 
have been well advised, given dwindling financial support, but the ability to commission 
legal intervention assisted families to secure prison visits in the face of the intransigent 
Robben Island prison management. In addition, these attorneys facilitated the transfer of gifts 
to Gwala from sympathisers, for example a gift of R20 from Omar Badsha. Badsha had 
known Gwala since the 1970s in Natal and the two had worked together in an attempt to 
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revive SACTU.136 Elda, Lulu, Mfana, Linda and Lindiwe were able to visit Gwala at Robben 
Island. Elda had her maiden family living in Langa and Gugulethu in Cape Town which gave 
them a place to stay when they visited Robben Island.   
By the early 1980s, Brown had made arrangements to have the Pietermaritzburg local 
newspaper, The Natal Witness delivered to Harry Gwala on Robben Island.137 Being able to 
read the newspaper and corresponding with family and friends enabled Gwala to be updated 
with what was happening in Pietermaritzburg. Gwala read about the passing of Selby 
Msimang in the newspaper. He lamented to his friend, Themba Xulu, that Msimang ‘was a 
man who outsmarted his contemporaries.’138 Gwala had known Msimang from the 1940s and 
had regarded him as his ‘political elder’139 It was also through The Natal Witness that Gwala 
read about Lindiwe when she ‘lost her clothes at the station’ on the way to school.140 He tried 
to console her by saying she ‘should not worry but try to forget it as things like that should 
happen to the people.’141 He subsequently wrote to Elda and asked her to ‘try to comfort 
Lindiwe to forget’ it because he was worried that this was going to affect her concentration 
on her studies. Gwala seemed to be concerned about the future of his children and their 
education.142  
The Robben Island authorities seemed to have been reluctant to allow Gwala to receive letters 
from outside the prison. There is evidence that the prison censor hid some of the letters and 
that Gwala never received them.143 Since most of Gwala’s letters were written in Zulu, they 
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had to be translated into English before he was given the original. A copy was kept in the 
prison censor’s office. In addition, as a strategy to isolate Gwala, the prison authorities were 
reluctant to approve visits by certain ‘suspicious’ individuals including Gwala’s brother, 
Caiphas Bhukuda who was a church priest. It was Elda who, again, took charge of facilitating 
the application to Robben Island’s management on behalf of the extended family, relatives 
and friends who were eager to visit Gwala.  
In March 1984, Elda applied to the prison authorities to visit Gwala on 12 and 13 May.144 
The epistolary exchange between Elda and Robben Island management suggested that it was 
common to apply for a visit a month before the planned trip. Elda’s visit was approved, but 
with the dates amended to 19 and 20 May on the grounds that the requested dates were ‘fully 
booked.’145 During the month of May, Elda’s asthma deteriorated and she had ‘three attacks 
and nearly died on all these occasions.’146 Despite her precarious health, she visited Gwala on 
20 May and confided to him that her health had become weaker, exacerbated by the ‘uncalm 
conditions of traveling from the mainland to the island.’147 Just before they were separated by 
a warder, Gwala asked Elda how she was coping.148 Despite visible signs of weakening 
health, Elda insisted that she was not struggling as Gwala had prepared her before his 
imprisonment.149 Elda deliberately minimised the harsh realities that the family was going 
through. As Peter Brown reported during the deliberations of the Pietermaritzburg 
Dependents’ Conference, throughout the 1980s, the Gwala’s family was struggling and 
requiring additional support.150 Perhaps Elda did not want Gwala to feel burdened by the 
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plight of his family since there was nothing he could have done as a prisoner serving a life 
sentence.   
After visiting Gwala, she was unable to travel back to Pietermaritzburg and decided to spend 
time with her brother’s family in Gugulethu until she recovered. During the evening of 27 
May she had another asthma attack which ended her life.151 Gwala described the death of 
Elda as ‘sudden.’152 Correspondence between Gwala and the outside world suggests that the 
death of Elda caused him emotional distress and a sense of vulnerability. He remarked: 
The passing away of Kaipi [Elda] is the end of an era in my life. We share 
all our joy and our sorrow but she always took it with a big heart. She was 
always a source of inspiration to me and the family will be poorer without 
her. But if she was a source of inspiration I think we shall have her 
honoured if we try to do all that would make her feel proud. She was so 
gentle and pure in spirit that even when she decided to leave this world 
and follow the path of our forefathers she had the decency to pay me a 
visit only to bid me farewell.153  
Gwala admitted that Elda’s death upset him but that he was consoled by ‘the sympathising 
telegraphs, letters and post cards’ he received.154 Among the people and organisations that 
sent letters and telegrams of condolences were MB Yengwa, the Natal Indian Congress and 
Victoria Mxenge.155 Others preferred to visit Gwala on Robben Island just to ‘console him, 
pass condolences and pledge their solidarity with his situation.’156  
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Gwala had wished Elda to be buried at Mountain Rise, a local cemetery in 
Pietermaritzburg.157 However, despite Gwala’s wishes, she was buried at Swayimane because 
members of the extended family were adamant that she should be buried with other family 
members.158 Norman Abrahams, acting on behalf of the Gwala family, instructed Omar, 
Vassen, Sonn and Abercrombie to ask Robben Island management to temporarily release 
Gwala so that he could attend Elda’s funeral.159 This application was refused on the grounds 
that ‘practical considerations’ made it ‘impossible’ to accede to requests of this nature.160 The 
funeral was organised by various pro-ANC organisations including the SACC, Federation of 
South African Women and the United Democratic Front (UDF). UDF-aligned organisations 
used Elda’s funeral as an opportunity to air their political grievances against the South 
African government.  
The funeral, held at the Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre, was described as a ‘customary 
heroine’s funeral.’161 Scores of women marched into the hall bearing the black and green 
colours of the Federation of South African Women. Inside the hall, posters in black, green 
and gold (the colours of the ANC) declared ‘jail shall not bend our leaders’ and ‘women unite 
in struggle.’162 Reverend Mazwi Tisani and A. S. Chetty presided over the funeral as co-
programme directors. Tisani and Chetty had been active in the leadership of the SACC and 
NIC in Pietermaritzburg respectively. Among the key speakers was Victoria Mxenge, who 
had worked with Elda to support the wives of the detainees; Archie Gumede, UDF president 
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and Gwala’s legal team for the 1976 trial. Also among the speakers were Gladys Manzi as 
well as Khaba Mkhize.163  
During the funeral, speakers praised Elda as a freedom fighter. There were conflicting 
accounts of how many people attended the funeral with Lulu claiming that there were over 
10 000 mourners, while the Echo and The Natal Witness estimated 200 and 600 mourners 
respectively.164 The conclusion of the funeral at KwaSwayimane ended with a brawl as a 
Special Branch member Samuel Gule was attacked. Gule was a detective warrant officer, 
stationed at Greytown, and was a resident at Swayimane.165 The attack on Gule, allegedly 
after he was confronted by ‘woman demanding to know why he was not singing a freedom 
song that was being sung’ indicated the extent of the politicisation of Elda’s funeral and the 
militant political approaches that were emerging from the grassroots.166 The attack on Gule, 
who later became a known supporter of Inkatha and often suspected of assisting it with arms, 
was an indication of growing militancy which was perhaps provoked by the state’s attitude 
towards the Gwala family. 
After Elda’s passing, ‘the responsibility to keep the family together fell on Lulu’, at that time 
aged 30.167 Gwala seems to have transcended patriarchal stereotypes and invested a lot of 
trust in his daughters. On 23 June 1984, nearly a month after Elda’s passing, he wrote 
separate letters to Lulu and Lindiwe. Gwala’s letter to Lindiwe’s seems to have understood 
her emotional vulnerability and weakness and offered consolation. He emphatically 
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encouraged Lindiwe to ‘learn something from her mother and be inspired by her spirit.’168 
Gwala drifted from the loss of Elda to focus on giving Lindiwe encouragement about her 
studies and career. He wanted Lindiwe to enrol for a degree at the University of Natal, 
because ‘it was nearer and the most important thing is a degree and you can do anything 
thereafter.’169  
Gwala’s letter to Lulu was different. Gwala challenged her to face her mother’s death. He 
wrote: 
In such an incident what can we do? Yes, we are crying as our hearts are 
painful and torn. Death is the everyday occurrence, the time it comes you 
must be shocked and it is a surprising thing. What we must bear in our 
minds is that it’s each and every individual’s path to be followed here on 
earth. It is just the same as the birth of a person.170 
Gwala’s letter suggested he had a relationship with Lulu based on respectability, trust and a 
sense of collegiality, something he never had with the other children. Perhaps this was 
because Lulu was the eldest and already had two children of her own which Gwala had taken 
responsibility for as they were born out of wedlock.  
Gwala’s intention in the 23 June letters to his daughters was to establish the new social order 
in his family. The will that he had drawn up in 1976 was based on the probability of him 
dying first. In 1984, the question was how Gwala’s four children and three grandchildren 
would sustain themselves and maintain the integrity of the family that Elda had built since 
Gwala’s imprisonment. Of his four children, Lulu was most outspoken, and became a 
prominent face of youth of the families of detainees. She visited Gwala more often than the 
other children, she wrote regular letters, and developed a high level of connectedness with her 
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father and the ANC in exile, both in Lusaka and in London.171 It was against this background 
that Gwala bestowed on Lulu the responsibility of being the head of the family before he met 
with Norman Abrahams about administering Elda’s estate and determining the fate of 
Gwala’s children. Gwala wrote: 
The death of your mother left a big job over your shoulders as far as the 
children of your family are concerned. That means you should work with 
cooperation there at home, support each other with a clear spirit to close 
the gap of your mother. There must be no one who may say wish that my 
mother is still available. Secondly, you must cool down your spirit and 
anger to stop the quarrel in between one another.172  
Gwala went on to caution Lulu about the financial difficulties she would be facing. He 
advised her not to wait for assistance, rather to work hard to earn an income to afford ‘paying 
for rent and taxes.’173 He cautioned her to ensure that debts were paid and never to forget 
‘that your mother did not want to stay with a debt.’174 Gwala’s belief in education as tool of 
emancipation was undiminished and he instructed Lulu to ensure that ‘all children must be at 
school.’175 He wrote: 
There must be no one then who does not go to school. When your aunt 
was here she notified me about the burial preparation. I asked her to tell 
you that all my children should stay at home and they should continue 
with their studies.176 
Gwala’s letter also demonstrated his frustration about the instability that Elda’s death was 
likely to cause the family. He emphasised: 
There must be no child who may experience any hardship or disabled 
access to anything. You must work in such a way that your mother’s gap 
is closed very soon.177  
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Gwala’s letters to his daughters suggested a personal feeling of disconnectedness and void 
that he wanted to close. Elda had been the one who was the face of the family and Gwala’s 
linkage between his life in prison and the world outside. After Elda’s death, Gwala had to 
accept the disconnectedness and establish another way to maintain his family and to put an 
alternative authority figure in place, Lulu. Gwala expressed his disappointment that, of all the 
children, only Lulu wrote to him.178 He emphatically urged Lulu to tell the other children to 
‘get used to writing letters’ to him.179  
Gwala’s family and the Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches 
After Gwala had given Lulu authority as head of the family, she began to take over the 
responsibilities of her mother. Cassius Lubisi remembers that after ‘mam Gwala passed away 
the responsibility to keep the family together fell on Lulu Gwala.’180 Lulu seems to have 
identified three areas of focus as the new head of the Gwala family. These were to be the face 
of the Gwala family in the broader structures of mass mobilisation as well as in 
communicating with Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches, to work with civil society 
organisation to ensure that the memory of Gwala was kept intact, and to coordinate access to 
Gwala in prison.  
As prisoners had a limited number of visitors per month, Lulu took it upon herself to manage 
visits to Gwala. Correspondence between July and December 1984 suggested that she had 
developed a relationship with prison authorities as she would often recommend who should 
be given permission to visit Gwala. This was to ensure that Gwala was properly briefed about 
his family and was connected with the broader developments that were taking place in Natal. 
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Lulu seems to have carefully selected those she recommended should be permitted to visit 
Gwala, mainly key family members, his children and relatives.181  
Lulu started communicating directly with the PCC’s Dependants’ Conference in July 1985 in 
her capacity as head of the family. The PCC had been established as a regional structure of 
the SACC in Natal and acted as the Dependants’ Conference in Pietermaritzburg.182 
Correspondence suggests Lulu felt ambiguous about the DC. While she appreciated the 
support of the DC and of Brown for the Gwala family, she had misgivings about the manner 
in which the DC conducted its operations to support detainees’ families in Pietermaritzburg. 
She felt its policies did not take into consideration the particularities of family dynamics.183 
Lulu had approached the PCC to request an increase in its stipend to the Gwala family.184 
This request was declined because the PCC felt that it was only obliged to support direct 
dependants of Gwala, which excluded Lulu’s two children. It was against this background 
that Lulu lodged a ‘complaint about the PCC’ to the SACC national office.185 Lulu wrote: 
I’ve got a big complaint about Pietermaritzburg Council of Churches. I’ve 
got two children whom my father was supporting before he went to jail 
and my mom died. The two kids were under my parents because I am not 
married. As from this year the D. C. people told me they have nothing to 
do with my children. I have to go and look for a job.186 
Lulu’s desperation was caused by the fact that the SACC had changed its policy on 
supporting extended families, mainly grandchildren. In December 1984 the SACC approved 
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a new funding structure for families of detainees which limited the definition of a dependant 
to children of the detainees and those who were either imprisoned or detained and ‘were 
unemployed or under-employed.’187 The re-evaluation of the grant policy was necessitated by 
declining local and international donor support to the SACC and PCC. The impact on 
Gwala’s family was that the grant was significantly reduced. Perhaps Lulu felt the PCC had 
taken this decision arbitrarily and capriciously, and she alleged that ‘there was a lot of 
corruption within the PCC.’188 These allegations were never investigated.  
In her capacity as the leader of the detainees’ wives, Elda had been able to source aid for 
these families from the DC and from foreign donors, but conditions had changed by the time 
Lulu became the head of the Gwala family. The DC had fewer resources at its disposal.189 
Lulu had already been targeted by the Special Branch during its close surveillance of the 
Gwala family.190 By the end of June 1984, Lulu had to look for a job as her business had not 
been successful. It appears that around September 1984 she found a job somewhere in 
Pietermaritzburg.191 However, in January 1985, Brown reported to the PCC that Lulu ‘was 
fired because she did not do her job.’192 Brown’s version came from a report from Lulu’s 
former employers. However, Lulu asserted that the Special Branch came to these employers 
and instructed them to dismiss her within three months, a claim supported by Lindiwe and 
Cassius Lubisi.193  
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Lulu had a collegial, yet sometimes complex, relationship with the PCC. Minutes of the DC 
suggested that field workers and sometimes Brown himself visited Lulu a number of times 
each month to try to help her to take care of the family’s financial needs, and to resolve an 
on-going family dispute that occasionally erupted between her and her brother, Mfana.194 By 
June 1985, Gwala’s family grant from the DC had decreased to R70 from R140 because since 
November 1984 Lindiwe was regarded as the only legitimate beneficiary according to the 
‘new guidelines of the SACC.’195 By the end of 1985, Lulu was finding it increasingly 
difficult to adhere to Gwala’s wish that all children must be at school and should reside at his 
home. Key challenges included a leak in the roof of the house and the need for the sewerage 
system inside the house to be refurbished.196 Brown and Azaria Ndebele, now working as a 
field worker for the DC, visited Lulu to try to assist her with necessary repairs to the house.197 
Ndebele, previously having been imprisoned with Gwala, put pressure on the health 
inspector, Mr Ntuli, to look into repairs of the Gwala’s roof.198 Lulu also found herself under 
immense pressure to buy a tombstone for Elda. The DC had indicated that ‘this was not their 
matter.’199 
By 1986, the SACC and PCC were in a dire financial situation. Reverend Mazwi Tisani and 
Brown, in their capacities as chairman and vice-chairman respectively, often issued appeals 
for donations from the general public and donor community.200 At the same time, Lulu sought 
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assistance from donors outside South Africa since it was clear that neither the SACC nor 
PCC were in any position to assist the Gwala family to meet its financial obligations. It was 
in this context that Mr and Mrs Trevitt came across the plight of the Gwala family and began 
to communicate directly with Lulu and Lindiwe.201 From 1985, the question of where 
Lindiwe was studying was not clear to the DC as she had matriculated in 1984 at Ukusa High 
School in Mpumalanga township, outside Hammarsdale. There were conflicting reports 
purporting that she was student at Mangosuthu Technikon while others indicated that she was 
enrolled for a secretarial course in one of the private colleges in Durban.202  
From 1986, the Trevitts began to donate an amount of R500 directly into Lulu’s bank account 
for Lindiwe’s education, including boarding expenses, at ‘Mangosuthu Technikon.’ The 
Trevitts had become concerned about the Gwala family, including Lulu’s asthma, and it 
appears that there was regular communication between the Trevitts and both Lulu and 
Lindiwe.203 Having been contributors to IDAF, the Trevitts were familiar with how 
international aid operated. After not receiving proper reports on how the money they were 
donating to the Gwala family was being spent, they approached the PCC, through Norman 
Abrahams, to be the conduit of funds to the Gwala family and to take responsibility for 
accounting for this expenditure.204 The Trevitts responded to a request from Lulu for R410 to 
pay for Lindiwe’s educational needs by sending it to the PCC together with a request that this 
amount be ‘administered according to the normal policy of the PCC.’205 The Trevitts also 
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asked the PCC to investigate how the funds they had transferred earlier to the Gwala family 
had been utilised. Brown made several attempts to contact Lulu and Lindiwe but failed. The 
PCC decided to contact Mangosuthu Technikon to enquire whether Lindiwe was in fact a 
student there.206  
Mangosuthu Technikon’s reply was that ‘Lindiwe Gwala is not enrolled at this Technikon 
and our records do not show that she has done so before.’207 When Brown confronted Lulu 
with the Mangosuthu Technikon response, she said that perhaps Lindiwe registered with her 
English name, Precious, and Brown should make further enquiries. When it became clear that 
Lindiwe had never been enrolled at Mangosuthu Technikon, Brown made several attempts to 
arrange a meeting during the school holidays with both Lulu and Lindiwe, but these meetings 
never materialised.  
Understanding the complex interplay between Lulu, donor funding, and accountability 
requires appreciating the broader context that shaped Lulu’s life and that of the Gwala family. 
When Gwala bestowed upon Lulu the responsibility of leading the family, he was under the 
impression that his family was sufficiently supported by funding from international agencies 
and benevolent individuals. However, the declining donor funding and the closure of the 
International Red Cross in South Africa caused a major shift in the financial health of 
families of the detainees.208 Because it was no longer able to raise as much funding as had 
been possible in the past, the PCC decided to provide food parcels and reduce the number of 
visits to Robben Island from twelve to six per annum.  
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Lulu’s financial situation was made more precarious because she had given birth to two 
additional children, Nomathemba and Noluthando in 1985 and 1987 respectively, while 
Mfana also had a child.209 Lulu found herself in a situation where she had to lie in order to 
fulfil her commitment to Gwala, to ensure that the children were educated and taken care of. 
Lindiwe remarked that even after her mother had passed away she felt taken care of, hence 
she was able to enrol for a post-matric qualification.210 Lulu made her siblings her highest 
priority, becoming a mother and father to them under extremely difficult circumstances.211 
Despite these conflicted times, her relationship with white liberals, specifically Brown and 
Peter Kerchhoff, was able to transcend these difficulties.212  
Gwala’s health in prison and the new frontiers of struggle  
While Harry Gwala had sought to be a strong fulcrum for various roles in his life, he had 
numerous health complications. Gwala, Elda and Lulu were asthmatic. However, the severity 
of Gwala’s asthma did not stop him from being actively involved in the politics of mass 
mobilisation and radicalisation of both the ANC and Communist Party. Lindiwe remembers 
that Gwala did not want to be reminded about his asthma.213 Even though Gwala had been 
living with asthma since the late 1940s, it was only disclosed to the public in September 1976 
during the course of his trial.214 Despite his health conditions, Gwala downplayed the impact 
of asthma in his life until 1982 when he admitted to his friend, Themba Xulu, that he ‘was 
suffering from asthma’ but believed that if he could be transferred to a dry place he would be 
‘alright.’215 Perhaps Gwala and Elda spoke about their asthmatic conditions during visits. 
Motlanthe was among the few who knew that Gwala was asthmatic, saying:  
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Harry Gwala was asthmatic. He suffered from asthma. And when 
everybody else had gone to bed and slept, he would wake up and go into 
the ablution sections, the section which is separated from the cell, which is 
where the showers and the toilets were. And so he would wake up and go 
and clean the toilets and showers earlier, thoroughly, so that you would 
not find a speck of dust. And then of course he would start with his 
exercises. One of his favourite exercises was to stand on his head, so that 
more oxygen would be supplied to the brain.216 
Motlanthe remembered that ‘Gwala was emotionally disturbed by Elda’s passing’ and he had 
to spend time with him trying to console him.217 Although Gwala received emotional support 
from fellow prisoners, he became weak and in October 1984 he confided to Lulu about his 
‘unusual deteriorating’ health condition. By November 1984 he had developed a ‘progressive 
weakness of his upper limbs’, which he reported to the prison authorities.218 On 11 November 
1984, Gwala was referred to the Groote Schuur hospital for observation and diagnosis, 
marking the beginning of the decline of his health.219  
Throughout 1985 Gwala’s health steadily deteriorated and he was an occasional patient at 
Groote Schuur Hospital.220 After several consultations, specialists agreed that he was 
suffering from a rare disease, motor neuron, which they concurred was progressive and 
terminal. He was admitted at Groote Schuur Hospital for observation from 19 January to 3 
February 1987 during which ‘extensive investigations and symptomatic treatment’ were 
applied.221 Doctors referred him for physiotherapy to try to reverse the incapacitation of his 
limbs, prescribed treatment for pain, and requested the prison authorities to ‘incorporate fresh 
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milk and fruits into his diet.’222 From March 1987 it appeared that doctors had stopped trying 
to treat the disease, focusing instead on providing regular physiotherapy.223  
There was a general belief that Gwala’s contraction of motor neuron disease was not natural. 
Vincent Diba argues that Gwala was poisoned by the state in order to destroy him as it had 
become aware of his clandestine political education activities on Robben Island.224 Perhaps, 
this belief was fuelled by the fact that doctors at Groote Schuur no longer tried to cure Gwala 
of this disease, instead focusing on physiotherapy which did not stop the progression of the 
disease.  
While Gwala’s health was deteriorating, he seemed to have chosen to concentrate on himself 
rather than on the broad intellectual education of prisoners. As early as 1980 Gwala had been 
trying to register for a Bachelor of Arts degree at UNISA.225 Elda posted money for his 
registration but it was intentionally delayed by the Robben Island prison authorities and only 
sent on after registration had closed.226 It was not until 1985 that he was able to enrol for a 
BA at UNISA. His tuition fees were paid by Navanethem Pillay and company who requested 
sponsorship on Gwala’s behalf.227 In line with his political viewpoints, Gwala registered for 
courses in ancient history, the theory of law and international politics in his first year.228 The 
examination results of December 1985 indicated that Gwala failed ancient history dismally 
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with a mark of only 17%, while he passed theory of law and was absent from examinations 
for the international politics course.229  
Two factors could have contributed to Gwala’s failure at UNISA. During the course of 1985, 
his health was deteriorating, leading to the discovery that he had motor neuron disease. Thus, 
he might not have been in a right emotional state to focus on his studies. In addition, Gwala’s 
interpretation of the South African history and the global political situation was contrary to 
that of the then dominant political viewpoint. It was not surprising that he scored only 17% in 
ancient history. Despite underachieving, Gwala was determined to pursue his education even 
though his health was steadily deteriorating.230  
Gwala’s commitment to continue his studies was not affected by his health. By March 1987, 
as his arms became weaker, he applied to the head of prison to be granted permission to 
purchase a typewriter.231 Despite being fully informed about Gwala’s state of health, the 
Robben Island prison authorities were reluctant to grant permission for him to use a 
typewriter. W. S. J. Coetzee, Deputy Director for Educational Services, was ‘not in favour of 
making typewriters available to prisoners.’232 However, Coetzee suggested that an opinion 
from the District Surgeon should be sought. The District Surgeon’s report indicated that a 
typewriter could have been of assistance to Gwala and it ‘would serve as occupational 
therapy for his affected muscles.’233  
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While the prison authorities were aware of Gwala’s deteriorating health, they believed that 
‘there was an attached risk that a prisoner could use a typewriter for other purposes.’234 By 
May 1987 Gwala ‘was virtually unable to hold a pen in his right hand.’235 Dr Philcox, acting 
head of the neurology section at Groote Schuur Hospital, indicated that Gwala’s disability 
was ‘such that he would be unable to complete a standard 3-hour written examination in less 
than double of that time’ and that an alternative method of examination need to be 
explored.236 Philcox’s medical report and demands made by Mlaba, Made and Partners, 
Gwala’s new legal firm, as well as the Release Mandela Campaign (RMC) compelled the 
Robben Island prison authorities to agree to provide Gwala with a typewriter. R. A. van 
Deventer, writing on behalf of the Commanding Officer, stated that ‘we have no choice but to 
grant the prisoner a typewriter.’237 However, the approval was subject to strict conditions 
such as that ‘the prison authority would not accept responsibility for any damage; the 
typewriter should not be electrically wired; it must be purchased from the prisoner’s personal 
money; and he was the only person authorised to use the typewriter.’238  
As the issue of granting Gwala permission to purchase a typewriter was being discussed, the 
RMC was applying pressure on the authorities to transfer him to Pietermaritzburg. Health 
practitioners had warned that Gwala might die at any time because his condition was 
progressive. The Department of Prisons transferred Gwala to Pietermaritzburg prison on 28 
July 1987 before he had been advised that permission to acquire the typewriter had been 
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granted. A warder by the name of Swanepoel had suggested that ‘announcement of approval 
be delayed until the prisoner’ had been transferred off Robben Island.239  
The process of transferring Gwala was ‘treated with the greatest sensitivity and 
confidentiality’ in order not to mitigate the risk of media attention.240 Instructions were given 
that Gwala must be transported in a Kombi ‘as it makes it possible for the prisoners to be 
transferred lying down.’241 Further instructions were that Gwala was to be accompanied by 
three officials - two warders and a nurse. Once he had formally been handed over to 
Pietermaritzburg Prison, the authorities there were informed that he had been given approval 
to acquire a typewriter, subject to the abovementioned conditions.242 The typewriter was 
eventually purchased towards the end of 1987.  
Despite the state saying Gwala was being transferred to Pietermaritzburg so that he should be 
‘closer to his family’, this was not its genuine intention. When Gwala arrived in 
Pietermaritzburg Prison, he encountered systemic problems that were to make his life more 
difficult. However, Gwala seem to have settled quickly into the new environment. On 1 
August 1987, Gwala’s letters indicated the direction of his new struggle for connectedness. In 
the first letter, addressed to his lawyers, Mlaba, Made and Partners of Durban, he complained 
about the manner in which he was treated at Pietermaritzburg Prison. He informed them that 
while he had medical attention at Robben Island and a special diet as prescribed by doctors of 
Groote Schuur Hospital, there was no access to health facilities or his medically prescribed 
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diet in Pietermaritzburg Prison.243 Based on this complaint he applied to the Supreme Court 
to: 
Restrain the Pietermaritzburg Prison officials from mixing [him] with 
common law prisoners particularly who are beyond the pale. One of them 
is a habitual criminal who seemed to be mentally touched. This can only 
suggest one thing, that harm must befall me or alternatively that I must 
spend restless nights. If nothing is done about this I demand that I be 
immediately transferred back to Robben Island where I have received all 
the reasonable care, alternatively that I should be released from prison.244 
While there are no archival records on how the Supreme Court dealt with Gwala’s 
application, Mlaba, Made and Partners did take Gwala’s matter to the Commissioner of 
Prisons. The two common law prisoners were duly removed from his cell.245 The second 
letter was addressed to the Registrar of UNISA, in which he notified UNISA about his new 
‘temporary address.’246 Perhaps Gwala’s reference to Pietermaritzburg Prison as a ‘temporary 
address’ indicated his intention to put pressure on the state to release him, a struggle that Lulu 
started during mid-1986.247 Gwala reiterated his request to UNISA to be examined by means 
of a tape recorder. He also made enquiries about his ancient history marks that had not been 
calculated properly.248 It seems as if UNISA acceded to Gwala’s request to be examined by 
tape recorder. However, it was not clear whether it was the responsibility of Gwala or of 
UNISA to provide the recording machine.249   
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Dis/connectedness and Gwala’s prison struggles 
After Gwala had been diagnosed with a motor neuron disease and been informed by various 
medical specialists that he was unlikely to live more than two to three years, he spent his life 
in perpetual pain.250 His deteriorating health became a focal point around which the struggle 
for his release was fought. While at Robben Island, Lulu had approached Mlaba, Made and 
Partners, to present compelling reasons for Gwala’s release.251 Kwenzakwakhe Mlaba, 
affectionately known as Kwenza, was an anti-apartheid lawyer who represented various 
freedom fighters in Natal during the 1980s. Mlaba and Nomalungelo Makhaye, his legal 
partner, had visited Gwala at Robben Island on 25 and 26 June 1987, a month before his 
transfer, but were ‘unable to reach conclusive consensus’ on how to approach the prison 
management about Gwala’s release.252 Once Gwala had been transferred to Pietermaritzburg 
Prison, Mlaba, Made and Partners begun a process of engaging the prison authorities about 
the ‘instruction by his [Gwala’s] family to bring action relating to his ill-health.’253  
By the end of October 1987, Gwala’s appeal to the authorities to be allowed to consult his 
legal representatives had fallen on deaf ears on the grounds that he was not ‘entitled to have 
privileged consultations with legal advisors.’254 Prison authorities were only willing to allow 
Mlaba, Made and Partners to visit him as ‘normal visitors’, and to deduct these visits from 
Gwala’s annual visit allocation.255 Gwala’s attorneys were later given permission to consult 
with him after they had threatened to ‘take the matter to the supreme court.’256 In addition to 
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representing Gwala against the prison authorities, Mlaba, Made and Partners were also legal 
representatives in the Harry Gwala vs D. V. Ngcobo matter in the Pietermaritzburg 
Magistrate’s Court. The cause of the dispute was not divulged, but Ngcobo had impregnated 
Lulu.257 
While Harry Gwala was fighting for access to his legal representative, he was also trying to 
comprehend the causes of the political turmoil that was unfolding in Natal from the mid-
1980s. Since the early 1980s, Brown had made arrangements for The Natal Witness to be sent 
to Gwala. By 1985, Gwala had managed also to obtain permission for a subscription to the 
Sunday Tribune.258 In September 1987, he applied to the prison authorities to be allowed to 
possess a ‘portable FM radio’, which had been brought by his family.259 After permission was 
granted, Gwala’s family applied to bring him a television. In the meantime, Gwala’s family 
was, at this stage, being assisted by certain warders who were in sympathy with the Mass 
Democratic Movement (MDM) and had befriended the Gwala family.260 The applications to 
allow Gwala to have radio and television served to orientate him with the broader struggles in 
Pietermaritzburg, Natal and South Africa more broadly.  
At the time when Gwala was being transferred to Pietermaritzburg Prison in May 1987, the 
Commissioner of Prisons requested the Release Advisory Board (RAB) to consider the 
possibility of releasing him and made such recommendation to the Minister of Prisons.261 The 
RAB met on 3 November 1987 to consider the application for Gwala’s release. It 
recommended that the application be postponed to a meeting that was scheduled for 15 
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January 1988. At that meeting the RAB decided to postpone it again to 15 April 1988 
because it was concerned that Gwala’s release could fuel unrest in Edendale since he still 
believed in the ideals of the ANC.262 Furthermore, it requested medical reports from 
independent medical specialists concerning Gwala’s health. It had already requested that the 
prison management should arrange for Gwala to be admitted for two nights at Grey’s 
Hospital for ‘tests.’263  
At Grey’s Hospital, Gwala was examined by Dr Errol Ackermann, a neurosurgeon specialist 
who predicted that he will only survive a year or two.’264 However, the Ackermann report did 
not overcome the state’s anxiety about the potential threat that Gwala’s release would pose to 
national security. When the RAB met on 15 April it resolved to ‘leave Gwala’s case over 
until 27 May 1988 until input from the South African Police’ (SAP) had been received.265 
The report of the SAP which, was written by Major Muller, raised serious concerns about the 
potential danger to the domestic security situation should Gwala be released unconditionally. 
At the same time, the RAB had held thorough deliberations which ‘considered the extreme 
sensitive strategic and humanitarian complication if Gwala was to die in prison.’266 The RAB 
recommended that he be released unconditionally on medical grounds. However, it remained 
concerned that Gwala’s deteriorating health outweighed the impact he could have had on the 
security situation in Pietermaritzburg and other areas, despite his weakened state.267 Perhaps 
the views of the RAB epitomised the state’s anxiety about the possibility of Gwala’s re-
involvement in the ANC propaganda machinery, even though his health had been weakened 
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by motor neuron disease.268 While the SAP report indicated that Lulu would be ‘able to take 
care of Gwala’, it raised concerns that despite Gwala weakened state he was still able to 
communicate well and in a ‘normal state of mind.’269  
After considering the recommendations of the RAB and the mounting pressure for the 
unconditional release of Gwala, Minister of Justice, H. J. (Kobie) Coetsee recommended that 
Gwala should be unconditionally released. Final approval was still required from State 
President, P. W. Botha. Botha approved Gwala’s release but he added the condition that 
Gwala should divorce himself from the military activities and violence.270 Botha’s condition 
indicated the state’s ambivalence about Gwala, despite his deteriorating health. The state 
offered Gwala a parole, meaning that he would be given a conditional release. Gwala rejected 
the offer on the grounds that he did not believe in violence, and that accordingly the state’s 
offer did not apply to him.  
It became apparent that the state’s decision to transfer Gwala to a prison facility in 
Pietermaritzburg had backfired as it seemed to bolster his confidence and political agency. 
On the other side he received increasing grassroots support and public sympathy. As he had 
rejected the conditional parole, as a display of desperation, the state began a process of 
transferring him to Westville prison in Durban where he was to receive access to 24-hour 
nursing care in better equipped medical facilities, away from his major support base in 
Pietermaritzburg.271 He was finally transferred to Westville on 4 July 1988. While the state 
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pretended to be motivated by compassion for Gwala’s health, its hypocrisy became evident in 
its detention strategy. The Commanding Officer of Westville Prison noted that:  
One of the passages in medium A hospital has been identified for the 
detention of [Gwala]. The barred gate has in the meanwhile been closed to 
prevent sight of and contact with other prisoners. One of the cell’s toilets 
has been removed and sealed, and a table has been provided so that it 
serves as an eating/recreational room. Some of the other cells have been 
made suitable for the storage of emergency medical equipment, as well as 
the prisoner’s medical records. Other prisoners who must keep him 
company will be accommodated in the remaining cells. There is a bath and 
a shower in this section and the windows have been painted to prevent 
prisoners in the passage seeing him when he is being bathed.272 
The state remained worried that Gwala ‘continued to enjoy a good reputation among radical 
black youth, who view him as a father figure and [that] he has the capacity to incite a crowd 
which could give rise to escalating unrest-related incidents.’273 The detention strategy was 
influenced by the state’s belief that placing him with criminals would displace his politics and 
isolate him from Pietermaritzburg, his major political base. The strategy had been developed 
on the instruction from the Deputy Director of Detentions who warned that Gwala’s case was 
politically sensitive and it should be handled as such. As part of the detention strategy, Gwala 
was kept with two other prisoners who were regarded as having a ‘relatively low intellectual 
capacity’ to ‘dilute left-wing manipulation.’274  
While Gwala’s fate was being handled through the bureaucratic processes of the state 
machinery, the public pressure to release him was mounting rapidly. By June 1988, 
individuals and civic organisations, both local and international, began to petition the State 
President to release Gwala on compassionate grounds. Correspondence between Helen 
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Suzman and Brown suggests that he requested Helen Suzman to ‘make enquiries about 
Themba Harry Gwala’, which she promised to do when she met with ‘Thaba [Thabo] Mbeki 
in Harare.’275 Suzman further committed herself to securing an ‘appointment with Minister 
Coetsee to see if [she] can get his release on compassionate grounds.’276 Suzman spoke with 
Coetsee on 7 June 1988 and he told her that Gwala’s release was under consideration. 
However, Suzman gathered that the chances were not ‘unfavourable’ and she ‘was not a 
given a firm decision by the Minister’.277 Brown undertook to inform the Gwala family about 
Suzman’s meeting with the Minister but to ‘tell them to expect nothing.’278 
In the meantime, Mlaba, Made and Partners petitioned the State President to release Gwala. 
The petition was based on Gwala’s deteriorating health and the inability of the prison 
authorities to deal with Gwala’s health conditions.279 Mlaba requested the State President to 
release Gwala on ‘humanitarian grounds to be allowed to die in dignity in the midst of his 
loved ones.’280 However, PW Botha did not make a determination based on Mlaba’s petition. 
Instead, he sent the matter on to the Minister of Justice as ‘the matter fell under his 
jurisdiction.’281  
Various correspondence between Peter Brown and Helen Suzman, Mlaba and the offices of 
the State President and Ministry of Justice indicate that pressure to release Gwala was 
intensifying from various sectors of society. In addition, Gwala’s condition was receiving 
more media coverage which resulted in the growing interest by local and international media 
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in how the state was treating him.282 Perhaps this could be attributed to the RMC campaign to 
release Gwala. The prison authorities received letters from a certain Cecil Spencer, Reverend 
H. W. Hopper from Eastbourne and Northern Ireland respectively, both requesting that 
Gwala be ‘released as he was terminally ill’ and that ‘he was unlikely to be a law breaker in 
the future.’283 L. E. Guffatho’s letter from England pleaded for the authorities to release 
Gwala so that ‘the end of his life might be easier and that he may have the care he needs.’284  
The SACC had been indirectly brought into the Gwala matter through its ecumenical 
Dependants’ Conference. While the Pietermaritzburg DC continued to be actively involved in 
supporting the welfare of the Gwala family, from June 1988, the SACC took a more direct 
interest in Gwala’s imprisonment and his state of health. During its national conference on 27 
and 28 June 1988, the SACC resolved to appeal to the Minister of Justice ‘for the release of 
Mr Harry Gwala on humanitarian grounds.’285 Coetsee’s response to SACC head, Reverend 
Frank Chikane, suggested ambivalence on the part of the state regarding the mounting 
pressure to release Gwala.286 While the state was concerned about the consequences of Gwala 
dying in prison, it was similarly concerned about his unwillingness to change his politics and 
divorce himself from the militant ideological viewpoints of the Communist Party and the 
ANC.  
Up to this point, the pressure for Gwala’s release had come from concerned individuals and 
bodies other than Gwala himself. However, from September 1988 Gwala seemed to have 
                                                 
282 City Press and Business Day both sent media enquiries to the Prisons Department enquiring about Gwala’s conditions 
and possibility of his release, see NAR, DOP papers, file no. 1238, media enquiries from Daniel Simon (Business Day) to the 
Prison Service, 5 June 1988; Staff reporter, ‘Lawyers call on PW to release terminally ill ANC veteran Gwala’, City Press, 5 
June 1988, 2. 
283 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, declassified letter from Cecil E. Spencer to the Governor, Pietermaritzburg Prison, 23 
June 1988. Another letter, dated 7 June 1988 was received from Rev. H. W. Hopper.  
284 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, declassified letter from L. E Guffatho to the Prison authorities, 28 June 1988.  
285 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, correspondence from Rev. Frank Chikane [signed by B. H. Bam], Secretary General of 
the SACC to Mr K. [H. J.] Coetzee [Coetsee], Minister of Justice, 1 August 1988.  
286 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, correspondence from H. J. Coetsee to Reverend Chikane, 27 October 1988.  
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decided not to rely on other people to fight for his cause. On 24 September, Gwala was 
assisted to write a letter to the Head of Prison requesting that he be released.287 Gwala’s letter 
included highlights of the conclusions of medical practitioners from Groote Schuur, Grey’s 
and St Augustine’s hospitals. He requested to be ‘released on medical grounds as a 
humanitarian gesture by the state…so that [I] may have a peaceful death among members of 
[my] family.’288 In spite of the pressure, the state remained convinced about Gwala’s 
potential to incite violence. Although there was clear medical evidence from specialists that 
Gwala’s health had deteriorated so much that he had become physically paralysed, the state 
was determined to seek further medical evidence.   
The prison medical practitioner, Dr J. D. Strydom, was instructed to consult with other 
specialists about Gwala’s medical condition and to arrive at a firm conclusion. Strydom 
sought the opinion of Dr Hugh Staub, a neurologist at Chelmsford Medical Centre, who 
concluded that ‘a very urgent and forceful application for his [Gwala] early release should be 
made to the authorities based on the fact that he has a disease which is progressive and 
terminal.’289 The state also referred Gwala to Dr J. de la Rey Nel, specialist physician at 
Westville Hospital, who also concluded that Gwala’s condition was not reversible.290 Despite 
these medical reports the state remained undecided.  
The Release Mandela Campaign and the struggle to release Gwala 
The Release Mandela Campaign applied created ‘enormous pressure to release Gwala’.291 
The RMC had been founded on 9 March 1980 when the Sunday Post of Johannesburg 
                                                 
287 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, correspondence from written for T. H. Gwala to the Head of Prison, 24 September 1988.  
288 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, correspondence written for T. H. Gwala to the Head of Prison, 24 September 1988. 
289 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, correspondence from Dr H. Staub to Dr J. D. Strydom, 3 October 1988.  
290 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, correspondence from Dr J. de la Rey Nel to Dr J. P. Strydom, Westville Prison, 14 
October 1988. Gwala was also seen by Dr Y. T. Singh and Dr W. F. C. Kennedy and who also concluded that his medical 
conditions were incurable and progressive and recommended that he should be released from prison.  
291 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi; Ruth Lundie interview with Cassius Lubisi.   
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launched a nationwide petition, signed by about 15 million people, for the release of 
Mandela. By the mid-1980s, the RMC had support from many other African countries and 
international anti-apartheid organisations in Europe. In 1984, Kennett Kaunda, the President 
of Zambia, became a fervent supporter of the RMC and called on the South African 
government to release all political prisoners.292 Other organisations that supported the RMC 
included the Soweto Committee of 10, Inkatha ye Nkululeko Yesizwe (later the Inkatha 
Freedom Party), the Azanian People’s Organisation (Azapo), the Labour Party, the NIC and 
the SACC.293 Cassius Lubisi remembered that  
While the RMC was focusing on Mandela, it did not only concern 
Mandela’s release. Instead, Mandela was a symbol of our struggle because 
he was known internationally and the RMC used his name for symbolic 
purposes. The RMC was fighting for the release of Nelson Mandela and 
all other political prisoners, return of all exiles and the subsequent 
implementation of the Freedom Charter.294  
The election of Lubisi to the executive of the RMC in 1986 raised new prospects for the 
RMC in Natal.295 Under conditions of heightened apartheid repression, the RMC was 
determined to ‘constantly put the names of key leaders in the public domain.’ In the case of 
Natal, the RMC had identified Harry Gwala as one of the key leaders to focus on due to the 
political momentum that had been built by Elda and her subsequent funeral. In 1987, the 
RMC had decided run a project around Pietermaritzburg to highlight the leaders who were in 
prison on Robben Island at the time. The person who symbolised that was Gwala. Through 
this project, the RMC visited places such as Sobantu, Imbali, Dambuza and Mpumalanga 
                                                 
292 Ilanga reporter, ‘UKaunda uthi iSA ayikhulule uMandela’, Ilanga lase Natali, 11-13 June 1984, 7.  
293 http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/nelson-mandela-timeline-1980-1989, accessed 5 July 2016. 
294 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi.  
295 Lubisi was originally from Nelspruit and had come to Pietermaritzburg to study for a BSc degree at the University of 
Natal Pietermaritzburg at the beginning of 1985. By June of that year he had been elected as vice chairperson of the local 
branch of the Azanian Students’ Convention (AZASCO). He utilised his new position, with the support of fellow students 
and founders of the D. C. O. Matiwane Youth League, Sipho Shezi, Andile Reve, Aubrey Ngcobo and Thandi and Phumla 
Gqubule, to reorientate AZASCO from a ‘cheese and wine’ leisure group to a proactive and militant student movement 
concerned with bread and butter issues that operated both on campus and in the broader community. In 1986 Lubisi was 
elected to the national leadership of the Release Mandela Campaign. He consequently undertook frequent clandestine trips to 
Lusaka and Harare to consult with the ANC on RMC and youth matters. It was during these trips early in 1987 that he was 
recruited by Ngaoko Ramatlodi and Super Moloi unto the ANC, see Sithole, ‘The ANC Underground’. 
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Township to conscientise ordinary people about Gwala. Linked to Harry Gwala’s name were 
the names of Anton ‘Mfenendala’ Xaba, John ‘Mabulala’ Nene, Zakhele Mdlalose, Matthew 
Meyiwa and Truman Magubane, who were imprisoned with him during the 1976 trial. Lubisi 
argues that the RMC chose these names because they believed that ‘there was no chance that 
people would have forgotten about them.’ Gwala, as the ‘chief commander’, became the 
symbol of the RMC in Natal.296  
During the RMC’s campaign to release Gwala, Lulu, who was already politically active, 
became the face of the family. It was through Lulu that Lubisi and Ben Martins became very 
close to the Gwala family.297 Gwala’s other children were also involved in one way or 
another. Now and then Lubisi stayed at Gwala’s house even before Gwala’s release from 
prison. Lubisi and other RMC members became Gwala’s regular visitors while he was 
imprisoned in Pietermaritzburg and Westville.298 To the RMC, the transfer of Gwala to Natal 
prisons meant that his release was imminent, so they had to establish a Reception Committee 
(RC) to ensure that his house was improved in line with his political stature, in order to 
manage security and access, and to accommodate his disability as he was suffering from 
motor neuron disease.299 It was against this background that the RMC requested Beyers 
Naudé and Sydney Mafumadi from the ANC to work with Kwenza Mlaba and Linda Zama to 
ensure that there were sufficient funds to ‘make Gwala’s house a bit respectable.’300 On the 
request of the RMC, Linda Zama, a prominent anti-apartheid lawyer, established the Harry 
                                                 
296 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi. 
297 Ruth Lundie interview with Cassius Lubisi. 
298 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi. 
299 The Reception Committee consisted of Reggie Hadebe, Skhumbuzo Ngwenya, Mdu Ndlovu, Thami Mseleku, Shakes 
Cele, Blade Nzimande, A. S. Chetty, Chota Motala, see Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi.  
300 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi. The reconstruction of Gwala’s house started in mid-1989 and was 
finalised, after numerous delays due to late payments by donors, in June 1990. See UWC-RIM Mayibuye Archives, MCH 
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Street, London), 30 July 1990. 
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Gwala Trust and raised funds from local and international donors to improve Gwala’s house. 
In a funding proposal to build Gwala’s house Zama stated: 
What is uppermost is that he [Gwala] lived in a 2-bedroom house with 9 
additional members of the family including grandchildren. The house is 
crowed and there is no security. A person of Mr Gwala’s standing is 
vulnerable. Political assassinations are prevalent in South Africa.301 
The state finally acceded to the pressure and petitions from various organisations, countries, 
medical specialists, and individuals locally and abroad to release Gwala. He was 
unconditionally released on 26 November 1988 into the ‘care and supervision of his daughter, 
Lulu Gwala.’302 Lulu had informed the RC about Gwala’s imminent release in order to plan a 
‘warm reception.’ Unlike his release in 1972, which was quiet and unnoticed, this time a 
large group of youth waited at his home to welcome Gwala in a ‘revolutionary mode, 
particularly by the young people.’303 As Gwala was approaching, the narrow streets of 
Dambuza reverberated with youth singing, toyi-toying and ululating ‘uHarry Gwala, ubaba 
wethu, thina sonqoba’ [Harry Gwala our father, we will conquer]. Gwala’s reception became 
a mini-political rally, an indication that, although he had been absent for many years, he 
remained immensely present in the political fabric of Edendale, Pietermaritzburg and 
Natal.304 Reporting about Gwala’s reception, the Echo highlighted that: 
Neighbours, old friends and host of Maritzburgers streamed to see the 
ailing Mr Gwala upon his return home. The list read like a 
Pietermaritzburg who’s who.305 
                                                 
301 UWC-RIM Mayibuye Archives, MCH 31, IDAF collection, box 734, ‘motivation for funding Mr Harry Gwala’, from 
Linda Zama and Company to the sponsor, London, 18 July 1989. After Gwala’s release from prison, the Trust extended its 
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302 NAR, DOP papers, file no.1238, release certificate, 26 November 1988. 
303 Video interview with Gwala, unrecognised interviewer, UWC-RIM Mayibuye Archives, INTV EP 1 & 5.  
304 See Gwala’s interaction with the youth during his reception event at his home, UWC-RIM Mayibuye Archives, INTV 
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The media coverage of Gwala’s release highlighted the bias and censorship that characterised 
news agencies. While the UmAfrika, a pro-UDF regional newspaper, highlighted Gwala’s 
release in a bold front page story with a picture of Harry Gwala, The Natal Witness and 
Ilanga newspapers reported it as a minor story.306 While reportage in UmAfrika and Echo 
covered Gwala’s political life from the 1940s, Ilanga and The Natal Witness focused on his 
‘ailing health’ and said that he might not survive for more than a year.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has interwoven Gwala’s involvement in football during the late 1940s in 
Pietermaritzburg and mid-1960s at Robben Island as a continuation of his politics of 
connectedness. While football has been understood to have followed political party lines, oral 
interviews have revealed that it was a catalyst that brought about political unity among the 
varying political formations on Robben Island.307 This chapter has also demonstrated that 
Gwala occupied various roles on Robben Island that were multi-layered, complex and fraught 
with ambiguities of class consciousness. His outspoken defence of the analytical 
interpretation of society in terms of class resulted in confrontation with proponents of African 
nationalism. This was expressed in the political turmoil that stifled prospects for political 
connectedness between various formations on Robben Island.  
The chapter has further demonstrated that despite its limitations, Gwala’s politics of 
connection enabled him to develop political education as a modality to stimulate political 
consciousness and enhance the struggle against apartheid on Robben Island. It was through 
Gwala’s political education programmes that Robben Island earned its title ‘university of the 
                                                 
306 Staff reporter, ‘Inkakha kaKhongolose idedelwe etilongweni’, UmAfrika, 3 December 1988; Staff reporter, ‘Owe ANC 
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struggle.’ As Mandela remarked, the products of Gwala’s political education would 
themselves develop into political giants in their own right, using the tools he gave them to 
develop independent thought and analysis.308 The chapter has also argued that the 1960s were 
especially very difficult years in the history of the liberation politics as the ANC and other 
liberation movements faced direct repression by the state that led to the banning, 
imprisonment and exile of many of the leaders. Despite attempts to regenerate the ANC 
during the Morogoro conference in 1969, the nature of the repressive systems that had been 
introduced by the South African state prevented any possibility that political education could 
have been influenced by such developments.   
This chapter has also demonstrated how the sudden death of Elda in 1984 left Gwala’s 
children in a state of political exclusion and financial vulnerability. Lulu, aged 30, became 
head of the family and played a key role in keeping the family intact and connected Gwala’s 
name with the new wave of mass mobilisation to ensure that his political identity was not 
obliterated by state. Despite Gwala’s imprisonment, his family employed his politics of 
connectedness to mobilise grassroots organisations and public sympathy to put pressure on 
the state to release him unconditionally.  
 
                                                 
308 Nelson Mandela, speech at the funeral of Harry Gwala, 1 July 1996.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Harry Gwala, militancy and violence in Natal, 1988-1995 
Introduction 
From the mid-1980s, the greater Pietermaritzburg and Natal exploded into one of the 
bloodiest episodes of political violence of the last decade of apartheid. When Harry Gwala 
was released from prison on 26 November 1988, he found himself in a complex, violent 
political environment that required him to take proactive political stances to protect his 
constituency in Dambuza and greater Pietermaritzburg. Violence in Natal and Zululand was 
accompanied by crowd resistance and mass mobilisation that had been key features of events 
in Pietermaritzburg during the late 1950s. The 1980s, however, were different as crowd 
resistance and mass mobilisation became violent. This was because, unlike the 1950s, the 
1980s were characterised by the dominance of Inkatha which had been established by 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi on 21 March 1975. Inkatha promoted narrow notions of Zulu 
nationalism and the existence of a homogenous Zuluness that had to be defended.1 Despite 
Buthelezi’s commitment to non-violence when Inkatha was established, by the mid-1980s his 
approach seemed to have undergone a metamorphosis as Inkatha was embroiled in aggressive 
and violent attacks on its those who did not support it.2 By the time Gwala was released from 
prison, the stage was already set for a showdown.  
John Aitchison has argued that Gwala’s release heralded a birth of a new era in 
Pietermaritzburg and Natal. To the people of Edendale, Gwala’s release filled the leadership 
void they had been waiting for many years, especially in the face of violence that had 
                                                 
1 P. D. S. Forsyth, ‘The Past as the Present: Chief A. N. M. G. Buthelezi’s Use of History as a Source of Political 
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devastated many families.3 During this period, Gwala’s life was characterised by notions of 
political militancy, the re-establishment and expansion of the ANC’s influence on local 
politics, and navigating the complex interplay between regional and national politics. This 
chapter seeks to deepen our understanding of Gwala’s interpretations of violence and how the 
modalities of retaliation became instruments of political defence to protect ANC supporters. 
It seeks to understand Gwala’s interpretation of violence beyond the work of Matthew 
Kentridge, John Aitchison, Gerhard Mare′ and Ashwin Desai who have argued that violence 
in Natal was the cathartic release of aggression and a form of protest against apartheid.4 
Matthew Kentridge, John Aitchison and Gerhard Mare′  have described the patterns of 
regional violence and have raised similar questions about the persistence and interplay 
between the notion of a ‘third force’ and histories of economic and social deprivation. Based 
on their work I argue that the entanglement of violence with Gwala limits our ability to 
recognise the role of organised class and political interests in the liberation struggle. I do not, 
however, try to dispel the notion that Gwala persona might have played a role in the violence 
as he often poetically stated during his public addresses, ‘kuzokhala isigwagwagwa.’5  
Recent studies by David Welsh, Mac Maharaj and Mxolisi Mchunu have characterised Gwala 
as an ANC warlord.6 Welsh has described Harry Gwala as a ‘counterpart in the ANC who 
either believed that negotiations were futile or that political grounds had to be defended and 
expanded by violence.’7 Welsh further argues that Gwala was linked to the violence that 
                                                 
3 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with John Aitchison. 
4 M. Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990); G. Mare, 
‘Inkatha and Regional Control: Policing Liberation Politics’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 45, 1990; J. 
Aitchison, Death from Political Violence in Natal Midlands, 1980-1992 (Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult Education, 
University of Natal, 1993; A. Desai, ‘The Eye of a Violent Storm: Inanda, 1985’, New Contree, No.70, Special edition, 
2014.  
5 This is a Zulu expression that refers to the rattle of a machine gun.  
6 Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 416; M. R. Mchunu, ‘A History of Political Violence in KwaShange, Vulindlela 
District and of its Effects on the Memories of Survivors (1987-2008)’, PhD dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2013; 
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7 Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 416.  
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unfolded in Natal by saying, ‘he did not support peace talks between Mandela and Buthelezi, 
despite Jacob Zuma’s advice to Mandela.’8 Mchunu and Maharaj characterise Gwala as an 
ANC warlord who did not own up to the violence committed by supporters. Such 
characterisation indicates the extent to which Gwala’s involvement in the realignment of the 
post-1990 geo-politics of Natal has been misunderstood and read in an unproblemitised and 
ahistorical manner.9  
The views of Welsh, Maharaj and Mchunu that Gwala was a warlord reflect the dominance of 
uncritical, dogmatic perspectives of understanding violence in Natal and KwaZulu during the 
1980s and 1990s. These views are not based on a nuanced analysis of Gwala’s role and do 
not take into consideration a variety of sources that have documented wider histories of 
violence in Natal Midlands. The labelling of Gwala as a warlord is the result of an inability to 
locate him within the context of Natal at that time, a context which was dominated by 
conflict, violence and low intensity war.  
Violence in Natal and early interactions with Inkatha  
The situation in Natal and the role of Buthelezi in the political dispensation that was 
unfolding during the 1980s was discussed extensively on Robben Island. Due to the lack of 
understanding of conditions on the ground, Gwala and the rest of the political leadership had 
taken a view that the violent approaches of supporters of the Congress of South African 
Trade Union (COSATU) and UDF was at odds with the ANC’s vision.10 In anticipation of 
Gwala’s release, as he was being transferred to Pietermaritzburg prison, the leadership at 
Robben Island mandated him to explore ways to stop violence in Pietermaritzburg and in 
Natal more broadly. After Gwala had been transferred to prisons in Natal, he was regularly 
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briefed by his daughter Lulu, Cassius Lubisi and other political leaders of the UDF and 
COSATU during prison visits. In addition, access to a television, radio, and daily newspapers 
(The Natal Witness and The Natal Mercury) enabled him to have access to wider knowledge 
of political conditions in Natal as they were unfolding. However, he was still convinced that 
it was necessary to ‘negotiate with Inkatha to end the violence’ as it was ‘one of the good 
steps in the direction of eliminating apartheid.’11 However, when Gwala was released, his 
enthusiasm for a peaceful settlement seemed to have dwindled as he was exposed to the 
extreme brutality and violence in Natal. This caused him to gravitate towards mobilising 
communities into politics of violent confrontation with Inkatha.12  
From the mid-1980s, there had been a prevailing climate of political intolerance in Natal 
between supporters of Inkatha on the one hand and the supporters of the UDF and COSATU 
on the other.13 This degenerated into violence which Anthea Jeffery has referred to as a low-
intensity civil war.14 The roots of violent confrontation can be traced back to the attacks of 
1983 when Inkatha’s amabutho (militias) attacked students at the residences of the University 
of Zululand. The establishment of the UDF and COSATU in 1983 and 1985 respectively 
exacerbated the climate of political turmoil because Buthelezi saw these formations as threats 
to the dominance of Inkatha. By 1985, violence had started in Mpumalanga Township, near 
                                                 
11 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
12 APC, PC189/7/1/1, ‘Police involvement in the Natal Conflict’, affidavit of Father Timothy Smith, undated. Smith was a 
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incidents of violence and provided counselling to victims of violence.  
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Hammarsdale, and on parts of Edendale. It intensified after a group of operatives trained on 
the Caprivi Strip border zone in what is now Namibia returned to join the KwaZulu Police 
(KZP). Witness testimonies during the hearings of the TRC indicated that these trainees never 
underwent any police training or followed proper admissions procedures, not even filling in 
KZP application forms. They were issued with KZP appointment certificates and with official 
police firearms. Under the disguise of being official law enforcement agents, they engaged in 
large-scale hit squad assassinations of supporters of the UDF and COSATU, mainly in the 
Natal Midlands including Edendale and Mpumalanga townships.15  
Kentridge has attributed the emergence of violence to Inkatha as it tried to ‘invade non-
Inkatha territories’ to redraw the political geography of Natal.16 The appointment of Brigadier 
Mac Buchner in November 1987 as the head of the Security Branch in Pietermaritzburg with 
overall command of the riot police coincided with the re-emergence of the Congress 
movement and its militant youth. This challenged Buthelezi’s dominance of the political 
space and presented fertile grounds for violent encounters in Pietermaritzburg.17 Buchner had 
been an experienced security policeman, with a vast background in fighting the ANC, 
especially turning former ANC guerrillas into ‘askaris.’ He viewed violence in 
Pietermaritzburg as a product of ANC’s threat to attack Inkatha and ‘dealing with that threat 
[was] always naturally [his] first concern.’18 
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16 Kentridge, An Unofficial War, 1.  
17 APC, PC189/7/1/1, ‘The Warlord and the Police’, affidavit of Father Timothy Smith, undated; Kentridge, ‘An Unofficial 
War’, 211. 
18 Kentridge, An Unofficial War, 212. 
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Once Gwala had been transferred to prisons in Natal his proximity seemed to have brought a 
sense of legitimacy and identity formation to the supporters of UDF and COSATU. They 
began to use Gwala as a symbol of the struggle, with his profile becoming a tool to build 
mass support against Inkatha. It was against this background that Musa Gwala was able to 
mobilise the youth to denounce Inkatha at Swayimane, marking the beginning of an era of 
brutal violence between the supporters of UDF and Psychology Ndlovu, a local leader of 
Inkatha. While imprisoned, Gwala had accumulated much respect both on Robben Island and 
in the Natal Midlands, particularly after the RMC had taken an interest in him. Gwala’s 
political profile served to disprove Buthelezi’s claims that the UDF was ‘undisciplined’ and 
that they were manipulating school children in Natal’s townships.19 Gwala became the 
embodiment and symbol of a political moment that connected the UDF and COSATU to 
broader sense of comradeship.20  
There is no doubt that Buthelezi was aware that Gwala had become an iconic and highly 
respected leader within the broad political structures of both the UDF and COSATU. Cassius 
Lubisi said that after Gwala was released, one of the first groups to arrive to welcome him 
was a Kombi-load of Inkatha officials sent by Buthelezi.21 Among them were David 
Ntombela and Velaphi Ndlovu. Ntombela and Ndlovu had been leaders of Inkatha in the 
Greater Pietermaritzburg area. They took the opportunity to brief Gwala about their views on 
violence that was taking place in Natal.22After having facilitated a visit by the local 
leadership of Inkatha, Buthelezi wrote a letter to Gwala on 2 December 1989. In the letter 
                                                 
19 UWL, HLP, Buthelezi’s speeches, A1045, ‘We March Together to Achieve Victory’, delivered by M. G. Buthelezi at 
Ondini, 13 September 1980. Students in KwaMashu embarked on a strike action in 1980s that marked the revival of 
students’ organisation in the early 1980s, see Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Sihle Mbongwa; J. Seekings, The UDF: A 
History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991(Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), 280-290; F. Meer, 
Resistance in the Townships (Durban: Madiba Publishers, 1989), 36; B. Nzimande, Schooling in the Context of Violence 
(Durban: Education Policy Unit, 1993), 9.  
20 For a detailed discussion on comrades see Sitas, ‘The Making of the Comrades’, 629-641. 
21 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi.  
22 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi. 
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Buthelezi addressed Gwala as a ‘brother’, suggesting a desperate need for collegiality, mutual 
political respect, and an attempt to initiate grounds of a political treaty. Buthelezi further 
wrote: 
You are a son of Africa; a son of South Africa and one of the greatest of 
many who have suffered in the process of bringing about a better South 
Africa. Some suffer out of jail; some suffer in jail and it is the suffering of 
the masses that has inspired people like you to do what you have done. 
You are one of those few in the history of the struggle who was sentenced 
to life imprisonment. I say few knowing that even one would be far too 
many.23 
Being aware that Gwala had already been in prison when Inkatha was formed, Buthelezi’s 
letter tried to convince Gwala about his political belief that ‘there is no one way in which 
apartheid could be eradicated.’24 Exercising his ability to use history to claim political 
legitimacy for himself, Buthelezi situated the establishment of Inkatha within the broader 
historical and political developments that gave rise to the BCM, BPC and independent trade 
unions during the 1970s.25 He appealed to Gwala to understand what he described as the 
necessity of a ‘multi-strategy approach in which each does what each can best do in their own 
circumstances.’26 Ntombela and Ndlovu had already briefed Gwala about their perspectives 
on violence, and the relevant part of Buthelezi’s letter reads:   
One of the pangs I feel intensely, and daily, is the violence between 
Blacks in the Greater Pietermaritzburg area, which involves the 
ANC/UDF-COSATU alliance, and Inkatha. I have tried to do all that is 
possible to contribute towards peace in the Greater Pietermaritzburg area. 
There has, for example, been the Peace Accord signed by COSATU in 
Pietermaritzburg and Inkatha. I feel that this ACCORD can never really 
stop the violence unless the leadership of the ANC and the UDF also 
                                                 
23 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from M. G. Buthelezi to Mr Harry 
Gwala, 2 December 1989.  
24 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from M. G. Buthelezi to Mr Harry 
Gwala, 2 December 1989. 
25 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from M. G. Buthelezi to Mr Harry 
Gwala, 2 December 1989. For a broader discussion on Buthelezi’s use of the past, see Forsyth, ‘The Past as the Present’; C. 
Hamilton, Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998).  
26 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from M. G. Buthelezi to Mr Harry 
Gwala, 2 December 1989. 
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identify with the Peace Accord. I share this as a pain which I know you 
must feel as intensely as I do.27 
 Gwala’s reply was characterised by sarcasm and corrections of political and historical 
distortions in Buthelezi’s letter. He sarcastically addressed Buthelezi as ‘Mtwana 
[mntwana]’, and acknowledged that Buthelezi’s letter had ‘touched some of the important 
aspects that affect the African people.’28 Gwala concurred with Buthelezi that opposition to 
apartheid required ‘multi-strategies’ but emphasised that in ‘a society divided into social 
classes, race, colour, and nationality, the people will respond to this oppression in the way 
they feel it.’29 Without making a direct reference to Inkatha, Gwala warned Buthelezi that 
‘the Nationalist government has created various agencies to deceive the people, thus making 
efforts to create some social classes among the oppressed which should act as shock 
absorbers as the struggle against apartheid intensifies.’30  
Gwala’s statement that ‘the tactics of the enemy have tended to confuse the oppressed into 
thinking that apartheid would be destroyed by the people in collaboration with a reforming 
Nationalist regime’ suggested how he viewed Inkatha within the broader politics of the 
liberation struggle.31 Indirectly critiquing Inkatha’s approach, Gwala said that ‘the multi-
strategies of the people which are raising out of their objective conditions should not be 
allowed to make the people fight among themselves, each claiming that his strategy is the 
                                                 
27 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from M. G. Buthelezi to Mr Harry 
Gwala, 2 December 1989. 
28 In Zulu, mntwana is a person of royal blood, a prince. SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 
01.10, box 7, letter from T. H. Gwala to The Chief Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, 20 December 1989. 
Gwala’s sarcastic reference to Chief Buthelezi as mntwana could have been influenced by Mzala’s book which exposed that 
Buthelezi was not a legitimate heir to the Buthelezi throne and his use of royal lineage was mainly to advance his political 
aims, see Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988).  
29 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from T. H. Gwala to The Chief 
Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, 20 December 1989. 
30 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from T. H. Gwala to The Chief 
Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, 20 December 1989. 
31 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from T. H. Gwala to The Chief 
Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, 20 December 1989. 
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only one that should be used.’32 While Buthelezi’s references to violence in his letter were 
limited to Natal, Gwala described ‘bloodshed’ as a national phenomenon and he quoted other 
areas affected by violence such as the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Transvaal. Gwala 
stated that ‘the bloodshed…should make every patriot worried.33 Gwala’s letter suggested 
that Buthelezi’s politics of collaboration should shift to identify the National Party 
government as the oppressor and to ‘explain to our people who the real enemy is.’34  
The epistolary exchange of correspondence between Buthelezi and Gwala shows their 
differing political approaches to opposing apartheid. They also highlight the level of personal 
and political animosity between them that later contributed to fuelling political violence 
between Inkatha and ANC/UDF supporters. Buthelezi, however, claimed that he had a 
‘cordial’ relationship with Gwala dating back to the 1950s.35 Buthelezi claimed that when 
Gwala was released from prison in 1988, he even gave him an amount of R2 000 to perform 
the traditional Zulu cleansing ritual of slaughtering a goat which was performed when a man 
is released from prison. However, Lindiwe Gwala did not remember such ritual being 
performed and it is unlikely that Gwala would have performed such a ritual as he did not 
have much of a connection with ancestral belief systems.36  
Violence and the politics of mass mobilisation in Natal 
Before Harry Gwala’s release from prison, a number of peace settlements to resolve the 
stalemate of violence in Natal and KwaZulu had been proposed. By 1987, the KwaZulu-Natal 
Indaba had been established with Buthelezi as a key player. However, it was rejected by both 
                                                 
32 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from T. H. Gwala to The Chief 
Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, 20 December 1989. 
33 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from T. H. Gwala to The Chief 
Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, 20 December 1989. 
34 SAHA, AL 2421, Natal Indian Congress collection, section 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, letter from T. H. Gwala to The Chief 
Minister of KwaZulu and President of Inkatha, 20 December 1989. 
35 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Mangosuthu Buthelezi.   
36 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Lindiwe Gwala.  
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the UDF and COSATU on the grounds that it was undemocratic because it ‘lodged itself on a 
regional solution based on similar principles as offered by the tricameral system.’37 When it 
became apparent that the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba had no impact in curbing violence, the 
Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce initiated the Peace Accord to mediate the conflict. 
This also failed and violence increased exponentially. By that time UDF and COSATU had 
collected witness statements and affidavits about perpetrators of violence, which implicated 
the Inkatha leadership. However, lack of prosecution by law enforcement agencies convinced 
the UDF and COSATU that the state agencies and Inkatha were colluding with one another.  
Correspondence between Archie Gumede of the UDF and Buthelezi suggested that while 
both wanted to engage their organisations in peaceful negotiations, the atmosphere of 
violence, political intolerance and broad political differences prevented them from reaching 
consensus on key principles to underpin a peaceful settlement.38 In a letter addressed to 
Buthelezi which was published in the media before Buthelezi received it, Gumede and UDF-
affiliated organisations tabled a series of demands as a precondition for any peaceful 
negotiations.39 The UDF’s demands were the establishment of a democratic framework, with 
a strong focus on freedom of association, expression, movement and organisation. Gumede 
argued that such a democratic framework should remove ‘restrictions on the UDF to meet, 
discuss and deliberate openly.’40  
Gumede was pessimistic about areas of convergence since Buthelezi insisted on ‘Black unity’ 
while the UDF called for a ‘non-racial unity.’41 Moreover, Gumede had demanded that the 
                                                 
37 The tricameral Parliament (1984 to 1994) had separate chambers for whites, coloureds and Indians, but no representation 
for Africans. ‘Business and Trade Unions’, Document 96: speech by Jay Naidoo to the business conference, 27 November 
1987, in Gerhart and Glaser, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 6.  
38 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, correspondence between A. Gumede and M. G. Buthelezi, 19 November 1987, 
9 February 1988.  
39 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, correspondence from A. Gumede to M. G. Buthelezi, 19 November 1987. 
40 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, correspondence from A. Gumede to M. G. Buthelezi, 19 November 1987.  
41 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, correspondence from A. Gumede to M. G. Buthelezi, 19 November 1987. 
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culture of forcing people to join Inkatha should be abolished. He emphasised that Buthelezi 
had made ‘it clear that he was expecting civil servants of KwaZulu to identify with Inkatha’ 
and UDF members were not welcomed in the state employ.’42 In addition, Gumede alleged 
that ‘Inkatha’s intolerance of democratic organisations often becomes displayed as opposition 
to non-Zulus’ and accused Buthelezi of rhetoric that perpetuated ethnic discrimination.43  
Cases involving violence in Pietermaritzburg occupied the courts to an unprecedented extent. 
Courts were finding it more and more difficult to preside of over such matters due to their 
scale and, in most cases, the lack of crucial evidence. As a result, in a criminal case involving 
Phineas Zondo and others vs Inkatha and others, the court compelled the leadership of 
Inkatha and COSATU to enter into an agreement to find an alternative solution that would 
‘ameliorate the violence between resident of the townships in the greater Pietermaritzburg.’44 
This resulted in the adoption of a ‘Joint Declaration’ which condemned violence and 
‘recognised the right of every community resident to make a free and unfettered choice to 
join any political party.’45 As part of the declaration, the organisations agreed to establish the 
‘Complaints Adjudication Board’, which was to be chaired by an independent chairperson 
and assessors nominated by both organisations. The organisations also agreed that Justice N. 
R. Leon would be the convenor and appoint a chairperson.46  
In an environment that was characterised by high levels of impunity from punishment and 
police bias towards Inkatha, the ‘Joint Declaration’ was destined to fail. During the address at 
                                                 
42 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, correspondence from A. Gumede to M. G. Buthelezi, 19 November 1987. 
43 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, correspondence from A. Gumede to M. G. Buthelezi, 19 November 1987. 
44 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, agreement of settlement in the matter of Phineas Zondo and others v Inkatha 
and others (case no. 372/88) and in other matters referred to in paragraph 5 hereof, 2 September 1988; SAHA, AL2431, 
UDF Collection, box 29, confidential memorandum from Cheadle Thompson and Haysom to COSATU, entitled re-
evaluation of COSATU’s position on the structure and function of the Complaints Adjudication Board, 9 December 1988.  
45 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, Joint Declaration adopted by Congress of South African Trade Unions and 
Inkatha, undated.  
46 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, the structure, function and operation of the Complaints Adjudication Board, 
undated.  
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
246 
the King Shaka Day commemoration at Taylor’s Halt on 25 September 1988, Buthelezi 
indicated that he was pessimistic about the potential of the Joint Declaration to succeed as he 
announced that he was ‘poised to drive towards unity…but there were factors that incite our 
people to more and more self-lacerating violence.’47 In addition, lack of funding, the inability 
of the Board to have a dedicated coordinator, and displacement of witnesses were other 
factors that paralysed its functioning to such an extent that it collapsed.48 By the time Gwala 
was released, Archbishop Denis Hurley and Jay Naidoo had approached Buthelezi in an 
attempt to calm Inkatha-UDF violence in the Pietermaritzburg region.49  
As all attempts to curb violence crumbled, various explanations were offered for the 
seemingly intractable conflict. The leadership of the UDF and COSATU attributed violence 
to the ‘emergent trend of warlords in Pietermaritzburg and Natal’ who wanted ‘complete 
control and identified with violence in each area.’50 A contrary view was offered by Gavin 
Woods, director of the Inkatha Institute, a think-tank that was established by Buthelezi with 
donor funding. He argued that violence was a product of frustrated youth in the townships 
because they felt ‘alienated and anxious due to the absence of a future purpose.’51 Woods 
based his claim on the unfounded observation that 90% of all types of violence was 
perpetrated by youth aged between 15 and 24 years who were deeply frustrated about their 
lives and the poverty they lived in, which manifested as anger and aggression. In addition, 
Woods also claimed that 50% of violence was driven by gangsterism and criminal elements 
                                                 
47 SAHA, AL2431, UDF Collection, box 29, address by M. G. Buthelezi during the King Shaka Day commemoration, 
Taylor’s Halt, 25 September 1988.  
48 SAHA, AL2421, Natal Indian Congress Collection, 01.5 to 01.10, box 7, file 2, letter from Alec Erwin to Jay Naidoo, 
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that operated in the name of a political body.52 His theoretical interpretations ignored the role 
of political formations in violence such as Inkatha, UDF and COSATU.  
William Beinart, Gerhard Mare′  and John Wright offered interpretations that are very 
different to those offered by Woods.53 They argued that the violence that unfolded in 
KwaZulu and Natal could be separated from the political developments of the regions, 
especially the rise of Inkatha, its vigilantism and the emergence of an insurrectionary 
‘comrades’ movement in the 1980s.54 Furthermore, their interpretations situated the 
upheavals in Natal, KwaZulu and other areas in South Africa within the context of long-
established historical patterns of violence in the region. The problems of ‘tribal’ explanations 
were that they were based on assumptions that Zulus are predisposed to be warlike and that 
the crisis was generated from below.  
Nkosinathi Gwala (as Blade Nzimande was known as) extended earlier arguments by Beinart, 
Mare′ and Wright as he attributed violence to Inkatha’s attempts to spread its ‘hegemony to 
the rest of Natal and KwaZulu.’55 In the case of Pietermaritzburg, especially Edendale, 
Nkosinathi Gwala argued that, since the banning of the ANC, no political party had had a 
strong hold in the area and neither Inkatha nor UDF could claim to be in the majority. He 
argued that the real spark which ignited conflict was Inkatha’s forcible recruitment which 
terrorised Edendale and other townships in the Natal Midlands.56  
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53 W. Beinart, ‘Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
Vol. 18, No. 3, 1992; G. Mare, ‘History and Dimension of the Violence in Natal: Inkatha’s Role in Negotiating Political 
Peace’, Social Justice, Vol.18, No. 1, 1991, 186-208; Mare′ and Wright, ‘Ethnicity, Society and Conflict’.  
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Gwala’s approach, which was supported by the broader leadership of the ANC and 
Communist Party, was that violence was unacceptable and that the UDF and COSATU 
supporters should not be involved in violent confrontation with Inkatha.57 In addition, 
Gwala’s militant approach of the 1960s had become more moderate and he was optimistic 
that a peaceful solution was possible.58 He denounced Buthelezi’s view of localising violence 
to Natal and its ethnic interpretation as simplistic and argued that it was orchestrated by the 
ruling apartheid elites to frustrate the liberation project. He emphasised that: 
The ANC believed in peaceful solutions of problems. Now this violence, 
which is not only confined to Natal, is violence that is unfortunate. 
Because we do not want the people to fight among themselves and forget 
the primary objective, the real source of the problem.59  
Harry Gwala argued that political formations in Natal were different to that of other regions 
in South Africa. He emphasised that the situation was unique in Natal and KwaZulu since 
there was a single unified tribal group, the Zulu nation.60 He posited that when the apartheid 
government developed the bantustans, there was dividing line between the KwaZulu 
government, the Zulu royal family and Inkatha. When the violence started, Gwala argued that 
it assumed its own peculiarity that had an ethnic undertone, yet Inkatha represented ruling 
class interests.61 He disputed the analysis of the Inkatha Institute that located violence within 
the domain of criminality. Instead he argued that violence in Natal, and other areas in South 
Africa, was a political outcome that was perpetuated by the apartheid government. For him, 
there was no conflict between ‘Inkatha and ANC, instead the conflict was between apartheid 
on one side, which did not want the people to advance, and the people on the other side, who 
were trying to liberate themselves.’62 Gwala maintained that an organisation like Inkatha was 
                                                 
57 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
58 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala. 
59 Thomas Karis interview with Harry Gwala.   
60 RIM-UWC Mayibuye Archives, Harry Gwala interview, EP 1 & 5.  
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62 Padraig O’Malley, interview with Harry Gwala, 8 January 1993. 
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being used as a ‘pawn by the ruling class in the country to uphold apartheid institutions’, and 
regarded Buthelezi as an ‘instrument of apartheid.’63 Two days after his release, Gwala 
emphasised that the killings were an ‘ugly aspect of the revolution’ and that talks were vital.64 
Gwala’s stance on violence underwent a metamorphosis after his release from prison as he 
was exposed to material conditions of brutality that were orchestrated by Inkatha and 
police.65 Cassius Lubisi believes that Gwala’s exposure to ‘sites of death where people had 
been hacked and mass burials’ had an impact on his understanding of the context of 
violence.66 He felt that there was a need to protect the people against Inkatha’s brutal attacks. 
During the funerals and UDF rallies he began to adopt militant rhetoric which emphasised 
that people must defend themselves and retaliate against Inkatha attacks. By the end of 
December 1989, the relationship between Gwala and Buthelezi had become antagonistic as 
the two leaders began to criticise each other publicly during political rallies. While Gwala 
perceived Buthelezi and Inkatha to be ‘apartheid proxies’, Buthelezi claims he does not 
remember having a fall out with Gwala and he was surprised when he heard Gwala criticising 
him on public platforms.67  
Gwala described violence in Pietermaritzburg as a war. Unlike Buthelezi who characterised it 
as ‘black on black violence’, Gwala argued that it was ‘a war between apartheid and the 
people that was taking different forms.’68 Furthermore, he rejected the argument that 
characterised violence as ‘black on black’ as ‘racist to the core.’69 Lubisi argues that Gwala 
‘did not subscribe to the notion of the third force.’70 Instead, Gwala’s view was that there 
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were two sides, the side of liberation fighters who sought to liberate South Africa, and the 
side of the enemy, the apartheid regime. According to Gwala, it was clear that Inkatha was on 
the side of apartheid.  Gwala interpreted violence of the later 1980s and 1990s as a 
continuation of the violent nature of the state which manifested itself through forced 
removals, detention, imprisonment and torture, something he and other political leaders 
experienced from the 1960s. It was in that context that he believed that calling to people to 
defend themselves was in line with the declaration by the 1985 Kabwe ANC conference 
which persuaded South Africans to make the country ungovernable.71 
Gwala formulated a new political epistemology and a framework of critiquing violence. For 
him, while violence was a tool of the ruling class, for it to be justified, it had to be driven by 
collective demands and should thus be a collective action.72 Mzala (as Jabulani Nxumalo was 
known) argued that Gwala ‘saw violence in Natal as an expression of the problems in South 
Africa.’73 Gwala’s understanding of the role of violence in the process of the destruction of 
colonial order was different to that of Frantz Fanon. Unlike Fanon, Gwala did not believe that 
‘decolonisation [should] always [be] a violent phenomenon.’74 While Fanon believed that 
violence was a tool for building nationalism, Gwala despised its destructive nature, yet 
utilised it to protect his supporters against Inkatha’s aggression. Gwala’s theoretical 
interpretations of violence seems rather to have been similar to that of Amilcar Cabral, who 
never saw violence as an end in itself.75 Gwala’s attitude towards violence should be 
understood within the context of self-defence and self-protection as Inkatha had resorted to 
aggression in order to prevent the UDF’s support base from growing. Like Cabral, Gwala’s 
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method of retaliation, meeting violence with violence, was a necessary step for oppressed 
people seeking their self-determination and the destruction of the apartheid state. Lubisi 
argues that Gwala’s notion of violence was influenced by the material conditions of what he 
had witnessed in Natal after his release from prison in November 1988.76 Gwala’s statement 
that ‘we don’t want war, we don’t want death but war is imposed upon us’ indicated the 
extent to which he saw violence as an inevitable part of ending apartheid with specific ways 
of responding to it being necessary.77  
Harry Gwala’s views were that violence would not provide a solution. But he viewed it as a 
political struggle to identify and isolate his opponents, Inkatha and eventually the South 
African government. He often reminded his supporters that the ANC was a political 
organisation with the aim of liberating South Africa, not a military force. In addition, he 
emphasised that the ANC had to overthrow the National Party because ‘it was responsible for 
stoking the violence as it supplied weapons and support to Inkatha when it was attacking 
ANC areas.’78 Gwala believed that apartheid and capitalism were founded on the premise of a 
violence project that sought to pit the members of the working class against each other, thus 
perpetuating class disconnection.79 Despite the escalating brutality, he believed that there was 
still a possibility to ‘negotiate with Inkatha to end the violence, [as] it [would be] one of the 
good steps in the direction of eliminating apartheid.’80  
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The revival of ANC branches and ambiguities of peace in Natal  
After Gwala’s release from prison, his home became a place of meeting for UDF/ COSATU-
aligned supporters and victims of violence in Edendale. By January 1989, he was visiting 
areas in greater Pietermaritzburg and Natal that were affected by violence. As his influence 
grew in the Natal’s politics, Gwala was invited by Nelson Mandela for a visit to Victor 
Verster Prison at his ‘nearest possible convenience.’81 Gwala, accompanied by Linda Zama 
and Lulu, undertook the visit on 5 May 1989.82 During the meeting, which lasted for four 
hours, Mandela informed Gwala that he had been approached by members of the De Klerk 
cabinet to consider initiating negotiations.83 Gwala claimed to have been ‘disturbed by 
Mandela’s approach’ because he believed that his prison conditions would not enable him to 
engage in an unbiased manner.84 Perhaps, the brutality of the state police and allegations that 
Inkatha had orchestrated the Trust Feed Massacre on 3 December 1988 had an impact on 
Gwala’s perception that Mandela might not have the recent understanding of violence during 
negotiations.85  
There is no doubt that violence and the deteriorating situation in Natal was part of the 
discussion as Mandela’s letter to Linda Zama, five days after the meeting, emphasised that 
‘our people, especially those in Natal, should seriously consider the question of security for 
Mphephethe [Gwala].’86 The prospects of establishing a peace settlement and negotiations 
                                                 
81 RIM-UWC Mayibuye Archives, MCH 31, IDAF collection, box 374, correspondence from Nelson Mandela to Harry 
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374, flights tickets of South African Airways.  
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with the apartheid state were discussed extensively during the visit.87 While Gwala did not 
disagree with Mandela on the necessity of ending violence, it appeared that the volatile 
conditions in Pietermaritzburg coupled with Inkatha’s aggression left Gwala in a state of 
ambiguity as the demands to ‘defend’ UDF and COSATU supporters grew rapidly.88 As 
Bonnin has argued, the patterns of violence shifted as it became more deadly as the KZP, 
which overtly supported Inkatha, took over policing in townships.89 Moreover, by mid-1989, 
it became apparent that the KZP was facilitating the licensing and provision of G5 machine 
guns for Inkatha supporters. Gwala’s connection with the unfolding events in the greater 
Pietermaritzburg areas and elsewhere in Natal and Zululand made him to choose to ‘protect’ 
supporters of the UDF and COSATU while he was considering how Mandela’s peace might 
take effect.90  
While Gwala was still caught in the dilemma of choosing whether to endorse peace or adopt a 
protective stance, he became a victim of police violence during the funeral of a trade unionist, 
Mrs Jabu Ndlovu, at Mountain Rise cemetery. Gwala was part of the crowd that was 
sjamboked by members of the South African Police which had imposed severe restrictions on 
supporters of the UDF and COSATU.91 Despite the SAP’s denial, Dr Motala, a medical 
doctor and a leader of the NIC in Pietermaritzburg, examined Gwala and confirmed that ‘he 
had sjambok wounds and [had been] severely beaten in his back and had an injury above the 
knee’, possibly as a result of falling during the incident.92 In an attempt to vilify the state and 
to garner public sympathy, Gwala called a media meeting and explained how he had been 
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http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
254 
sjamboked and showed ‘his bruises’ to the public.93 Furthermore, he instructed Linda Zama 
to sue the SAP for damages and loss of dignity. It appeared that Linda Zama did lodge 
charges against the state on 4 October 1989.94 By mid-1990 the matter was reported as ‘not 
finalised’ and there are no archival documents that indicate what the outcome of the case 
was.95  
The announcement by F. W. de Klerk on 2 February 1990 that government would unban the 
liberation movements and unconditionally release Nelson Mandela necessitated a shift in the 
ANC’s approach as it now had to operate as a legal organisation inside South Africa with 
branches and organisational processes, something it last had during the late 1950s. The major 
challenge was to re-launch the organisation and make necessary preparations to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement and design a new political dispensation. Harry Gwala had already 
assumed leadership of UDF and COSATU affiliates in Pietermaritzburg, despite not being 
elected to any leadership position. Months before the unbanning, Gwala had initiated the 
process of preparing the ANC to operate as a legal organisation. Makhosi Khoza remembered 
that, at the end of 1989, Gwala persuaded her not to leave Pietermaritzburg so that she could 
assist in opening an ANC office, which was initially run from his house.96 After the 
unbanning of the ANC, Gwala began to broaden his political approach as he occupied 
himself with mobilising grassroots support for the ANC in the greater Pietermaritzburg area 
and in Natal more broadly. It was through the ANC office that Gwala began a process of 
encouraging the youth to establish ANC and Communist Party branches throughout Natal and 
KwaZulu. ANC branches were launched in Dambuza, Machibisa, Ashdown, Imbali, Sobantu, 
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Mpumalanga township, Wembezi, Swayimane, KwaXimba and many other areas soon after 
the unbanning of the ANC. Because violence continued unabated, Gwala had to provide 
‘protection’ for the emerging ANC branches and its supporters.  
The release of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990 marked a turning point in the politics of 
Natal and of South Africa. Mandela’s choice to hold his first political rally at King’s Park 
Stadium in Durban on 25 February was an indication of how important the leadership of the 
ANC considered Natal to be. At a packed stadium, Mandela’s message to the supporters of 
the ANC was to ‘take your guns, your knives, and your pangas, and throw them into the sea. 
Close down the factories of war, end the violence now.’97 Gwala was present at the rally as 
part of the leadership of the ANC in Natal. While he supported the idea of a peaceful 
settlement to end violence, he did not approve of Mandela’s call to throw weapons into the 
sea.98 Gwala emphasised that the ANC supporters had no weapons; instead it was Inkatha 
that had distributed weapons to its supporters, and it had the backing of the KZP.99 Perhaps, 
as Lubisi contends, Mandela’s decision to call for peace was because ‘the ANC leadership on 
Robben Island had misunderstood what was happening in Natal and had a relatively positive 
disposition towards Buthelezi.’100  
The attention that the ANC leadership gave Natal seemed to suggest that ending the violence 
was one of its top priorities. By the end of February 1990 there was speculation in the media 
about a possible meeting between Buthelezi and Mandela. Buthelezi emphasised that such a 
meeting would not be an unusual phenomenon since ‘Mandela and I were old family friends 
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and his visit would be natural expression of that friendship.’101 When the leadership of the 
UDF and COSATU in Natal questioned Mandela about this, he argued that it was important 
to talk to Buthelezi so that he could not be used by the apartheid state against the ANC. In 
addition, Mandela mentioned Buthelezi’s history with the ANC Youth League, and he 
emphasised his belief that the ANC and Buthelezi should work together.102 Nevertheless, 
Mandela’s visit to KwaPhindangene, Buthelezi’s royal homestead, did not materialise. Even 
though the meeting did not ‘go ahead as planned’, talks of reconciliation between Buthelezi 
and Mandela continued. Gwala claimed that these talks were facilitated by the national 
leadership of the ANC in Shell House (the national ANC headquarters) without consulting 
with the regional leadership of Natal and Zululand.103  
As arrangements for a possible peace initiative between Buthelezi and Mandela were being 
made, the Edendale and Vulindlela areas reverberated with gunfire on 25 March 1990. 
Inkatha supporters returning from a political rally at King’s Park in Durban began to attack 
ANC supporters. This marked the beginning of the ‘Seven Days War’ which only ended on 
31 March.104 As the war was raging, Gwala insisted on witnessing the war for himself rather 
than to be informed by the accounts of others. Lubisi remembers that in Ashdown, Gwala 
was nearly killed by heavily-armed Inkatha vigilantes shooting and moving in his 
direction.105 As bullets flew past him, Gwala had to be physically taken away from the 
battlefield as he insisted that ‘let’s not go, if we die let’s all die here.’106 By the seventh day, 
31 March, about 100 people had been killed and over 20 000 people were seeking refuge in 
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churches, church halls and schools in the Edendale area and in refugee camps that had been 
set up by the newly established Midlands Crisis Relief Committee. The Seven Days War had 
a significant impact on Gwala and he adopted ‘a much harder line in regard to Inkatha.’107 
The war also reinforced Gwala’s perception that violence was due to Inkatha aggression. He 
argued that the ‘people of Edendale valley have never gone out of their boundaries to attack 
Inkatha, they have always defended themselves and as I said we shall defend ourselves 
successfully, we will give them a hot reception.’108 
By mid-1990, relations between Gwala and Buthelezi had deteriorated to such an extent that 
Gwala claimed to have received information from ANC intelligence that a hit squad from 
Ulundi had been dispatched to assassinate him and Patrick ‘Terror’ Lekota, who was a 
convener of the Southern Natal ANC. Buthelezi described these allegations as ‘ludicrous in 
the extreme, devoid of truth and can only cause more violence in an already overheated 
situation.’109 Gwala’s lawyers, possibly Linda Zama, indicated that Gwala’s life was under 
threat after family members claimed to have seen a red car with four occupants, two of them 
white, apparently keeping Gwala’s Dambuza house under ‘surveillance.’110 However, during 
the interview I had with Buthelezi he claimed that he did not know what had caused such 
poor relations between him and Gwala. Buthelezi emphasised that he had been friends with 
Gwala for a long time and denied having ever been involved in an attempt to kill Gwala or 
even to have felt any hatred towards him.111 
Towards the end of June 1990, the ANC claimed that, despite attempts to initiate a peaceful 
settlement in Natal, these had been ‘repeatedly scuttled by the leadership of Inkatha and the 
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apartheid regime.’112 Gwala convinced the ANC national leadership that the war in Natal was 
a national political issue which could only be resolved by putting pressure on the national 
government to end it, since regional attempts had failed. It was against this background that a 
week of a national mass action was planned from 2 to 6 July 1990, which culminated in a 
national rally in Pietermaritzburg on Saturday, 7 July. The national mass action drew major 
crowds in Durban and Johannesburg, but the rally in Pietermaritzburg became the epicentre 
of events on the day as Gwala and Anton ‘Mfenendala’ Xaba led about 10 000 demonstrators 
in a march for peace. The march started at Market Square (now called Freedom Square) and 
proceeded to the Loop Street police station where a memorandum was handed over to 
Captain Stef Steyn who represented the district commissioner.113 The memorandum 
contained complaints about the way in which the SAP had handled violence. It accused the 
SAP of giving direct assistance to Inkatha vigilantes, and failing to investigate crimes and 
assaults against ANC supporters. 
As relations between Buthelezi and the regional ANC leaders in Natal, mainly Gwala and 
Archie Gumede, deteriorated, Buthelezi drifted towards building good relations with Mandela 
and the national leadership of the ANC. The ANC national executive committee had already 
established a sub-committee on Natal in July 1990, chaired by John Nkadimeng, whose task 
was to ‘work towards finding a solution to the violence in Natal.’114 Nkadimeng’s sub-
committee and a delegation of Inkatha, led by Dr Frank Mdlalose, established the Joint 
Working Committee whose role was to prepare for a joint summit to be held in January 1991 
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between the ANC and Inkatha, which had re-established itself in July 1990 as the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP).115  
The joint summit took place on 29 January 1991 in Durban and was attended by Central 
Committee members of the IFP and the National Executive Committee of the ANC, led by 
Buthelezi and Mandela respectively.116 At the end, a joint statement emphasised that ‘the 
primary purpose was to explore ways and means to bring about the final cessation of the 
violence which had already cost more than eight thousand lives.’117 In addition, the parties 
committed themselves to a joint declaration that emphasised the principles of promoting 
political tolerance, desisting from vilification and freedom of political activity, as well as the 
establishment of joint mechanisms to promote peace and stability through organising joint 
tours to affected areas.118 Gwala did not attend the summit for reasons which are not clear.  
The signing of the ANC-IFP joint declaration did not curtail the escalation of violence in the 
greater Pietermaritzburg areas as Inkatha, supported by both KZP and SAP, continued to 
attack ANC supporters who retaliated with violence.119 It was the brutal assassination of 
Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo on 25 February 1991, less than a month after the signing of 
a Peace Accord, that fuelled Gwala’s militancy. Maphumulo had been president of the 
Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) and a local chief in 
Mkhambathini area. A subsequent affidavit by Sipho Madlala, an intelligence agent who 
claimed to have participated in the orchestrated assassination of Chief Maphumulo, was an 
indication of the extent of the state’s involvement in violence in Pietermaritzburg.120 
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Maphumulo had been a close friend of Harry Gwala and together they were working towards 
the establishment of an ANC branch in Maqongqo. Jill Kelly argues that, before his 
assassination, Chief Maphumulo had already turned from an attitude of peace to one of arms 
and self-defence.121 Kelly attributed this to Gwala’s influence and his first-hand experience of 
the government’s inability or unwillingness to enforce law and order, and the police 
kitskonstabel122 attacks on his homestead.123  
Throughout 1991 there was evidence that the IFP was still collaborating with the SAP to 
attack ANC supporters. The affidavit of Wilford Mncwabe revealed the details of Inkatha 
attacks on ANC supporters in areas around Bulwer. When Mncwabe attempted to report an 
attack on his house and its burning, Sergeant Dickson of the Bulwer police station asked him 
which political party he belonged to. When Mncwabe informed him that he was a member of 
the ANC, Dickson’s reaction revealed an attitude against the ANC and that the SAP was 
complicit in fuelling violence in Natal. In his affidavit, Mncwabe said: 
He [Dickson] said to me that my house was burnt because I was a member 
of the ANC and he refused to take a statement from me. He went on to say 
that he was glad that my house was burnt. He said that he did not want to 
see me in Bulwer again, he said that as all my property was burnt I had no 
reason to be in Bulwer.124 
Perhaps reports of the escalating violence and police bias against ANC supporters 
exasperated Gwala and made him pessimistic about the prospect of the joint declaration 
succeeding.125  
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By mid-1991, in keeping with the agreed resolution, Buthelezi invited Mandela to address an 
IFP political rally in Taylor’s Halt in Vulindlela where attacks by IFP supporters on the ANC, 
driven largely by David Ntombela, had continued. Lubisi remembers that after it had become 
known that Mandela and the national ANC leadership had accepted Buthelezi’s invitation, 
Gwala organised taxi loads of his supporters, mainly the youth, to Shell House to oppose 
such a joint address as violence continued unabated.126 Gwala’s concern was that such a joint 
address had the potential to strengthen the IFP’s legitimacy by bestowing equal status on the 
IFP and the ANC. Mandela agreed to rebuff Buthelezi’s invitation. He insisted that he and a 
delegation of senior members of the ANC would visit Pietermaritzburg in order to observe 
first-hand the conditions that Gwala described.127 Buthelezi claims to have been disappointed 
when he received a message that Mandela would not be attending the joint rally after having 
been ‘almost manhandled by Gwala at Shell House.’128  
The paradox of increasing violence while peace negotiations were taking place demonstrated 
‘elite coalescence’ of the peace processes.129 While Mandela and Buthelezi were engaging in 
talks about signing a peace accord at joint rallies, Gwala’s reservations about these initiatives 
were being ignored, which was an attempt to isolate him. Perhaps, Mandela underestimated 
Gwala’s influence in the political landscape of Natal.  
Militancy, warlordism and Gwala’s political discomfort  
In April 1990, the ANC national leadership announced the appointment of convenors to head 
its regional offices in each of the organisation’s major districts. Gwala was appointed 
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convenor for the Natal Midlands.130 It was through Gwala’s leadership that the ANC in 
Pietermaritzburg established an interim committee and opened offices in May 1990 in Church 
Street in the centre of Pietermaritzburg.131 The committee had to deal with specific issues 
such as political education, finance and recruitment of new members to the ANC.132 The 
interim committee’s major tasks were to build the membership of the ANC in the Natal 
Midlands and to facilitate the establishment of ANC branches which would lead to a regional 
elective conference later in the year. The elective conference was held in Cedara on 2 
December 1990. Gwala received an overwhelming majority of votes and became the first 
chairperson of the regional executive.133 His election meant that grassroots political structures 
of the ANC and Communist Party in the Natal Midlands, Zululand and greater Natal were 
represented in the official regional ANC structure.  
The election of Gwala as chairperson of the ANC’s Midlands region coincided with 
increasing attacks by Inkatha on the ANC’s support base and, Gwala had to find ways to 
‘defend’ ANC supporters. Michael Worsnip, then lecturer at the Federal Theological Seminar 
of Southern Africa (FEDSEM), was working as an underground operative to mobilise the 
churches and be a conduit for funding of ANC-related activities in Natal.134 Worsnip 
remembers establishing contact with Gwala as soon as he was released and was inspired by 
his commitment to non-racialism. Worsnip travelled between the Pietermaritzburg and 
Johannesburg offices of the SACC to collect money from Beyers Naude.135 The money was 
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used by Gwala to buy weapons from Mozambique and sometimes Swaziland.136 Once Gwala 
had been elected as a leader of the Natal Midlands ANC, a highly influential political position 
in Natal, the responsibility to protect ANC supporters fell on him. Worsnip asserts that he had 
witnessed SAP and KZP distributing weapons to IFP supporters. Worsnip elaborates: 
What Gwala was doing and there is no doubt in my mind that he was 
defending us. He was defending people who were not Inkatha. I think that 
must never be forgotten. Because if it was not for Gwala, we would have 
been finished. We were living in dangerous times and had it not been the 
ANC, an armed ANC fighting for us we would all have been dead.137 
The role of the ANC in the violence that was unfolding in Natal and elsewhere in the country 
was an axis of incongruous relations between Gwala and Mandela. Gwala’s stance on 
violence in Natal put him at loggerheads with Mandela, who had been elected as Deputy 
President of the ANC on 2 April 1990. As discussed earlier, Gwala and Mandela respectively 
represented opposing socialist and nationalist political views in the ANC.138 These divergent 
political views had resulted in endless robust debates within the ANC on Robben Island 
during the late 1970s. The nature and the extent of political differences between Gwala and 
Mandela were highlighted in the South African media and in state intelligence agent reports 
as it ‘was in their interests to articulate differences within the ANC.’139 Ben Martins is 
emphatic that even though the relationship between Gwala and Mandela appeared to have 
been extremely polarised, this disagreement was at a theoretical and political level and did 
not degenerate into the personal animosity that was reported by the media.140 For Martins, the 
reportage about the deteriorating relations between Gwala and Mandela was intended to 
divide the ANC and misdirect the liberation struggle. 
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As Worsnip has argued, the on-going political violence required Gwala to respond by taking 
steps to defend ANC supporters. During the Workers’ Day rally on 1 May 1990, Gwala 
warned the government that the armed struggle would continue, but did not discount the 
possibility of a peaceful settlement.141 It was in this context that he established links with 
networks in Mozambique to purchase weapons to be utilised by ANC members to defend 
themselves against IFP attacks.142 Gwala had anticipated that once the ANC was unbanned, 
members of MK would come to defend ANC supporters in violent parts of Natal. To this end, 
he facilitated the deployment of a large number of MK operatives in Natal and Zululand to 
assist ANC supporters to defend themselves against the IFP. The IFP was sponsored by state 
forces including operatives trained in Caprivi.143 Gwala was, however, ‘taken back by the 
ANC’s decision to suspend the armed struggle.’144 For Gwala, at that stage, arms were 
necessary for self-defence, and to maintain the ANC’s connectedness with the people.  
Ben Martins remembers that Gwala was very critical of the process that had been followed by 
the national leadership’s decision to suspend the armed struggle. Gwala would have preferred 
for such a decision to be taken after consultation with ANC branches and with a final 
decision taken by delegates at an ANC consultative conference. It was against this 
background that the national leadership dispatched Chris Hani, commander in chief of MK, 
to visit Gwala to explain to him the context of the decision.145 Gwala strongly believed that 
Mandela, including the national leadership, did not understand the objective conditions on the 
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ground in Natal, which led them to a different understanding of how to deal with Buthelezi 
and the IFP.146 
Ben Martins has argued that Gwala understood that MK was merely an extension of a 
political struggle and took its direction from the ANC, so such a decision could not be 
questioned.147 However, he suggests further, that although the ANC leadership had taken a 
decision to cease armed operations against the apartheid government, particularities of 
Pietermaritzburg necessitated a different approach. Gwala and the local leadership of the 
ANC in Pietermaritzburg agreed that the suspension of the armed struggle did not mean the 
‘suspension of their right to self-defence.’148  
In March 1991, Gwala was reported to have survived two assassination attempts. The first 
attempt took place in Richmond where he was addressing a rally and the second attempt took 
place in Pietermaritzburg.149 It was within this context that in May 1992, despite the decision 
of the national leadership of the ANC to suspend the armed struggle and pursue peace, Gwala 
and Lekota authorised the establishment of self-defence units (SDUs).150 The state 
intelligence interpreted the establishment of the SDUs as Gwala’s plan to ‘destabilise 
KwaZulu and the Inkatha Freedom Party, as well as the safety of Buthelezi.’151  
State intelligence agents reported that Gwala and Lekota were the two key personalities 
involved in the training of SDUs in the Natal Midlands and Durban regions.152 Perhaps 
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Gwala’s level of involvement was at the point of instructing that they be established rather 
than being ‘involved’ in training. Training was undertaken by trained MK cadres who were 
under Gwala’s leadership. There was no doubt that state intelligence intended to implicate 
Gwala in violence in order to discredit him and vilify the ANC in front of a growing number 
of supporters in Natal.153 Gwala and Lekota mainly recruited youth for SDU training by an 
experienced MK cadre to provide protection to ANC supporters when they were attacked by 
IFP militias. In addition, SDUs were established to provide extra protection after the 1994 
general elections as an increased violence was expected.154 As Mamdani has pointed out, 
militias of this kind lack military discipline and are motivated by revenge.155  
State intelligence agents were aware that the decision to establish SDUs was never approved 
by the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC). Based on this observation, they claimed 
that Gwala was ‘operating independently in Natal and had established his private army.’156 
This claim was based on an illusion of homogeneity in the ANC. Ben Martins has argued that 
certain individuals within the national executive committee had supported the establishment 
of SDUs.157 It was possible that Gwala leveraged his election to the NEC in July 1991 to 
lobby certain members to support the SDU project.  
Prior to mid-1992, violence monitors and media commentators had consistently attributed 
violence to the IFP and its warlords such as David Ntombela, Mandla Shabalala, Psychology 
Ndlovu, Calalakubo Khawula, Wiseman Nkehli, and many others, and ANC supporters and 
its leaders were perceived to be victims of Inkatha’s aggression. However, as Gwala’s 
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speeches became more ‘inflammatory’ and he consistently called on ANC supporters to 
retaliate, he was increasingly viewed as someone who was ‘fuelling the conflict and 
thwarting the peace initiative.’158 By mid-1992 Gwala’s name was intrinsically associated 
with SDUs and violent activities that were taking place in Pietermaritzburg. As the violence 
intensified, Gwala became more militant. Oral interviews suggest that Gwala was responsible 
for facilitating the movement of large caches of arms from the Swaziland border into 
Natal.159 Due to his militant rhetoric as well as his involvement in defending ANC supporters, 
the media began to label him as a warlord, with the London’s Daily Telegraph listing him as 
one of the world’s top 30 warlords.160  
There was no doubt that Gwala’s use of the phrase ‘kuzokhala isigwagwa’, his militant 
political stance in favour of violence, and his involvement in the shipment of caches of arms 
into Natal and their distribution to SDUs were the main reasons why he was labelled a 
warlord. However, as Haswell argues, Gwala was protecting ANC supporters and he did what 
any other leader in his position would have done in the context of the material conditions in 
Natal.161 It is not accurate to describe Gwala as a warlord. While his conduct was militant, it 
was a proportionate response to the attacks on ANC supporters by Inkatha. Intelligence 
reports that Gwala had, with support from Blade Nzimande, established a private military 
force in the Natal Midlands, which was not subject to the control of the ANC national 
leadership, were unfounded. Control over the SDUs was exerted by the collective leadership 
of the ANC region and branches.162 Andrew Ragavaloo, an ANC activist and a former mayor 
of Richmond, has argued that Sifiso Nkabinde, once Gwala’s trusted political friend and an 
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ANC leader in Richmond, took advantage of the SDU and ‘used these trained youths for his 
own nefarious activities.’163  
During the early 1990s Gwala’s politics were characterised by political ambiguity and he 
often disagreed with the conventional views of the leadership of the ANC, COSATU and 
Communist Party. One such ambiguity was displayed during the 48th conference of the ANC 
at the University of Durban-Westville from 4-7 July 1991. During the conference, Mandela 
was announced as the unopposed candidate for election as president of the ANC.164 However, 
the position of deputy president was highly contested. Chris Hani and Thabo Mbeki were 
nominated, and both had similarly levels of delegate support. Because the Hani/Mbeki 
contest had the potential to split the ANC, the elders, including Gwala, requested the 
conference to adjourn. Walter Sisulu, who had already indicated that he wanted to spend his 
political time in his region, was persuaded to make himself available as a compromise 
candidate for the deputy presidency. Kgalema Motlanthe remembers that, even though Gwala 
had assisted in crafting the agreement to put Sisulu forward as the sole candidate for deputy 
president, Gwala decided to make himself available as a candidate for the post.165 Motlanthe 
confronted Gwala about this as they walked to the conference venue. Gwala emphatically 
stated: 
you know, 80% of the delegates to this conference have never attended an 
ANC conference. This is their very first conference of the ANC. And so, if 
we don't teach them by example that the constitution of the ANC, which 
says, every member has a right to nominate whomsoever and be 
nominated in any position…because if we don't teach them by example 
now, by the time we get to fourth, fifth congress after this one, leadership 
of the ANC would not be elected but arranged. That is what he said. So, he 
then crowned it all by saying, “in fact, I am going to vote for Walter 
Sisulu myself.”166 
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However, the media and certain leaders within the ANC misunderstood Gwala’s political 
stance on this matter and created an impression that, by making himself available as a 
candidate, his intention was to refuse to defer to the decisions of the national leadership of the 
ANC.  
Gwala’s robust theoretical and intellectual debates became another source of contentious 
relations with the leadership of the ANC, especially Mandela. The media and state 
intelligence deliberately created false impressions that political differences had degenerated 
into personal hatred between Gwala and Mandela. While it was not unusual that the two 
leaders held divergent political views and disagreed with each other publicly, this did not 
necessarily manifest as personal animosity or divisive factionalism.167 Intelligence agents 
reported that Mandela had requested Gwala to stand down as a regional leader of the ANC in 
the Natal Midlands since he had been elected to the NEC of the ANC in 1991. This was not 
necessarily a result of what was described as their reported ‘frosty’ relationship. It was based 
on the constitution of the ANC which required that members who had been elected to the 
NEC resign from other junior positions within the organisation.168  
The modalities of political transition and negotiated settlement became another strongly 
contested matter within the ANC and Communist Party. Gwala claimed to have heard about 
the negotiations for the first time when he visited Mandela in prison on 5 May 1989.169 
Furthermore, when he went to London to undergo a medical procedure, O. R. Tambo 
approached him to discuss the prospect of negotiations and Tambo asked him to comment on 
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the draft Harare Declaration before it was sent out for comment from a wider group.170 After 
it had been considered by the ANC’s National Working Committee (NWC), the Harare 
Declaration was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity’s Ad Hoc Committee on 
Southern Africa on 21 August 1989. A revised version was later approved by the United 
Nations General Assembly in December 1989.171 Gwala said he was approached later in 
London by Thabo Mbeki who spoke of the approach to the ANC by the South African 
government and the pressure to produce a roadmap for negotiations. On his way back to 
South Africa he had been invited by the Zambian President and the ANC’s National 
Executive Committee that was meeting in Lusaka to provide an overview of conditions in 
South Africa. Gwala used the platform to speak about the high levels of state-sponsored 
violence he had witnessed in Pietermaritzburg and parts of the Transvaal and the Western 
Cape.  
Gwala had been sceptical about negotiations planned for the Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa (CODESA), as he argued that peace should be a prerequisite for any 
negotiations to take place. CODESA was unable to reach consensus by May 1992, despite 
having established working groups that met regularly. The escalating political tensions 
resulted in the Boipatong massacre on 17 June 1992 which claimed the lives of 45 people. 
This resulted in the formal suspension of talks. Gwala was present at the Bisho massacre in 
which 28 ANC members were shot dead on 7 September 1992. Perhaps his direct experience 
of the Bisho massacre made Gwala conclude that ‘nothing good would come out of 
negotiations and they needed to use action not words to gain power that they rightly 
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deserve.’172 After the CODESA negotiations had collapsed, the ANC NWC decided to 
establish a new mechanism for communicating with the government which was led by Cyril 
Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer, representing the ANC and the National Party government 
respectively.173 This resulted in the establishment of multiparty negotiations which eventually 
paved the way for a negotiated settlement. By this time, Gwala’s politics seem to have 
undergone a metamorphosis as he began to agitate for peace while engaged in robust 
theoretical debates with the national leadership of the ANC, especially Mandela, and the 
Communist Party.  
One such robust debate was his response to Joe Slovo’s proposed ‘sunset clauses’ and the 
‘strategic perspective’ document which was discussed in the September 1992 NWC meeting 
of the ANC. This also appeared in the African Communist, the Communist Party journal, at 
the end of September. Slovo argued that negotiations were imperative as neither the apartheid 
state nor the liberation movement could win on the battlefield. The two parties should find 
each other in order to build a new South Africa.174 Gwala was critical of Slovo’s sunset 
clauses. He emphasised that, instead of rushing to settle a constitutional framework, the 
immediate need was to address the question of economic redistribution.175 Gwala’s criticism 
of the debate initiated by Slovo was that these proposals were a ‘top down approach’ with no 
mandate since they had not been discussed in ANC branches.176 Gwala was concerned that 
Slovo’s proposals for power-sharing represented a shift in the philosophical and political 
values of the struggle for the liberation in South Africa.  
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Gwala’s response, rooted in the historical analysis of the ANC’s liberation struggle since 
1912, emphasised that, even though the peculiarities of South African colonialism had been 
taken into consideration, there was a need to spell out the meaning of power-sharing and how 
it would impact on economic and land redistribution. For Gwala, Slovo appeared to have 
abdicated his class interests and opted to ‘trust the enemy’, referring to the South African 
government.177 Gwala warned Slovo, Mandela and the negotiating team of the ANC that 
‘they should not reconcile the oppressed to neo-apartheid dressed in the robes of a new 
constitution.’178  
Gwala stressed that the strength and the ability of the negotiators would determine the fate of 
South Africa. He warned against political expediency which, he said, would lead to disaster. 
He pleaded with the negotiators and Mandela not to lose sight of the importance of land 
redistribution as he emphatically stressed that unless the land question had been solved, 
nothing would have been settled.179 Slovo’s proposals were adopted by the ANC National 
Executive Committee in February 1993, while Gwala and the Natal Midlands ANC 
vehemently rejected them. Gwala, supported by Pierre Cronje, a member of the regional 
executive, labelled Slovo’s proposals as a ‘power sharing pact between the ANC and 
apartheid government’ and urged the ANC to convene a national consultative conference to 
seek endorsement from the branches.180 Nevertheless, an enigmatic Gwala conceded that, 
although he considered the National Executive Committee’s resolution to be unacceptable, he 
was bound by it. However, he committed himself to ‘try to persuade the NEC to rethink its 
position.’181  
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The growing disconnect between Gwala and the national leadership of both the ANC and 
Communist Party regarding the ANC’s position on negotiations seemed to have demoralised 
him to the extent that he contemplated retiring from politics at the end of 1993 in order to 
spend time with his grandchildren.182 It was his close friends, amongst them Robert Haswell, 
who urged Gwala to not to retire, arguing that ‘it would be tragic if the parliament of the new 
South Africa never gets to hear Gwala’.183 Haswell said: 
Gwala we won’t let you, we want you for the election, we want the whole 
country to hear you in the fullest. We want you to make the audience, as 
only you can, think seriously and constructively about their plight.184  
In the meantime, the intensification of violence in the Natal Midlands, especially the 
Mkhambathini area, including Maqongqo, seemed to have had an impact on Gwala’s position 
on negotiations with the IFP as he observed extreme levels of brutality and devastation. He 
made a call to the IFP leadership to ‘blaze a trail of peace through the Natal Midlands.’185 
This was after he had visited the war-torn Mkhambathini areas with Mandela, David 
Ntombela and other leaders of the National Party, IFP and ANC. After this visit, Gwala 
called for joint rallies between the ANC and IFP, a suggestion he had previously shot down 
in 1990. Nevertheless, Gwala’s call to ‘boys and girls to start taking shooting lessons’ at 
Ixobho indicated the extent of his political ambiguity and militancy.186 By June 1993, 
Mandela and Buthelezi had agreed to a meet and hold joint rallies. Notwithstanding the peace 
initiatives, Gwala emphatically stated that ‘I am still a man of war, I am at war with 
apartheid.’187 
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The stance that Gwala had taken on violence and negotiated settlement became a subject of 
discussion at the ANC’s National Working Committee meeting of 24 March 1993.188 
Mandela reported that he had a meeting with the Natal Midlands Regional Executive 
Committee (REC) about Gwala’s utterances. He described Gwala’s behaviour as ‘improper 
and undesirable.’189 He reported that he had appealed to Gwala to resign as chairperson and 
discussed the matter with other members of the REC who had given him an undertaking to 
encourage Gwala to resign or not to stand for re-election. However, during the regional 
elective conference in mid-April 1993, Gwala was re-elected as ANC Natal Midlands 
chairperson. This prompted the ANC leadership to request Gwala to choose between his 
position on the NEC and the region. Gwala, in pursuance of his politics of connectedness, 
chose to resign from the NEC to remain chairperson of the Natal Midlands ANC.  
By late 1993 the relationship between Gwala and the national leadership of both the ANC 
and Communist Party had deteriorated to the extent that he had to be suspended from the 
Party. The ANC had established that Sifiso Nkabinde was an apartheid spy and had been 
linked to the assassination of key leaders of the ANC and Communist Party in 
Pietermaritzburg and Natal more broadly.190 However, Gwala had a blind spot about Sifiso 
Nkabinde, despite warnings from his comrades. This created distance between Gwala and a 
number of senior members of the ANC and the Communist Party as they felt in danger of 
being killed by Nkabinde and his collaborators. It was in this context that the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party, of which Gwala was a member, decided to suspend him 
for six months in 1994, and which he accepted. Nevertheless, as the media was not privy to 
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the underlying factors that had led to Gwala’s suspension, it opted to concoct malicious 
reports that he had been suspended because of his militant views and stance on violence.191  
After South Africa’s first democratic elections on 27 April 1994, Gwala became a member of 
the provincial legislature in KwaZulu-Natal and served as a chief whip of the ANC. 
Intelligence reports indicated that Gwala was disappointed with the ANC leadership in 
KwaZulu-Natal as he claimed it was too passive.192 Gwala’s frustration was that the ANC 
members of the Executive Council (MECs) were not taking the trouble to organise ANC 
meetings and rallies. He was worried that the ANC would not be able to win the impending 
1996 local government elections. Furthermore, intelligence reports suggested that Gwala was 
‘dissatisfied about the ANC leadership figures and the visible cordial relationship between 
the ANC and the National Party.’ Gwala’s concern was that the ANC leadership was 
preoccupied with reconciliation processes and was drifting away from pursuing economic 
redistribution and the land question.193 
Gwala’s deteriorating health and death 
Although medical practitioners at Groote Schuur Hospital and in Natal hospitals indicated 
that Gwala’s disease was progressive, there was still hope that doctors outside South Africa 
might be able cure him.194 It was in this context that in 1989 Gwala went to Britain, East 
Germany and the Soviet Union in search of a cure. However, no medical facility in any of 
these centres was able to be of assistance.195 Lubisi remembered that even when he came 
back to South Africa, he still believed that something could be done. There was a ‘switch 
from Western to Eastern medicine’ as Gwala consulted a practitioner of traditional Chinese 
                                                 
191 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with a person who wished to remain anonymous. 
192 SASSA, declassified intelligence report on Harry Gwala, undated.  
193 SASSA, declassified intelligence report on Harry Gwala, undated.  
194 Mxolisi Dlamuka interview with Cassius Lubisi. 
195 Ruth Lundie interview with Cassius Lubisi. 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/
276 
medicine based in Yeoville, Johannesburg. Initially, the Chinese medical practitioner seemed 
to help, as Gwala was able to control part of his right arm during treatment. However, there 
was no lasting effect.196 By mid-1993 Gwala had lost hope and stopped attending sessions 
with the Chinese doctor. When the Cuban government asked Gwala to come to Havana so 
that medical specialists there could try to assist him, he reluctantly agreed. However, after a 
week, he ‘changed his mind insisting that he was too old and he would not use his arms 
anyway.’197  
By 1993, Gwala was under tremendous political pressure and impending isolation from both 
national and regional leadership of the ANC and the Communist Party.198 In the meantime, 
his personal life was also crumbling as important people in his life had died under mysterious 
circumstances. Such loss made Gwala feel vulnerable. The sudden death of Lulu in June 1992 
had a major impact on Gwala’s life.199 Lulu had been a central figure in Gwala’s political and 
private life and he trusted her opinions. She had been the one responsible for maintaining 
Gwala’s home, controlled access to him, and guarded his privacy. After her death, Gwala 
became vulnerable in his personal life. It was in this context that the media published 
allegations that Gwala was sexually abusing young girls, including Makhosi Khoza.200  
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It was also after Lulu’s death that Sifiso Nkabinde, a Richmond ANC leader, befriended 
Gwala. Gwala had been drawn to Nkabinde’s militant charisma and saw him as a potential 
ally.201 Nkabinde quickly rose to the leadership of the ANC regional secretariat and became 
very close to Gwala. By late 1993 it had become apparent that Nkabinde was a state 
collaborator. The death of Gwala’s close confidante and trusted personal driver Thabo Nettie 
was another event that had a severe impact on Gwala. Nettie was mysteriously shot dead 
while outside a food store in the Pietermaritzburg city centre. It was possible that this 
sequence of events had such a cumulative impact on Gwala’s persona that ‘he started to give 
up’ and his health deteriorated increasingly.’202 
Although by early 1995 Gwala’s health had weakened, it was the death of Sibusiso 
Mavimbela, affectionately known as Ngwenya, that shattered his life. Mavimbela, a former 
MK member, had worked in the ANC security department in Pietermaritzburg after returning 
from exile in 1990, much of this time spent as Gwala’s personal bodyguard.203 Early in June 
1995, Nkabinde lured Mavimbela into becoming part of a cash-in-transit vehicle robbery in 
Howick. He told Mavimbela that ‘cash in transit security [officers] were part of the scheme’ 
thus there was no danger to their lives.204 When Mavimbela approached the vehicle, he was 
shot dead. Gwala had requested that the funeral entourage of Mavimbela pass by his home on 
the way to the cemetery so that he could pay his last respects.205 Lindiwe remembers that 
when Gwala saw Mavimbela in the coffin, the signs of devastation were visible on his face. 
During the evening of that Saturday his life ‘took a turn and was admitted at 
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Pietermaritzburg’s Midlands Medical Centre the following Monday, 12 June.’206 A week 
later, on Tuesday 20 June, Harry Gwala died of heart failure. 
After receiving the news of Gwala’s death, Mandela said that in Gwala’s ‘long struggle with 
progressive paralysis he demonstrated a rare courage and fortitude, KwaZulu-Natal is poorer 
without this senior leader.’207 The editor of The Natal Mercury said that ‘with Gwala’s 
passing, the lion will roar no more and the unguarded poor will need a new defender.’ This 
indicated an understanding of Gwala’s importance in politics during the 1990s.  
The death of Gwala was reported in local, national and international newspapers. During the 
week of his death, obituaries became a contestation to redefine, re-arrange and re-interpret 
Gwala’s life and his contribution to the evolution of political thought. On 21 June, M. W. 
Moosa, a member of the National Council of Provinces of Parliament, proposed a motion to 
acknowledge the death of Gwala. This was adopted by all members who stood for a minute to 
pay their respects to Gwala.208 The six memorial services held in KwaZulu-Natal, the funeral 
service in Pietermaritzburg, and the burial service in Swayimane became exhibitions of 
politics, power and militancy.209  
On the eve of Gwala’s funeral, Blade Nzimande predicted that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, established in 1994 to investigate cases of gross human rights violations, would 
reveal the truth of what really went on in Natal and Zululand.210 Nzimande asserted that he 
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was pleased that before Gwala died they had discussed the matter. Nevertheless, the TRC in 
an uninformed way found as follows:  
Mr Harry Gwala, now deceased, functioned as a self-styled ANC warlord 
in the Greater Pietermaritzburg area, and that he established Self-Defence 
Units in the area under his control. Gwala’s policies and public utterances 
actively facilitated a climate in which gross human rights violations could 
take place. The Commission finds that in calling for the killing of persons 
opposed to the ANC, Gwala incited his supporters to commit gross 
violations of human rights, including killing, attempted killing, severe ill-
treatment and arson, for which he is held accountable. The ANC 
consistently failed to reproach, discipline or expel Gwala from its ranks, 
and thereby encouraged a climate to impunity within which Gwala 
continued to operate.211 
Robert Haswell contested the findings of the TRC, arguing that:  
Gwala protected the people of Edendale. He defended the people Edendale 
and elsewhere in Natal against the vicious attacks by Inkatha’s amabutho 
(militias). Had it not been for Gwala’s defence, the ANC would have been 
wiped out of Natal.212 
Haswell’s articulation indicates the necessity for balanced political analysis of Gwala’s role 
in the context of violence that prevailed in Pietermaritzburg and Natal more broadly. The 
TRC’s findings failed to locate Gwala within the social and political milieu of violence that 
had degenerated into a low-intensity civil war in Natal and Zululand. For Nzimande, Gwala 
was ‘a man of many qualities, many of them difficult to single out. He lived and died for the 
people.’213 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that material conditions of political violence in Natal and 
KwaZulu, the existence of a leadership vacuum, and a deeper theoretical understanding of 
violence were factors that were responsible for a shift in Gwala’s political approach. These 
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conditions lay behind Gwala’s turn to a militant, protective and defensive stance towards 
attacks from Inkatha on ANC supporters. In the evolution of Gwala’s political consciousness, 
he was often confronted by contradictions between initiatives for a peaceful settlement, 
which he supported, and the violent conditions in Pietermaritzburg which did not permit 
people to embark on such initiatives. Gwala epitomised how the art of defensive violence and 
the art of peace could coexist in one individual. Gwala’s politics never embraced offensive 
violence.  
The early 1990s were characterised by disenchantment between Gwala on the one hand and 
the leadership of both the ANC and the Communist Party on the other. In contrast to the 
national leadership, Gwala’s political choices were based on his personal experience of 
violence and displacement, and his political approach that was based on the principles of 
economic freedom and land redistribution. Because of these beliefs Gwala engaged critically 
with the ANC’s mandate on negotiations and how sunset clauses had potential to dislodge 
one of the crucial pillars of the ANC’s struggle, the land question. The debates on Slovo’s 
proposals illustrated Gwala’s desire to dismantle the political compact that disabled the ANC 
from pursuing the project of land redistribution and economic transformation.  
This chapter has shown how the apartheid government used its apparatus to reconstruct 
Gwala’s identity as a warlord who was dangerous to the state as well as to his fellow 
comrades. This was in large measures because of fear of Gwala’s political influence. Sifiso 
Nkabinde was part of the apparatus that sought to disconnect Gwala, by firstly planning to 
assassinate him, and later by implicating Gwala in a plot to assassinate key leaders of the 
ANC and Communist Party.  
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Gwala chose to oppose sunset clauses and peace unaccompanied by an end to IFP violence 
and destabilisation. In so doing, Gwala carried out the central defying feature of his political 
life right until the end. This was the effort to be connected to the struggles of the people and 
for the people to drive the political direction of the movement. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since Gwala’s passing in 1995, South Africa has been battling to define and settle his 
afterlife. His legacy of intellectualism, political activism, nonracialism and connectedness has 
been negotiated, mediated and reshaped by the state in order to fit its political agenda. But the 
complexity of Gwala’s life history has not made it easier to fit his legacy into a teleological 
biographical system of memorialisation and a dominant state historical narrative. Gwala’s life 
has been made to fit that of an exemplary life of service and a tool to understand notions of 
citizenship as well as historical and political inquiry.  
Since the transition to democracy, South Africa has been battling to come into terms with its 
history, particularly to undo the legacy of racial discrimination, spatial apartheid, and 
dispossession. The process of writing new histories has highlighted the ANC’s involvement 
in the liberation struggle, resulting in the exclusion of the role of other liberation movements 
and other modes of resistance that predated organised nationalism before 1912. In addition, it 
has also focused on celebrating key individuals to the exclusion of the broad mass of people 
who also played a pivotal role in the liberation struggle, leading to history seen as the stories 
of great men (and women). The post-1994 historical enterprise largely took the form of the 
imposition of an official narrative that often expressed a nationalistic view and undermined 
contributions made to national histories by people and political formations acting at the local 
level, especially in areas outside the major metropolitan cities. The focus has been on 
(re)constructing the history of the liberation struggle as homogenous, and incremented in 
teleological and celebratory histories that defined the story of South Africa. Little space was 
created to document histories of robust intellectual debate and to study contradictions within 
and between the liberation movements. It is because of such narratives that figures such as 
Harry Gwala have fell through the cracks of post-1994 South African historiography, or were 
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relegated to anecdotal mentions in the stories of others. The minimal presence that has been 
accorded to Gwala’s political life was, in part, a result of desperate political manoeuvring 
shortly before elections and served as a tool of political affirmation by those whose struggle 
credentials have been put under scrutiny.  
This dissertation was written at a time when debates about the need for accelerated restorative 
and economic justice for the African people, and for victims of the crime of apartheid, were 
re-emerging. New political paths within the legislative and political landscape were being 
considered. The meanings of the democratic state and the extent to which the previously 
oppressed and disposed were able to regain their rights and dignity were being scrutinised. 
The extent to which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa could be said to stifle 
economic and land redistribution was being debated with some questioning Joe Slovo’s 
proposals during the CODESA process that led to the negotiated settlement and that paved 
the way for South Africa to become a democracy. These debates invoked Gwala’s responses 
to Slovo published in African Communist in September 1992 and the political discussion it 
stimulated within the ranks of the ANC and the Communist Party.1   
Gwala argued that the struggle for the liberation of South Africa, as envisaged by the ANC, 
was based on meaningfully addressing the land question, and that the proposed inclusion of a 
clause in the Constitution that protected property rights would limit the state’s ability to 
redistribute land. Gwala emphasised that if the land question was left unresolved, nothing 
would be solved. Thus the liberation project has remained unfinished. Gwala questioned the 
need to make the writing of the Constitution a higher priority than economic redistribution. 
Gwala also argued that people living in deplorable conditions of poverty had put their trust in 
the ANC because it had promised them that it would provide employment, houses and access 
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to the economy. He proposed that the negotiating team should first develop a conceptual 
framework for economic redistribution, after which the Constitution could be written. 
Gwala’s strong views led to acrimonious relations between him and those supporting Slovo’s 
proposal. Nevertheless, Gwala’s warnings have come back to haunt South Africa. Less than 
10% of land claims have been successfully settled and there has been a growing outcry about 
the law not permitting claims for land that was taken before the passage of the Land Act in 
1913.  
As the history of South Africa is being rewritten, there has been a tendency to overlook 
contentious aspects that might undermine the ANC’s image. Among these is the involvement 
of the ANC in the smuggling of arms into Natal and KwaZulu during the early 1990s. Gwala, 
as a leader of the ANC in a region that was worst affected by violence, facilitated the 
purchase of arms and their distribution to key personnel, mainly trained MK members who 
had been deployed in the Natal Midlands. This biography of Gwala enables readers to 
understand that this was necessary to defend people against Inkatha’s aggression.  
The unprecedented crisis in the mid-2010’s in the Tripartite Alliance - the political pact 
between COSATU, the ANC and the Communist Party - was, in part, a signal that these 
partners had not been able to establish collective grassroots-based identities. This crisis was 
an indication of an absence of a connector whose life was an embodiment of various 
identities. Throughout his political life Gwala became a connector between disjointed sectors 
of struggle and disaggregated organisations in South Africa. As a deputy provincial president 
of the Natal branch of the ANC Youth League in the late 1940s, he became a key agent in 
ensuring that the views of communists and trade unions were clearly represented and 
articulated within ANC structures. He also supported the Youth League to become a 
vanguard of the socialist agenda.  
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In addition, Gwala succeeded in translating rural, urban and migrant experiences into a 
political platform that became the basis for harnessing of political consciousness and a bridge 
to unite diverse identities that coexisted in Pietermaritzburg and greater Natal Midlands. 
When the liberation movements were unbanned in 1990, it was Gwala who played a pivotal 
role in establishing ANC branches throughout Natal and Zululand, thus reconnecting the 
ANC with its grassroots constituencies. Gwala’s struggle entailed the entanglement of class, 
nationalism and politics. In 1992, he was awarded the highest ANC honour: Isithwalandwe-
Seaparankoe. He was also made an honorary life president of the National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa.   
Through this dissertation, I have sought to produce a historical narrative that examines the 
individual, the nature of class formation and political movements in the greater 
Pietermaritzburg area. Through analytical biographical theory, I have argued that Harry 
Gwala was a pragmatic leader who reacted proactively to societal challenges and class 
struggles in different ways. Gwala’s dynamism and his ability to remain rooted in the masses 
enabled him to become strongly influential in South African society. This biography has 
extended Ciraj Rassool’s understanding of biography as reciprocal construction through 
which relations between individuals and society are produced. Through telling Gwala’s life 
story, this dissertation has interrogated the construction of meanings and how the state 
apparatus forged political identities for its own political ends that remain entrenched and 
associated with specific individuals, even in the post-apartheid period.  
During the course of writing this dissertation there has been growing public interest in Gwala. 
In addition to being commemorated in the naming of streets, informal settlements, a stadium, 
and a school in Cape Town, Sisonke District Municipality was renamed in his honour. A 
number of opinion articles in newspapers written about Gwala have focused mainly on his 
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role during the 1990s, thus perpetuating a view of Gwala that has become a stereotype of a 
specific period in his life and the politics of South Africa, at a time when there was a low-
intensity war in Natal and KwaZulu. This biography clearly identifies Gwala as an important 
member of a group of leaders who played a pivotal role in the political developments in 
Pietermaritzburg between the 1940s and the 1990s. This close examination of Gwala’s life 
provides an opportunity for readers to grasp how class unity can transcend racial division.  
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